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PROMETHEUS RE-BOUND: How ADOPTION OF THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL ON CLIMATE CHANGE WOULD DEVASTATE THE
WESTERN U.S. COAL INDUSTRY

MICHAEL F. DUFFY*
As it approaches the 21s" century, the new millennium, and all that, the U.S.
coal industry does not lack for metaphorical models drawn from Greek mythology. Confronted on all sides by acronymed ambuscaders-EPA, IRS, OSM,
BLM, MSHA and others-the coal industry might well identify with Hercules in
his battle with Hydra, the nine-headed monster capable of growing two new
heads for each one the Titan was able to lop off. Sisyphus and his uncooperative
boulder provide an apt analogy for the industry's frustration with trying to convince the average American that energy doesn't originate in a wall outlet, that,
in fact, over 50% of this nation's electrical energy originates in a coal mine.'
In light of the current debate on global climate change and its implications
for the future of the coal industry, however, the myth of Prometheus provides a
most compelling metaphor. Prometheus, of course, was the Titan who stole fire
from heaven and brought it down to earth, much to the displeasure of Zeus. For
his audacity the Titan was exiled to Scythia where he was chained to an outcrop
on Mount Caucasus. Each day a vulture would feed on his liver; each night the
liver would rejuvenate itself.
There is more to the myth of Prometheus than this mere outline of the facts
conveys. For example, the name "Prometheus" means "foresight," a virtuous
trait that explains the Titan's motive in stealing fire from the gods in the first
place. Prometheus and his brother, Epimetheus, were given the task of creating
man and the animals:
Epimetheus accordingly proceeded to bestow upon the different animals the various gifts of courage, strength, swiftness, sagacity; wings to
one, claws to another, a shelly covering to a third, etc. But when man
came to be provided for, who was to be superior to all other animals,
Epimetheus had been so prodigal of his resources that he had nothing
left to bestow upon him. In his perplexity he resorted to his brother
Prometheus, who, with the aid of Minerva, went up to heaven, and
lighted his torch at the chariot of the sun, and brought fire down to
man. With this gift man was more than a match for all other animals
Prometheus' foresight lay in what he knew the gift of fire, i.e., energy,
would provide for mankind:

Deputy General Counsel, the National Mining Association.
1. Not long ago at a Washington, D.C. reception, an apparently well-educated gentleman was
heard to declare that coal was a primitive, outmoded and irrelevant source of energy. It was his
opinion that the U.S. ought to embark on a crash program to convert from coal to a cleaner fuel such
as "electricity."
2.

THOMAS BULLFINCH, BULLFINCH'S MYTHOLOGY 13 (1979).
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It enabled him to make ... tools with which to cultivate the earth; to
warm his dwelling, so as to be comparatively independent of climate;
and finally to introduce the arts and to coin money, the means of trade
and commerce.'
In Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound, the Titan, himself, describes the impact of
his action on mankind:
[T]hey, before as babes,
By me were roused to reason, taught to think.
In one short word, then, learn the truth condensed,
All arts of mortals from Prometheus spring.'
If, as is chemically the case, coal is nothing more than stored solar energy,
i.e., the "fire" that Prometheus appropriated from the gods in order to make
civilization possible, the identification of the coal industry with the mythical
Titan is most appropriate. As the title of this Article suggests, however, the coal
industry may be facing the same fate as Prometheus.
In December of 1997, over 160 countries, including the United States, negotiated the Kyoto Protocol, a framework for establishing mandatory limits on
the emission of greenhouse gases by developed nations. By the terms of the
Protocol, some of those nations, designated Annex B countries,6 would be required to meet specified greenhouse gas emission levels relative to the levels
they emitted in 1990.! For example, the United States would be required to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to a level 7% below 1990 levels.! Such reductions would have to be achieved between the years 2008 and 2012 with additional reductions thereafter subject to further negotiation.!
Because carbon emissions account for 83% of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions,' and since more than 98% of all U.S. carbon emissions can be traced to

3. Id.
4. Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, in NINE GREEK DRAMAS 166, 182-84 (Charles W. Eliot
ed., 1937).
5. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(Mar. 18, 1998) <http://www.unfccc.de/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf> [hereinafter Protocol].
6. Countries listed in Annex B include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belarus, Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Community, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States. United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (last modified Oct. 12, 1999)
<http://www.unfccc.de/resource/conv/index.html> (hereinafter Framework). Turkey and Belarus
declined to pledge reductions in their emissions pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol. OFFICE OF
INTEGRATED ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, IMPACTS OF THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL ON U.S. ENERGY MARKETS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY xi n.2 (1998) [hereinafter EIA
IMPACT STUDY].

7.
8.
9.
10.

See Protocol, supra note 5, at art. 3.
See Protocol, supra note 5, at Annex B.
See Protocol, supra note 5, at art. 3.
See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xii.
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the burning of fossil fuels," the production of energy from coal will undoubtedly
be a principle focus of emissions reduction efforts should the United States seek
to implement the dictates of the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed, both governmental and
private organizations have attempted to estimate the economic impact of the
Kyoto Protocol on energy production and fuel selection over the next two decades with the coal industry a primary focus of these studies.
This article will focus on the projected impact of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S.
coal production in general and western U.S. coal production in particular assuming, of course, that the U.S. Senate elects to ratify the Protocol (to date, the
Clinton Administration did not submitted the Protocol for ratification, and, as
will be noted below, the Senate has expressed profound reservations with respect to the Protocol in its current form). The discussion will begin with a brief
history of the western coal industry, followed by a summary of the evolution of
the global warming theory and its acceptance by the international political
community, as evidenced by the development of the Kyoto Protocol. That will
be followed by an overview of various economic predictions based on the assumption of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The consequential implications for the future use of coal are then discussed. Lastly, the paper will attempt to set forth the issues faced by American decision makers in weighing the
pros and cons of adopting the Kyoto Protocol or any other international attempt
to address the matter of global climate change.
I. THE RISE OF WESTERN COAL
The first historical record referring to coal in the New World is a map of
what is now northern Illinois charted in 1673-1674 by Louis Joliet and depicting
the presence of "charbon de terra."' 2 Following the discovery of coal near Richmond, Virginia in 1701, an 18"h century map of the upper Potomac River refers
to several "cole mines" along the current West Virginia-Maryland border." It is
well established, however, that Native Americans utilized coal for pottery firing
long before the settlers arrived."
The first recorded coal use west of the Mississippi was in 1804 when the
Lewis and Clark expedition stopped in present-day North Dakota to construct a
blacksmith's forge fueled by lignite.'" Contemporaneously, coal was used to heat
a Spanish fur trader's outpost in what is now Montana."' In 1854, the Territorial
Legislature of Utah offered a $1,000 reward to anyone who could discover a
coal supply within 40 miles of Salt Lake City," while by the early 1860's coal
mined near Denver was used to heat that city's homes and businesses." The true

11. See Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Emissions of
Greenhouse Gases in the United States 1997 15 (1998) [hereinafter EIA Emissions Report].
12. See Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Coal
Data: A Reference 1 (1995).
13. See id.
14. See Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Dept. of Energy, State Coal
Profiles I(1994) [hereinafter EIA State Coal Profiles].
15. See id. at 67.
16. See id. at 59.
17. Seeid. at91.
18. See id. at 23.
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spur to the development of the western U.S. coal industry, however, was the
establishment, expansion and maintenance of the transcontinental railway system.
Beginning in 1835, Congress began granting rights of way to railroads
through public lands, a logical outgrowth of fights of way granted for canals in
the earlier years of the republic." In 1850, Stephen A. Douglas, of LincolnDouglas debate fame, championed land grants beyond traditional rights of way
as an added incentive to the construction of railroads on public lands." Those
land grants provided readily available resources such as timber and stone for the
construction of the rail lines themselves.
The opening of the west as an adjunct to railway development, however,
came to full fruition with the passage of two Pacific Railroad Acts. The Act of
1862" incorporated the Union Pacific Railroad while the Act of 1864" established the Northern Pacific Railroad. 3 In addition to providing 400 foot wide
fights of way to the railroads, the statutes also provided land grants of up to 20
sections of land" for every mile of railway constructed from Omaha to
Missouri."5 In addition, Congress withdrew up to 25 miles of land on either side
of the rights of way and prohibited entry for settlement or homesteading except
for those claims already established.6
In all, Congress granted nearly 94 million acres of public lands to the railroads themselves and nearly an additional 224 million acres to states for development of lands served by railroad expansion.2 Of the approximately 320 million acres of total land grants, 30% or 97 million acres were located in those
western states now chiefly associated with coal mining: Arizona (18.3 million
acres); Colorado (8.2 million acres); Montana (20.7 million acres); New Mexico
(16.2 million acres); North Dakota (13.9 million acres); Utah (9.7 million acres);
and Wyoming (10.1 million acres)."
A condition was placed upon the railroad land grants in the initial 1862 Act,
i.e., that "all mineral lands shall be excepted from the operation of this act."'
That exception was modified in the 1864 Act, however, when Congress provided that the term "mineral lands" was not intended to include coal and iron
lands.' Thus, Congress expressed its intent that coal and iron, like stone and

19.

See PAUL W. GATES, PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW

DEVELOPMENT 357 (1968).
20. See id.
21. Pacific Railroad Act of 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489 (1862).
22. Pacific Railroad Act of 1864, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365 (1864).
23. Subsequent legislation established the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad (Act of July 27, 1866,
ch. 278, 14 Stat. 292 (1866)), and the Texas Pacific Railroad (Act of March 8, 1871, ch. 122, 16 Stat.
573 (1871)).
24. A section measures 640 acres.
25. See GATES, supra note 19, at 364.
26. See GATES, supra note 19, at 364.
27. See GATES, supra note 19, at 385.
28. See GATES, supra note 19, at 385. For purposes of this Article, discussion of "western
coal" will be confined to these seven states.
29. Pacific Railroad Act of 1862, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 489, 492 (1862).
30. See Pacific Railroad Act of 1864, ch. 217, § 3, 13 Stat. 365, 367-68 (1864).
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timber in the earlier enactments, were meant to be utilized in the construction,
expansion, and maintenance of the railway system. That intent was ratified in
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Soderberg,3' when the Supreme Court acknowledged that both coal and iron were necessary materials to the construction and
operation of the railroads?2
Contemporaneous to the passage of the initial railroad acts, Congress began
addressing the sale of federal coal lands in 1864. As part of the Townsite Act of
1864, Congress provided for the public sale of coal lands pursuant to Presidential order." Such lands were to be sold in tracts of "suitable legal subdivisions"
for a minimum of $20 per acre.' Thereafter, Congress amended the 1864 Act by
allowing entry onto federal lands by those persons "in the business of bona fide
actual coal-mining" for purposes of purchasing tracts of up to 160 acres."
The size of acquirable tracts was increased in 1873 with the passage of the
Coal Lands Act, which provided that associations of four or more persons could
qualify to purchase up to 640 acres of federal coal land if they could show that
they had expended at least $5,000 in the development and improvement of the
coal mine or mines situated on the land." The 1873 Act further provided that
each person or association was entitled to acquire only one tract, and that a
minimum price of $20 per acre be set for lands within 15 miles of an existing
railroad and $10 per acre for lands beyond the 15 mile swath."
Other than the Act for the Protection of the Lives of Miners in the Territories,' which set rudimentary mine safety standards and provided for a coal mine
inspector in each Territory, no further significant legislation affecting coal mines
was passed until the first decade of this century when Congress adopted the Coal
Land Acts of 1909" and 1910.' Those Acts were passed as a result of President
Roosevelt's decision to withdraw federal lands that, in the judgment of the Director of the Geological Survey, contained exploitable coal deposits." From mid
to late 1906, the Acting Secretary of the Interior carried out Roosevelt's policy

31. 188 U.S. 526 (1903).
32. Soderberg, 188 U.S. at 529-30. Coal, of course, was necessary to the forging of steel to
produce rails as well as a fuel for steam-powered locomotives. Thus, for example, the Union Pacific
Railroad developed eight mines in Wyoming from 1869 to 1888, and by 1885 that railroad company
owned or controlled most of the coal production in Colorado. Thomas E. Root, Railroad Land
Grants from Canals to Transcontinentals 1987 A.B.A. NATL. RESOURCES SEC., MONOGRAPH
SERIES No.4 70-71.
33. See Pacific Railroad Act of 1864, ch. 205, 13 Stat. 343 (1864).
34. Id.
35. See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 107, 13 Stat. 529 (1865).
36. See Act to Provide for the Sale of the Lands of the United States Containing Coal, ch. 279,
17 Stat. 607 (1873), superseded by Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (1920).
37. See id.
38. Seech. 564,26 Stat. 1104(1891).
39. See 30 U.S.C. § 81(1994).
40. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 83-85 (1994).
41. See GATES, supra note 19, at 726. Roosevelt's motivation for the withdrawals is believed
to have been a growing concern that the provisions of the earlier Coal Lands Acts limiting entries
upon coal lands to one per person or one per association were being circumvented through the use of
dummy entries, strawmen, or by the acquisition of coal lands under the pretense of acquiring them
pursuant to other federal land grant programs such as the various agricultural and homesteading acts.
GATES, supra note 19, at 726.
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by issuing orders withdrawing approximately 66 million acres from coal development.'2
Congress countered the withdrawals by allowing for entry upon coal lands
for agricultural and homesteading purposes, but reserved to the U.S. government
the fight to prospect, mine, and remove the coal." Finally, in 1920 Congress
adopted a comprehensive approach to the development of coal and other resources such as oil, gas, and several nonmetallic minerals, when it passed the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920." That Act provided that coal fights on federal
lands would be obtainable only through a leasing system." If exploitable coal
reserves were known to exist on a federal parcel, fights to mine the coal would
be made subject to competitive bids." If, on the basis of prospecting activity on a
federal parcel, a lease applicant was able to demonstrate the presence of previously undiscovered coal reserves in commercial quantities, that lease applicant
would be given a preferential right to the coal."
Once the railroads provided a reliable market for readily accessible coal, and
federal acquisition procedures were implemented, coal production in the western
states grew rapidly from the late 1800's into the early decades of this century."
The energy needs of the country during World War I provided an additional spur
to production."
A combination of factors, including oil and gas development in the Southwest and Wyoming, the rise of hydroelectric power in the Northwest, and, of
course, the devastating effects of the Great Depression resulted in a sharp decline in coal production in the 1920's and 1930's.' The demands of World War II
sparked a slight resurgence in western production in the first half of the 1940's,
but only Utah, at about 7 million short tons produced annually during the
1940's, appreciably exceeded the levels it had reached in the 1920's." In the
aggregate, the production for the seven states addressed here totaled only about

42. GATES, supra note 19, at 726.
43. See 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1994).
44. See ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1994)).
45. See id. at § 2, 41 Stat. at 438-39; 30 U.S.C. §184(a).
46. See id. at § 2; 41 Stat. at 438; 30 U.S.C.§ 201(a), repealed by scattered sections of 30
U.S.C. §§ 181-352 (1994), subject to valid existing rights.
47. Id.
48. See
DEPT.
OF
ENERGY,
State Coal
Profiles
(visited
Oct.
15,
1999)
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coallstatepro/imagemap/usaimagemap.htm>[hereinafter EIA State
Coal Profiles Website].
49. During that period Colorado led coal production in the western states producing 12 million
short tons by 1920. Wyoming was a close second producing more than 9 million short tons during
World War I. Utah, Montana, and New Mexico, respectively, reached 6 million, 5 million, and 4
million short tons, by 1920, while North Dakota reached production levels of I million short tons of
lignite during the same period. While Arizona coal utilization dates back to pre-Columbian times, its
production levels until the 1970's are negligible in comparison with its fellow western states. EIA
STATE COAL PROFILES, supra note 14, at 11, 23, 59, 63, 67, 87, 91, 107. See also EIA State Coal
Profiles Website, supra note 48 (illustrating through state-by-state graphs the fluctuations in

production).
50.
5I.

See EIA STATE COAL PROFILES, supra note 14, at 23, 59, 67, 91.
See EIA STATE COAL PROFILES, supra note 14, at 91.
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28 million short tons in 1947.2 Thereafter, the western coal industry experienced
a further precipitous decline in production during the 1950's and early 1960's
owing to the railroads' replacement of coal-fired steam locomotives with dieselpowered engines."
Two momentous events in the early 1970's fostered the boom in western
coal production that continues to this day: the passage of the Clean Air Act" in
1970 and the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974. The Clean Air Act mandated that
stationary sources, such as electricity generating power plants, reduce their
emissions of identified pollutants including sulfur oxides." Given the choice
between installing scrubbers and shifting to lower sulfur fuel, electric utilities
actively sought new fuel sources in the West where the sulfur content of the
coal, on the whole, was markedly lower than the sulfur content found in the
traditional coal fields of the Midwest and Appalachia.'
The Arab oil embargo spurred Congress to enact legislation aimed at reducing America's reliance on foreign and, in many cases, unpredictable supply lines
for its ever-expanding energy needs. Through passage of the Energy Supply and
Environmental Coordination Act of 1974," and the Powerplant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act of 1978," Congress went on record as supporting a switch from oil
and natural gas to coal as the preferred fuel for electricity generation. Given the
circumstances of international turmoil and domestic agitation for stricter environmental controls, the slumping fortunes of western coal were ripe for rejuvenation."
By the mid-1990's the sleeping giant had indeed awakened. In 1997, the
combined tonnages of bituminous, subbituminous, and lignite coal in the states
of Arizona, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota. Utah, and Wyoming equaled 446 million short tons or about half of all U.S. production.' Wyoming alone accounted for more than a quarter of U.S. production, at 282 million
tons." Thus, in a little more than a century the western coal industry increased its

52. See EIA State Coal Profiles Website, supra note 48.
53. See EIA STATE COAL PROFILES, supra note 14, at 59, 91.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
55. See id. § 7403(g)(1).
56. See EIA STATE COAL PROFILES, supra note 14, at 23, 27, 31, 59.
57. See Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 2, 88 Stat. 246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 791-98 (1994)).
58. Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289, repealed in part by Act of May 21, 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-42, 101 Stat. 310 (1987).
59. One commentator noted the following:
For more than a century, western coal was the prisoner of geography. It was
present in enormous abundance, but lay too far from major markets. Railroads
mined a moderate amount for their own use, but that market died with the steam
locomotive. Relatively small amounts were produced for western steel mills and
other industrial use.
Finally the sleeping giant of western coal is beginning to awaken. Western coal is
low in sulfur content, and that automatically gives it new value in the eyes of
midwestern utilities.
E.B. Leisenring, Jr., Western Coal-The Sleeping Giant, in Nineteenth Annual Proceedings of the
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 1,6-7 (1974).
60. See Dept. of Energy, Coal Production by State, (visited Nov. 19, 1999)
<http:/lwww.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/html/tI pOlp .html>.
61. See id.
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yearly output by 430 million tons. " Even more astounding, the recoverable reserves at currently producing mines in those states (excluding Arizona) now
stand at more than 11 billion short tons.63

II. "GLOBAL WARMING" AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The Swedish Nobelist Svante August Arrhenius (1859-1927) is credited
with the first articulation of the global warming theory in an Article entitled On
the Influence of CarbonicAcid in the Air Upon the Temperature of the Ground,
in which he argued that variations in the earth's temperature were owing to increases or decreases in the quantity of carbon dioxide (then, "carbonic acid") in
the atmosphere.' Arrhenius' speculations on the absorptive qualities of atmospheric gases led to the conclusion by others that the earth is not warmed solely
by the radiant energy of the sun; rather, the radiant energy reflected back by the
earth's surface is absorbed by atmospheric gases which trap heat in the lower
atmosphere to create the so-called greenhouse effect.6
Were it not for the naturally occurring greenhouse effect, scientists speculate
that the average temperature of the Earth's surface would be minus 19 degrees
Celsius as opposed to actual average temperature of plus 15 degrees Celsius.'
The gases most responsible for capturing heat to create the greenhouse effect
are: water vapor (H 2 0), carbon dioxide (CO2 ), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide
(NO), and a number of man-made chemicals called halocarbons, which include
chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) and hydro chlorofluorocarbons (HCFC's).'7

62. See EIA State Coal Profiles Website, supra note 48.
63. See Energy Info. Admin., Dept. of Energy, Recoverable Coal Reserves at Producing
Mines by State (visited Nov. 19, 1999) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/cla/html/
t25pOpl.html>.
64. Svante August Arrhenius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the
Temperatureof the Ground, PHILOSOPHICAL MAG. 237 (1896), reprinted at the Nobel Prize Internet
Archive (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <www.almaz.com/nobel/chemistry/1903a.html> with link to
excerpted text located at <http://maple.lemoyne.edu/-guinta/Arrhenius.html>. The original article

was an extract from a paper presented by Arrhenius to the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences on
Dec. 11, 1895.
65. See EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 1. The greenhouse effect has been
explained as follows:

[Greenhouse gases] are relatively transparent to incoming shortwave radiation,
but are relatively opaque to outgoing longwave radiation. The latter radiation,

which would otherwise escape to space, is trapped

. . .

within the lower levels of

the atmosphere. The subsequent re-radiation of some of the energy back to the
Earth maintains higher surface temperatures than would occur if the gases were

absent.
EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 150.
66. See EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 1-2.
67. See EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-5. Water vapor's prevalence in the
atmosphere (owing to the continuous process of evaporation condensation and precipitation) dwarfs
that of the other greenhouse gases; it accounts for 1% of the atmosphere while carbon dioxide
constitutes less than 0.04 percent. Id. at 2. Methane, in turn, accounts for 0.005 percent of the
atmosphere, while nitrous oxide comprises 0.0009 percent. Id. at 1 tbl. 1. The halocarbons, measured
in parts per trillion versus parts per million for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, have
been addressed elsewhere by the international community because of their potentially adverse effect
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It is important to keep in mind that the vast percentage of so-called greenhouse gases occurs naturally. For example, of the 157.5 billion metric tons' of
carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere in 1992, 150 billion metric tons
were naturally produced by releases from the oceans (90 billion metric tons),
aerobic decay of vegetation (30 billion metric tons), and plant and animal respiration (30 billion metric tons)." Accordingly, carbon dioxide attributed to human
activity, or anthropogenic carbon dioxide, now amounts to about 4.5% of the
total carbon dioxide released on an annual basis."
The theory of global warming postulates that naturally occurring greenhouse
gases are maintained in a state of equilibrium by their being absorbed and removed from the atmosphere." For instance, in the carbon-cycle, carbon dioxide
is absorbed by plants and through the process of photosynthesis is converted into
oxygen, which is released into the atmosphere, and carbon, which becomes part
of the plants' biomass." According to one group of experts, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)," the increased production of anthropogenic carbon dioxide since the dawn of the industrial age has upset the natural
equilibrium of the carbon cycle."
The IPCC was established in 1988 by the WMO and UNEP to assess the
scientific, technical, and socio-economic issues associated with climate change."
Thereafter, in 1990, the United Nations formed the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, the work of
which culminated in the issuance of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change (FCCC) adopted in May of 1992 and presented for signature in Rio de
Janeiro in June of that year." The United States was among the 160 nations to
sign the agreement referred to as the Rio Treaty, which called for voluntary
efforts to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide to 1990 levels by the year 2000."

on the ozone layer. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
26 I.L.M. 1541, 1551.
68. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to tons are to metric tons. One metric ton is
equal to 1.102 short tons. EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11,at 4 n.5.
69. See id. at 2 tbl. 2, 4.
70. The anthropogenic shares of methane and nitrous oxide are more difficult to determine. In
a document released in 1995, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an
international body commissioned by the United Nations, estimated that total methane naturally
emitted between 1980 and 1990 was within a range of 110-210 million metric tons, while 300-450
million tons could be attributed to human activity. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 92-93 (1996) [hereinafter
IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 19951.
71.
See EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11, at 1-2.
72. See EIA EMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 11,at 4.

73. See text accompanying footnote 75.
74. IPPC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 70, at 59-60. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) has estimated that carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere have increased
25% since the dawn of the industrial age owning to anthropogenic activities such as the use of fossil
fuels for transportation, electricity generation, and heating, as well as to the removal of carbon
dioxide absorbing plants through deforestation. IPPC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 70, at 59.
See also infra note 80 and accompanying text.
75.
76.
77.

See EJA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2.
See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2.
See EIA IMPACT STUDY. supra note 6, at xi.
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Thereafter, the FCCC Committee established a Conference of the Parties
(COP) to begin implementing the Rio Treaty.9 In 1995, the COP issued what is
referred to as the Berlin Mandate, directing Annex B countries to take "appropriate action" to set overall limitation and reduction targets for greenhouse gases
to be implemented in the year 2000 and beyond.79 Meanwhile, the IPCC, in
1995, issued an Assessment Report, which despite its recognition of significant
scientific uncertainties, declared that the "balance of evidence suggests . . . a

discernable human influence on global climate."'" These various activities culminated in the Kyoto Protocol, which established binding emissions targets for
the Annex B countries relative to their 1990 emissions levels." Under the Protocol, the established emissions targets must be reached between 2008 and 2012,
but demonstrable results must be shown by 2005." The target levels are to be
maintained through 2012 and further reductions may be instituted by the COP."
The Protocol does not dictate any particular means of reducing emissions but
does offer options such as the enhancement of carbon sinks" through reforestation and other land use changes, and the encouragement of energy efficiency."5
The Protocol also provides for emissions trading among Annex B countries, and
credits for developed nations that sponsor projects for reducing emissions in
developing nations."
Developed countries are allowed to bank Clean Development Mechanisms
(CDM) credits achieved prior to 2008 for future use, but they cannot borrow
against anticipated allowances." Annex B countries may also join together to
create an umbrella or bubble arrangement whereby they can collectively reach
their aggregate target through trade-offs among themselves."
Despite the range of options, however, there are innumerable uncertainties
as to how the Protocol will actually work. The parties have not yet determined
whether and how to account for emissions credits owing to the enhancement of
carbon sequestration through carbon sinks and other land use initiatives. 9 Likewise, no system exists for establishing emissions credits and overseeing their

78.
79.
80.

See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2.
See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2.
IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supranote 70, at 5.

81.

See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 3.

82. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 3.
83. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xiii.
84. See Framework, supra note 6, at art. 1. "Carbon sinks" refers to vegetation, such as forests
or soil reservoirs that absorb or take up released carbon from another part of the carbon cycle.
85. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 3-4. With respect to the last option, the Protocol
establishes a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) whereby Annex B countries can collect
emissions credits for technology transfers to non-Annex B countries that provide demonstrable and
long-term reductions in emissions. Such activities are to be evaluated and certified through a
mechanism to be developed under the Protocol. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
86. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
87. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
88. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4. For example, the emissions target for the
European Community is 8% below its aggregate 1990 levels, as is the target for each of its members.
Id. By mutual agreement, however, the members could reallocate their respective responsibilities to
meet the umbrella target. Protocol, supra note 5, at art. 4.
89. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
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trading among developed nations. ' Further, no system of sanctions for outright
nonattainment of targets or misrepresenting efforts to achieve attainment has
been developed."
In its current manifestation, the Protocol exempts developing nations from
any legal obligation to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions although they may
"volunteer" to enter the ranks of Annex B countries through amendment of the
Protocol."2 That exemption was crucial to the acceptance of the Protocol by developing nations that argued that the imposition of emissions targets upon them
would stymie their efforts to establish and expand their economies.'3 It should be
noted, however, that among the exempted nations are some of America's formidable or potentially formidable trade competitors, e.g., China, India, Mexico,
and Brazil." Moreover, unrestrained by the dictates of the Protocol, the developing nations will account for an ever-increasing share of global greenhouse gas
emissions." For example, in 1990 the developing nations emitted 25% of global
carbon emissions.' By 2015, that percentage will rise to more than 50% of the
global target anticipated by the Protocol.'7
III.

ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

There is no want of opinion on the impacts of America's implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol. The Clinton Administration released three prominent and
significantly conflicting scenarios: one by the President's Council of Economic
Advisors (CEA);" one by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) within
the Department of Energy;" and a third, also emanating from the Department of
Energy, known as the Five Lab Study." Several private sector studies have also
been issued, five of which have been selected by the EIA in its own study for
purposes of comparison with its projections on economic impact: the WEFA
Study,"' the CRA Study," the MIT Study, 3 the EPRI Study,"' and the DRI
Study.'

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xi.
See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6,at 4.
See EIA IMPACT STUDY,supra note 6,at 4.
See Global Warming: The High Cost of the Kyoto Protocol, National and State Impacts,
WHARTON ECONOMETRICS FORECASTING ASSOCIATES 10 (hereinafter WEFA).
95. See id. at 14.
96. See id. This percentage is a close approximation.
97. See id.
98. Administration Economic Analysis: Meeting the Challenge of Climate Change at a
Reasonable Cost, 148 DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) T-1 (July 31, 1998). The CEA scenario
is also summarized in testimony presented by Dr. Janet Yellen, CEA Chairman, given before the
House Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Energy and Power on March 4,1998.
99. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6.
100. Dept. of Energy, Interlaboratory Working Group on Energy-Efficient and Low-Carbon
Technologies, Scenarios of U.S. Carbon Reductions: Potential Impacts of Energy Technologies by
2010 and Beyond 1.1 (1997).
101. WEFA, supra note 94.
102. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 137. Paul M. Bernstein and W. David Montgomery
of Charles River Associates are acknowledged as contributors to the comparison study. No formal

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:2

The EIA study is, by far, the most comprehensive analysis of the effects of
the Kyoto Protocol and will, therefore, serve as the principle analytical source
for this discussion." The merits and demerits of the global warming theory are
beyond the scope of this Article. So are also the persuasiveness or lack thereof
exhibited by the various economic studies that have been produced in the wake
of the Kyoto Protocol. The purpose of this Article is to lay before the reader the
range of potential impacts thus far identified by the EIA with respect to the use
of coal, including western coal, if this country adopts the Kyoto Protocol as
currently structured. That said, reference to other studies will be made as appropriate.
IV. THE EIA STUDY
At the behest of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science,
the EIA, in October of 1998, issued its study entitled Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets and Economic Activity.' ' The Committee requested that the EIA consider several possible scenarios involving various potential levels of carbon reduction by the United States in response to the Kyoto
Protocol focusing on "U.S. energy use and prices and the economy in the 20082012 time frame," i.e., the time frame within which the Protocol directs the developed nations to reach their initial emissions targets.' '
In preparing its analysis, EIA utilized its National Energy Modeling System
(NEMS), a comprehensive integrated computer model capable of simulating all
elements of energy supply and demand within the context of the nation's macroeconomy.'" The NEMS is used to produce EIA's annual American Energy Outlooks that set forth year-by-year projections for U.S. energy production and
consumption through the year 2020. "' The report includes a projection, called
the "reference case," which plots the energy-use horizon on the assumption that
all existing laws and regulations will be fully implemented, and that no new
relevant laws or regulations will be passed during the period under review."' The
reference case can then serve as a baseline for comparing scenarios that incorporate significant regulatory or policy changes."2

title is given to the CRA Study beyond that acknowledgment. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6,at
137 & n.91.
103. Henry D. Jacoby et al., CO 2 Emissions Limits: Economic Adjustments and the Distribution
of Burdens, 1997 ENERGY J. 31.
104. Alan Manne & Richard Richels, On Stabilizing CO, Concentrations-Cost-Effective
Emission Reduction Strategies, 2 ENVTL. MODELING & ASSESSMENT 251-65 (1997).
105. Standard and Poor's DRI, The Impact of Meeting the Kyoto Protocol on Energy Markets
and the Economy (1998).
106. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6.
107. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6.
108. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at iii.
109. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 6.
110. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 6.
11I. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 8.
112. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 6.
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Against the reference case, EIA posits six scenarios involving different reduction targets for carbon emissions."' The six cases, in reverse order of stringency, are: 1990 + 24% carbon emissions; 1990 + 14% carbon emissions; 1990
+ 9% carbon emissions; 1990 carbon emissions; 1990 - 3% carbon emissions;
and 1990- 7% carbon emissions."'
The EIA study then determines the costs of achieving each target level. This
determination is made by first establishing a "carbon price" and then applying it
to the cost of energy."' EIA defines a "carbon price" as "the marginal cost of
reducing carbon emissions to the specified level or, conversely, the value of
consuming the last metric ton of carbon," and likens it to the price that could be
established through a carbon emissions permit system."' The carbon price in this
case, i.e., the price per ton of carbon emissions, is then applied to each of the
energy fuels at its point of consumption relative to its carbon content."'
In order to arrive at the carbon price for each case, EIA makes certain assumptions, which, while not shared by other analysts, are at least consistent
throughout the various scenarios. For example, EIA assumes that carbon sinks
and other carbon sequestration activities by the U.S. would result in the absorption of 3% of America's carbon emissions."' Second, because the final contours
of an international system for trading carbon emissions permits are too uncertain, EIA assumes the creation of an intra-U.S. trading system for auctioning of
carbon emissions permits, and assumes that the price achieved through that system would be the same as that achieved through an international system."9 Third,
EIA does not assume that the United States would receive credits for technology
transfer programs entered into with developing nations under the CDM provisions of the Protocol."' Lastly, EIA does not assume that new nuclear plants
would come on line but it does assume that all currently operating units would
continue to operate through 2020.'
As for the time frames for achieving the emissions targets, EIA's analysis
conforms to the expectations of the Protocol: demonstrable steps toward compliance by 2005; attainment of the reduction targets between 2008 and 2012; and,
maintenance of the target levels until 2020 or until further reductions are negotiated pursuant to international agreements.' Given those assumptions, the EIA
113. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 10.
114. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 10-11. The study concentrates on three of the six
scenarios, the 1990 + 24% case, the 1990 + 9% case, and the 1990 - 3% case. EIA IMPACT STUDY,
supra note 6, at 11. For comparison purposes, the reference case, i.e.. business as usual with no
mandated reductions, would amount to 1990 + 33% carbon emissions, or 1791 million tons. EIA
IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 10.
115. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 11.
116. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 12.

117. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 11. The higher the carbon content of a given fuel, the
higher the carbon emissions and, in turn, the carbon price. Among its fossil competitors, coal
produces the highest carbon emissions, natural gas the lowest, and oil somewhere in between.
Nuclear power, hydropower, and other renewables produce no carbon emissions and carry no carbon
prices. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 11.
118. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 9.
119.

See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 13.

120.
121.

See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 5.
See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 25.

122.

See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xiii.
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study estimates the carbon price for each case (expressed in 1996 dollars per ton

of carbon emissions) as follows:"'

2010

2020

1990+24%

$67.00

$99.00

1990+14%

129.00

123.00

1990+9%

163.00

141.00

1990

254.00

200.00

1990-3%

294.00

240.00

1990-7%

348.00

305.00

With these carbon prices established, EIA proceeds to analyze their effect on
the marketability of each energy fuel under each scenario.'2 First, the marketability of coal is severely if not fatally eroded because coal combustion produces
more carbon emissions than any of its competitors."' No matter how efficient the
industry becomes in producing, transporting, and utilizing its product, absent a
method for recovering carbon emissions, coal will be saddled with a "carbon
tax" that would overwhelm whatever productivity gains it might achieve over
the next two decades.'
The average delivered price per ton of coal, reflecting the costs of production, transportation, and its "carbon price" for each scenario is shown in the
following chart:

123.
124.
125.
126.

EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xv-xvi tbl. ES1 & tbl. ES2.
See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 12.
See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xvi & xix fig. ES9.
EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xv-xvi.
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Coal Prices to Electricity Generators (1996 Dollars/Short-ton)'"

2005

2010

2020

Reference Case

23.37

22.20

19.56

1990+24%

25.96

57.03

71.95

1990+ 14%

49.51

90.53

85.72

1990+9%

64.24

109.56

95.33

1990

69.51

162.69

129.43

1990-3%

74.07

185.47

156.60

1990 -7%

79.18

214.75

197.61

While the relative prices of other fossil fuels also increase in relation to the
reference case because they, too, must absorb a carbon price add-on, they do not
increase as dramatically as the price of coal owing to their relatively lower carbon content." For example, in the 1990 + 9% case, the average price for delivered coal (base price plus carbon price premium) to electricity generating plants
increases 346 to 368 percent over the reference case in the 2008-2012 period,
while the price of natural gas increases only 64 to 74 percent, and the price of oil
increases only 25 to 29 percent."
Beyond the competitive disadvantage coal would experience vis-a-vis other
fossil fuels, it would suffer in comparison with nuclear power and renewable
fuels as they would not be subject to any carbon price premium. Consequently,
under the 1990 + 9% case, coal's market share in the electricity generating sector falls from nearly 20 quadrillion BTUs to about 5 quadrillion BTUs between
2005 and 2020." Conversely, the 15 quadrillion BTU gap is filled by (in de-

127. See EIA IMPACT STUDY,
ton in 1996 is set at $26.45.
128. See EIA IMPACT STUDY,
129. See EIA IMPACT STUDY,
130. See EIA IMPACT STUDY,

supra note 6, at 202-203 tbl. B 16. The delivered price per short
supra note 6, at 22.
supra note 6, at 22.
supra note 6, at 29 fig. 22.
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scending order of market share) natural gas, nuclear power, hydroelectric power,
renewables, and oil."'
As coal's competitiveness declines, its annual production also declines, as
shown in this chart:
U.S. Coal Production (in Millions of Tons)...

2005

2010

2020

Reference Case

1,242

1,287

1,376

1990+24%

1,182

1,032

805

1990+14%

1,090

785

538

1990+9%

989

624

405

1990

946

418

207

1990-3%

924

369

172

1990-7%

867

313

144

A consequence of the decline in production will be a steady and substantial
decline in coal mine employment as shown in this chart:

13 1.
132.

See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 29 fig. 22.
See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 202-03 tbl. B 16.
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Coal Mining Jobs'

2005

2010

2020

Reference Case

75,000

68,519

60,000

1990+24%

75,000

58,223

40,000

1990+14%

75,000

50,224

37,500

1990+9%

75,000

42,531

25,000

1990

75,000

32,053

15,000

1990-3%

75,000

29,187

12,500

1990-7%

75,000

25,486

11,000

The EIA analysis treats coal as a heterogeneous commodity and distinguishes among ranks, e.g., bituminous, subbituminous and lignite, by BTU output, or by sulfur dioxide and ash content.'" This treatment makes it somewhat
difficult to extrapolate specific consequences for western coal across the various
scenarios. EIA does, however, speculate that because, for the most part, western
coal must be transported significantly greater distances than its eastern counterpart, it will suffer the disadvantage of having to absorb both its own carbon price
as well as that associated with transportation, i.e., the carbon price of fuel for
diesel locomotives, barges, and trucks."'
Moreover, given the precipitous downturn in demand for coal, EIA anticipates that investment in coal, if there is any, will be in rejuvenating existing
older mines rather than in initiating new ones.' 6 Because most new mining has

133. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 114 tbl. 23, fig. 109. Coal mine employment as
of 1996 is set at 83,462. EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 114 tbl. 23, fig. 109. The figures in
column "2005" and "2020" are close approximations.
134. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 110.
135. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 110-12.
136. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, 22-23.
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been originating in the West, EIA believes that the West will suffer
accordingly."
On the basis of these opinions EIA projects selective consequences specific
to western coal in terms of percentage share of U.S. production and coal mine
employment, as shown in the following two charts:
Western Coal's Percentage Share of U.S. Production"

1996

2010

2020

Reference Case

47%

57%

62%

1990+24%

47%

54%

45%

1990+9%

47%

39%

32%

190-3%

47%

28%

19%

137. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xviii.
138. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 112 fig. 106. The figures listed are close
approximations.
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Western Coal Mining Jobs In 2010"'

1990+ 24%

1990 + 9%

1990 - 3%

1990 - 7%

5,013

3,827

1,829

844

673

5,693

4,785

2,254

941

895

10,706

8,612

4,083

1,785

1,568

Reference

Case

Powder

River
Basin
Other

West

Total

V. COAL'S DIFFICULTIES BEYOND THE EIA PROJECTIONS

The dire predictions in the EIA study, substantially supported by other
analyses undertaken by the private sector, ought to be sufficient cause for the
coal industry to dread the imposition of the Kyoto Protocol. Unfortunately, the
situation may actually be worse.
First, the emissions target specified for the United States in the Protocol, 7%
below the 1990 emissions level, " is increasingly irrelevant. U.S. carbon emissions from the combustion of energy fuels reached 1,463 million metric tons in
1996, or 8.7% higher than the 1,346 million tons emitted in 1990.' The actual
percentage reduction needed to reach the Protocol target is therefore increasing
as the United States approaches 2008 to 2012, the period during which we are
ostensibly expected to meet the 1990 - 7% target.' 2 Thus, in 1996, the percentage reduction needed to meet the Protocol target rose to 15.7 % (7% + 8.7%)
and that number continues to climb in a growing economy."' For example, EIA's

139. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 114 tbl. 23. "Powder River Basin" includes
Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota, while "Other West" includes Colorado, Utah, Arizona, New
Mexico, Alaska and Washington (Alaska's and Washington's shares are negligible). See EIA
IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 114 tbl. 23.
140.

See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 9.

141. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xii & 208 tbl. B19.
142. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xiii.
143. This phenomenon is noted by the EIA:
AE095 [the EIA's American Energy Outlook issued in 1995] projected that
energy-related carbon emissions would reach 1,471 million metric tons in 2000, a
level nearly reached in 1996 when emissions were 1,436 million metric tons. Each
subsequent AEO has raised the estimate of carbon emissions, primarily because of
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American Energy Outlook in 2000, AEO 2000, states that carbon emissions in
the year 2000 are expected to reach 1,552 million metric tons, or 15% above the
1990 level, thereby raising the target to 22% (7% + 15%).'"
Second, in response to the establishment of the FCCC, the Clinton administration launched the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP).'' The CCAP offered
several dozen proposals for the reduction of greenhouse gases including voluntary programs, economic incentives, research and development, energy efficiency initiatives, and land use programs." The plan purported to reduce total
net emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000.' 7 The
CCAP fell short of the mark. For example, instead of achieving a reduction of
95 million tons of emissions through CCAP initiatives by 2000, as the plan projected, EIA estimates that the initiatives might only achieve a reduction of 36
million tons of emissions, and then, not until the year 2010."'
Likewise, the EIA discounts other claims of the CCAP on the evidence that
certain voluntary programs have proven less successful than anticipated, funding
for certain CCAP program has been less than requested, and U.S. economic
growth (and therefore, energy demand) has been higher than that expected by
the plan's sponsors."' The net results of the CCAP show that the Clinton Administration's assumptions regarding the success of domestic actions to reduce
carbon emissions were overly optimistic. Indeed, assuming U.S. acceptance of
the Protocol, the shortcomings of the CCAP presage an increase in the stringency of measures necessary to reach emissions targets as the implementation
period draws near."
Third, fundamental uncertainties regarding the likelihood and efficacy of an
international emissions trading system seriously undermine the more optimistic
predictions relating to meeting the Protocol targets, and doing so in a relatively
painless way. The Protocol itself declares that emissions trading arrangements
must be subsidiary to concrete programs for reducing carbon emissions."'
Moreover, those Annex B countries that may potentially have emissions allocations to trade, principally the former Soviet bloc countries, may choose, instead,
to bank their credits against future emissions on the belief that their economies

lower price projections that encourage energy use and reduce the penetration of
renewable sources of energy.
EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 9.
144. See Energy Info. Admin., Dept. of Energy, Annual Energy Outlook 2000 With Projections
to 2010 (visited Oct. 25, 2000) <http://www.eai.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/issues.html>.
145. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2.
146. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2.
147. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 2..
148. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 9.
149. See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 9.
150. The Administration's contention that carbon sequestration through sinks and modified
land use practices is a case in point. Although the EIA refers several times to U.S. State Department
and Council of Economic Advisors' claims that agriculture and land use programs and credits for
greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide may offset carbon dioxide emissions up to 4%, the EIA
appears to be somewhat skeptical. "[T]he rules to account for agriculture and forestry emissions and
sinks have yet to be developed and are subject to considerable uncertainty." EIA IMPACT STUDY,
supra note 6, at 9.
151. See Protocol, supra note 5,at art. 6.
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will rebound over the next several decades. 2 More fundamentally, without the
experience of an international trading system as a guide, it is impossible to predict how such a system will operate as a practical matter or how it might be
compromised by other geopolitical conflicts and tensions.
Similarly, the jury is definitely out as to whether and to what extent significant carbon "credits" might be obtained through technology transfers between
Annex B countries and developing countries under the so-called CDM provision
in the treaty. 3 Given the American public's inherent skepticism regarding the
need for and utility of foreign aid expenditures, it is difficult to comprehend that
taxpayers would support additional transfers of money overseas, particularly if
that money is being used to finance job growth in new technologies even while
U.S. jobs in fundamental industry sectors are being eliminated by cutbacks in
domestic energy demand. Conversely, if CDM initiatives are undertaken by the
United States in lieu of traditional foreign aid expenditures, developing nations
may resent having their discretion to redistribute American largesse circumscribed.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, there is a certain irrationality in a
system that purports to reduce "global" carbon emissions but exempts the vast
majority of countries from having to participate in the enterprise. The equity
argument, that the developed nations (most prominently, the United States) emit
more greenhouse gases, and therefore, should be exclusively responsible for
reducing them, is initially seductive but eventually falls under clear-eyed scrutiny: 1)over the life of the Protocol the emissions that developed nations eliminate will simply be replaced by those of the developing nations as their economies expand such that the campaign against global warming becomes a zerosum game; moreover, 2) the levels of emissions produced by the developed
nations merely reflect the levels of goods and services produced by those nations. In any event, the inconsistent applicability of the Protocol'.s mandate may
serve to undermine public support in the developed countries for unilateral efforts to reduce emissions.
These four issues call into serious question whether a smooth glide path can
be taken to reduce U.S. emissions to meet the Protocol's target as certain sectors
in the Clinton Administration had suggested. If the options touted for achieving
emissions targets do not materialize or prove to be less successful than advertised, the carbon price discussed above will increase and coal-fired energy production will become even less competitive than the EIA analyses predict.
VI. RE-BOUND OR ON THE REBOUND?
Fortunately for the coal industry, the same uncertainties that threaten its
survival have also caused concern elsewhere. As a treaty, the Kyoto Protocol
will not be binding on the United States until it is ratified by a two-thirds vote of
the Senate."' That development is highly unlikely in light of the current circumstances. The Senate has by a unanimous vote ' expressed its will not to ratify the

152.
153.
154.
155.

See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at 9.
See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6, at xxviii.
U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2.
See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supra note 6,at 10.
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Protocol until the developing nations are required to participate in the overall
effort to reduce greenhouse gases and until it can be shown that U.S. participation in the Protocol will not damage the U.S. economy.'" Congress has further
expressed reluctance to move ahead on climate change by enacting legislation
calling for further study of the phenomenon of global warming and the ostensible means of controlling it.'5
These positions firmly taken by both houses of Congress indicate strong
resistance to unilateral actions on the part of the United States until fundamental
questions of viability, fairness, and necessity are answered with respect to the
entire climate change issue. To that end the EIA projections, outlined above,
demonstrate how implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, even in the less stringent scenarios, will have a profoundly negative impact on an industry that has
been a fundamentally significant factor in the growth and prosperity of the
American West, indeed of the entire nation.
Returning to Prometheus, chained to that desolate crag in Scythia, we are
told that the Titan eventually was unbound by Hercules, apparently because
Prometheus possessed information crucial to the stability of Zeus's throne."' In a
similar sense, coal's future rests upon its ability to provide the American public
and its leaders with the information necessary to make rational choices with
respect to the Kyoto Protocol and its ominous implications-not the least of
which is whether the Protocol constitutes a viable and necessary response to a
legitimate crisis or a blueprint for the international redistribution of wealth and
opportunity on an epic scale.
Coal's challenge is a significant one, but inspiration can be taken from
George Noel Gordon, Lord Byron's own salute to Prometheus:
And, baffled as thou wert from high,
Still, in thy patient energy
In the endurance and repulse
Of thine impenetrable spirit,
Which earth and heaven could not convulse,
A mighty lesson we inherit.' 9

156. The Senate's position was expressed through a resolution sponsored by Senators Robert
Byrd (D-WV) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE). See EIA IMPACT STUDY, supranote 6, at 10.
157. See, e.g., National Climate Program Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (1994); Global Change
Research Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2921-61 (1994); and pursuant to Title XXIV of the Food and
Agriculture Act of 1990, the establishment of the Global Climate Change Program within the
Department of Agriculture, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6701-10 (1994) (asserting that Congress is unwilling to
legislate the phenomenon of global warming without further study).
158. See BULLFINCH, supranote 2, at 18.
159. Id. at 19.

THE Rio GRANDE CONVENTION OF 1906: A BRIEF HISTORY
OF AN INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE APPORTIONMENT OF

THE Rio GRANDE

WILLIAM A. PADDOCK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Late one morning in April 1598, a party of eight armed and mounted
men came to the river from the south through heavy groves of cottonwoods. They were emaciated and wild with thirst. On seeing the water
they lost their wits, men and horses alike, and threw themselves into it
bodily.

The men drank and drank in the river. They took the water in through
their skins and they cupped it to their mouths and swollen tongues and
parched throats. When they could drink no more they went to the dry
banks and fell down upon the cool sand under the shade of the big
trees. In their frenzied appetite for survival itself, they had become
bloated and deformed, and they lay sprawled in exhaustion and excess.

Their clothes were ragged, their boots were worn through, and their
bellies were hungry; for they had come for fifty days through deserts
with thorns, mountains with rocks, and nothing to eat but roots and
weeds. For the last five days they had not had a drop of water. In finding the river, they not only saved their lives; they fulfilled their assignment-to break a new trail to the Rio del Norte from the south, that
would bypass the Junta de los Rios, to bring the colony directly to its
New Mexican kingdom.'
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Then, as now, survival and prosperity in the western United Sates required
water for domestic use, for irrigation of crops, for commercial and industrial
purposes, as well as for maintenance of the environment and the biological systems on which life depends. By the turn of the 20" Century, little, if any, unclaimed water remained in the Rio Grande in Colorado, New Mexico, or northern Texas. Interstate and international apportionments were required to allocate
the water and maintain peace. These apportionments, including the Rio Grande
Convention of 19062; the allocation of water from the Rio Grande Project'; and
the Rio Grande Compact,' are frequently at the center of new disputes over water allocation spurred on by the burgeoning growth in the southwestern United
States. Unless one understands these "old" apportionments, and the fights they
were intended to create and preserve, it is not possible to make intelligent decisions on today's disputes.
Oliver Wendell Holmes once said "upon this point a page of history is worth
a volume of logic."5 This is equally true for many western water disputes. Accordingly, what follows is a brief history of, and a discussion of the reasons for,
the allocation scheme for water from the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte Reservoir in New Mexico and above Fort Quitman, Texas. This is a work more of
synthesis than scholarship, and is intended to provide a basis for further legal
and historical analysis.
II. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE BASIN
The river known as the Rio Grande was preceded by a rift of the same name.
The Rio Grande Rift extends from Leadville, Colorado, to Presido, Texas, and
Chihuahua, Mexico.' In hydrological terms, the Upper Rio Grande Basin extends
from the San Luis Valley of south-central Colorado southward through central
New Mexico to Fort Quitman, Texas. It includes parts of El Paso and Hudspeth
Counties in extreme western Texas, and that part of northern Mexico lying between the Rio Grande and the Sierra de Presido, Sierra de Juarez, and Sierra de
la Armargosa. The drainage area (excluding the Closed Basin in the San Luis
Valley, see below) is 31,100 square miles; the river is 650 miles long. This basin
is naturally divided into three areas: (1) the San Luis Valley in Colorado; (2) the

2. See Convention Between the United States and Mexico Providing for the Equitable
Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes, May 21, 1906, U.S.-Mex. 34
Stat. 2953 [hereinafter Rio Grande Convention of 1906].
3. See Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388-90 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 43 U.S.C.); Act of February 25, 1905, ch. 798, 33 Stat. 814. See generally Elephant Butte
Irrigation Dist. v. Department of the Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 605 (10th Cir. 1998) (describing the Rio
Grande Project).
4. See Act of May 3, 1939, ch. 155, 53 Stat. 785 (approving Rio Grande Compact).
5. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
6. W. Scott Baldridge, et al, Rio Grande Rift: Problems and Perspectives, in Rio GRANDE
RIFr: NORTHERN NEW MEXICO, 1,1 (W. Scott Baldridge et al. eds., New Mexico Geological
Society 1984). The valley between Salida and Leadville, Colorado, while still part of the Rio Grande
Rift, was hydrologically separated from the Rio Grande approximately three to five million years
ago when the Maysville Uplift pushed up a mountain barrier across the northern end of the San Luis
Valley.
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Middle Rio Grande in New Mexico; and (3) the Elephant Butte-Fort Quitman
section in southern New Mexico, western Texas, and northeast Mexico.
A. The San Luis Valley
The San Luis Valley is a high mountain valley extending approximately
ninety miles from north to south and fifty miles from east to west. The valley
floor ranges in elevation from 7,440 feet to about 8,000 feet and is ringed by
mountains between 10,000 feet to 14,390 feet in elevation. The valley's west
side is formed by the Conejos Mountains, the San Juan Mountains, and the La
Garita Hills; to the north are the Saguache and the Sangre de Cristo Mountains;
to the east are the Sangre de Cristo Mountains; and the southern boundary is
formed by the San Luis Hills. The Rio Grande's headwaters are in the San Juan
Mountains near the Continental Divide, from which it flows southeasterly entering the valley on the west at Del Norte. The river continues southeasterly
across the valley through the cities of Monte Vista and Alamosa. At Alamosa, it
turns south and runs nearly forty miles, passing through a break in the San Luis
Hills, and then entering a deep canyon above the New Mexico state line.
The Closed Basin occupies the northern part of the San Luis Valley. It is
hydrologically separated from the rest of the valley by a low divide that extends
southeast from near Del Norte to a few miles north of Alamosa and then easterly
to the east side of the San Luis Valley. The Closed Basin contains some 2,940
square miles that do not naturally drain to the Rio Grande. The lowest area in the
Closed Basin, known locally as the "sump," is located on the east side of the
valley at the foot of Mount Blanca. Historically, the sump was a chain of
ephemeral lakes. Prior to the Closed Basin Project,7 practically all water produced by streams flowing into the Closed Basin that was not consumed in irrigation flowed to the sump and was lost through evaporation and transpiration. In
addition, all unconsumed irrigation water applied to land in the Closed Basin
from ditches off the Rio Grande flowed to the sump area. Today, the Closed
Basin Project' pumps shallow groundwater from the sump area and delivers it to
the Rio Grande below Alamosa.
The Conejos River is the principal tributary of the Rio Grande in Colorado.
It rises in the southwest mountains of Colorado, is augmented by the San Antonio and Los Pifios Rivers, and flows northeast to join the Rio Grande at Los
Sauses. The other tributaries joining the Rio Grande from the west above the
Conejos River include La Jara, Alamosa, and Rock Creeks.
The San Luis Valley's southeast area extends east from the Rio Grande to
the lower slopes of the Culebra Range of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains and
from the New Mexico state line north to the Closed Basin. The principal streams
in this area, from north to south, are Trinchera, Culebra, and Costilla Creeks.
Costilla Creek rises in New Mexico, flows north and west for about ten miles
through Colorado and then turns south and joins the Rio Grande in New Mexico.

7. See Reclamation Project Authorization Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-514, 86 Stat. 964
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 615aaa (1999) (text omitted from published United States Code))
(authorizing the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Closed Basin Division, San Luis
Valley Project, Colorado).
8. See generally, Closed Basin Landowners Ass'n v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist.,
734 P.2d 627 (1987) (describing Closed Basin Project).
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Due to upstream reservoirs and extensive irrigation, these streams generally
contribute limited amounts to the Rio Grande.
B. The Middle Rio Grande
The Middle Rio Grande includes the Rio Grande and its tributaries between
the Colorado-New Mexico state line and the San Marcial Narrows at the head of
Elephant Butte Reservoir, a distance of about 270 miles. The upper half of this
reach is flanked on the east by the Sangre de Cristo Mountains. On the west, the
Conejos Mountains extend southward and separate the Rio Grande and the Rio
Chama drainages. The Rio Chama joins the Rio Grande near Espafiola, New
Mexico. This portion of the Rio Grande and the Rio Chama drainage area contributes most of the water supply for the Rio Grande that originates in New
Mexico. The tributary streams south of the Rio Chama are largely torrential,
carry a heavy silt load, and supply relatively little of the river's total flow.
The canyon that the Rio Grande enters in southern Colorado gradually deepens as the river flows through northern New Mexico, reaching a depth of more
than 1,200 feet at Embudo, seventy miles south of the Colorado-New Mexico
state line. In this reach, the principal tributaries are from the east and include the
Rio Colorado, the Rio Hondo, the Rio Taos, and Embudo Creek. These streams,
rising in the Sangre de Cristo Mountains, provide water for irrigation to the
mesa lands lying between the mountains and the river and contribute only flood
flows and return flows to the Rio Grande.
Below Embudo, the Rio Grande emerges into the Espahiola Valley, a valley
some twenty-five miles long and from one to three miles wide. Here, the Rio
Chama joins the Rio Grande from the west and the Rio Santa Cruz joins it from
the east. The Rio Chama drains some 3,200 square miles. About thirty miles
upstream on the Rio Chama is Abiquiu Reservoir, a flood control and storage
reservoir that was completed in 1963 with a capacity of 1.2 million acre-feet.
There is some irrigation in the mountain valleys both above and below Abiquiu
Reservoir. Another thirty miles further upstream on the Rio Chama are El Vado
Reservoir (185,000 acre-feet) completed in 1935, and Heron Reservoir (400,000
acre-feet) completed in 1970. El Vado Reservoir serves the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District, and Heron Reservoir is part of the San Juan-Chama Project, a transbasin diversion bringing water from the San Juan River Basin into the
Rio Grande Basin
Below the Espafiola Valley, the Rio Grande enters White Rock Canyon, "a
narrow tortuous gorge some twenty miles long."'" At the end of this gorge is
Cochiti Dam," a flood control reservoir capable of storing some 500,000 acrefeet, which largely inundates White Rock Canyon. From Cochiti Dam downstream, the Rio Grande enters the long narrow Middle Rio Grande Valley, which
extends 150 miles to the San Marcial Narrows. This valley is broken only by the

9. See generally Act of June 13, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-483, 76 Stat. 96 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 615ii (1999) (text omitted from United States Code)).
10. See Natural Resources Committee, Regional Planning, Part VI-The Rio Grande Joint
Investigation in the Upper Rio Grande Basin in Colorado, New Mexico and Texas, 1936-1937, 21
(1938) (hereinafter Joint Investigation).
11. See generally Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-645, 74 Stat. 492-93.
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narrows at San Felipe, Isleta, and San Acacia, which serve to define the Santo
Domingo, Albuquerque, Belen, and Socorro subvalleys. The Rio Grande's principal tributaries in the Santo Domingo Valley are the Santa Fe and Galisteo
Creeks, both of which enter the valley from the east. Galisteo Reservoir controls
the flood flows of Galisteo Creek. Jemez Creek enters the Rio Grande from the
west a few miles below the San Felipe Narrows. Its flows are controlled by Jemez Canyon Reservoir,'2 which has a capacity of some 100,000 acre-feet and is
operated for flood and sediment control purposes. The Rio Puerco and Rio
Salado enter the Rio Grande from the west just above San Acacia Narrows,
some sixty-five miles south of Albuquerque. These streams are largely torrential
and only contribute to the Rio Grande at times of flash floods. While the Rio
Puerco only drains about 5,000 square miles, contributing 10% or less of the Rio
Grande's total flow, it is the source of at least one-half of the river's total sediment load."
C. The Elephant Butte-FortQuitman Section
The Elephant Butte-Fort Quitman section of the Upper Rio Grande Basin
covers 250 miles from San Marcial, New Mexico, to Fort Quitman, Texas. In
the first sixty-five miles below San Marcial, downstream to the Caballo Narrows, the surrounding hills and mesas are close to the river and there is little
valley land. The eastern side of this reach includes the "Jornado del Muerto"
(Dead Man's March), a long, flat, tortuous expanse of high desert on which
many early settlers perished." Elephant Butte Dam now blocks the river forty
miles below the San Marcial Narrows. In periods of plenty, the resulting lake
fills the entire valley upstream to San Marcial.
Just below Elephant Butte Dam, the Rio Grande enters the Palomas Valley.
At the end of the short Palomas Valley is the Caballo Narrows, now occupied by
Caballo Dam," which impounds flood water and water released from Elephant
Butte Reservoir. Caballo Dam has a capacity of some 300,000 acre-feet and
began partial operations in 1938. Below that dam, the river enters the Rincon
Valley, a valley some thirty miles long and, at most, two miles wide. At the head
of the Rincon Valley is Elephant Butte Irrigation District's Percha diversion
dam, which takes irrigation water from the Rio Grande. The Rincon Valley ends
at Selden Canyon, below which the Mesilla Valley begins. That valley extends
some fifty-five miles south to "the Pass," four miles above El Paso. It reaches its
maximum width of about six miles near Las Cruces, New Mexico. The Elephant
Butte Irrigation District's principal diversions in this reach are the Leasburg and
Mesilla diversion dams, from which up to 88,000 acres are irrigated.
Below the Mesilla Valley is the El Paso Valley, which is about ninety miles
long and four to six miles wide, and extends from El Paso on the north to about
ten miles below Fort Quitman, Texas.

12. See id.
13. See Robert C. Evler et al., The Colorado Plateaus: Cultural Dynamics and
Paleoenvironment, 205 SCIENCE 1089 (1979).
14. See HORGAN, supra note 1,at 168-171.
15. See Convention Between the United States of America and Mexico for the Rectification of
the Rio Grande, February 1,1933, U.S.-Mex., 48 Stat. 1621, 1624 (authorizing the construction of
Caballo Reservoir).
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The land on the Mexican (west) side of the Rio Grande in this reach is called
the Juarez Valley. Under the 1906 Convention,"it was allocated 60,000 acre-feet
of water to irrigate about 25,000 acres. The land on the Texan (east) side of the
Rio Grande is included in the El Paso County Water Improvement District No. I
(the "El Paso District") and the Hudspeth County Conservation and Reclamation
District (the "Hudspeth District"). The El Paso District was established to provide irrigation water to some 67,000 acres. The El Paso District formerly used
two other principal diversion structures, the International Dam and the Riverside
Dam, located downstream of the Acequia Madre. In recent years, diversions for
Texas have been increasingly consolidated at the American Dam, upstream of
the Acequia Madre. The Hudspeth District typically makes no diversions from
the Rio Grande. Instead, it is supplied with tailwater from the El Paso District,
delivered by the Tornillo Drain into the Hudspeth Feeder Canal. There are no
perennial tributaries to the Rio Grande in the Elephant Butte-Fort Quitman section of the Rio Grande. Rather, the tributaries are dry arroyos subject to flash
floods. The principal tributaries enter from the west between San Marcial and
the Rincon Valley, and most of them are now regulated by flood and sediment
control reservoirs.
III. HISTORY OF EARLY SETTLEMENT

The concentration of runoff caused by the Rio Grande Rift made possible
permanent human settlements in the Rio Grande Basin. 7 The available evidence
suggests intermittent human occupation of the Rio Grande area for at least
10,000 years."8 It was not until the first millennium B.C. that corn and squash
agriculture appeared on the Rio Grande. The beginning of corn and squash agriculture also marked the beginning of irrigated agriculture in the Upper Rio
Grande Basin. The transition from mobile hunting and gathering to agricultural
food production required significant social, economic, and technological
changes, and the development of settled villages. This change occurred slowly,
with the first permanent dwellings appearing about A.D. 400.9 The principal
crops of grains, squash, gourds, maize, and beans were irrigated from ditches
drawing from the Rio Grande and its tributaries. By A.D. 850 or 900, the precursors of Indian pueblos appeared. 2' Then, from the twelfth through seventeenth
centuries, the Indian population grew and was concentrated in larger communities." By the time Spanish settlers first came in contact with the Indians in the
Upper Rio Grande Basin at the end of the 16 h Century, there were about 60,000
Indians living in some 130 pueblos. During the first century of Spanish occupa-

16. See Rio Grande Convention of 1906, supra note 2, at 2954 (distributing 60,000 acre-feet
of water to Mexico for irrigation purposes).
17. See John A. Ware, Man on the Rio Grande: Introduction and Overview in Rio Grande
Rift: Northern New Mexico. 271, 271 (W. Scott Baldridge et al. eds., New Mexico Geological
Society 1984) [hereinafter Ware].
18. See id.
19. See Stewart Peckham, The Anazai Culture of the Northern Rio Grande Rift in Rio Grande
Rift: Northern New Mexico, 275, 276 (W. Scott Baldridge et al. eds., New Mexico Geological
Society 1984).
20. See Ware, supra note 17, at 271-72.
21. See Ware, supra note 17, at 271-72.
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tion, however, the population of the pueblos declined dramatically, to 10,000 in
A.D. 1600, and then to fewer than 6,500 in A.D. 1706.
The first Spanish settlers in the Upper Rio Grande Basin above Fort Quitman arrived near El Paso in April 1598. This party, led by Don Juan de Ofiate,
proceeded up river to colonize New Mexico.22 It was not until December 8, 1659,
that the first permanent Spanish settlement, a mission dedicated to Our Lady of
Guadalupe of El Paso," was established at El Paso by Fray Garcia de San Francisco y Zuniga. The settlement was located on the south side of the Rio Grande
in present day Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. The population of Spanish settlers in the
area above San Marcial increased throughout the 1600's, as did their contacts
and conflicts with the Pueblo Indians. In 1680, the Pueblo Indian uprising forced
the Spanish leader Otermin and some 1,946 people, including 300 friendly Indians, down river to El Paso." In the years following, El Paso suffered greatly
from drought and Indian predation, so that by 1684 or 1685, El Paso was very
nearly abandoned.' It was not until 1688 when DeVargas began using El Paso as
a base of operations for the re-conquest of the Pueblo Indians that El Paso's
fortunes improved." DeVargas completed his re-conquest by 1693, and from
1700 to 1800 El Paso served as the gateway to Spain's northern colonies.27 By
1700, the Spanish population at El Paso was some 3,588, and increased to some
4,394 by 1779.
From the founding of El Paso in 1659 through 1827, there were no houses or
cultivated fields on the east side of the river. Rather, all dwellings and all irrigation were located west of the Rio Grande in present day Mexico. In 1827, Juan
Maria Ponce de Leon received a land grant of some 200-500 acres on the east
side of the river and he took up residence there."' Even after Ponce de Leon settled on the river's eastern side, development occurred slowly there until after the
Mexican-American War of 1844 to 1846. Thereafter, many new settlers moved
to the area and, in 1859, U.S. Army Colonel Anson Mills established the City of
El Paso. But even then the population of El Paso was only 300, while across the
river the population in and around Juarez was approximately 13,000."'
Irrigation was practiced by the Spanish settlers of El Paso from its founding
in 1659. The total land area under irrigation west of the river increased markedly
after 1680 due to the influx of refugees from upstream settlements. By 1821, the
population west of the river was 8,000, and their sustenance required substantial
irrigated cropland. By 1881, there were large areas under cultivation on both
sides of the river. As reported to President Franklin Pierce by Major Emory,
"cultivation extended along the Rio Grande for twenty miles below present-day
Juarez," an area estimated to be some 32,000 acres.'

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See HORGAN, supra note 1, at 161.
See S. Doc. No. 55-229, at 54 (1898).
See Joint Investigation, supra note 10, at
See Joint Investigation, supra note 10, at
See Joint Investigation, supra note 10, at
See Joint Investigation, supra note 10, at
See Joint Investigation, supra note 10, at
See Joint Investigation, supra note 10, at
Joint Investigation, supra note 10, at 72.

71.
71.
71.
71-72.
71-72.
72.
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While settlement was occurring in El Paso, Texas, it was also occurring
upstream in the Mesilla, Rincon, and Palomas Valleys, which after 1848 was the
United States Territory of New Mexico. By the 1870's, substantial land areas in
the Mesilla Valley were irrigated and the Valley's farmers were quite prosperous. The arrival of the railroads in the early 1880's"' and the pacification of the
Indians, however, caused a marked decline in prosperity: the railroads brought
agricultural products from the Midwest that competed with local produce; and
the pacification of the Indians meant that fewer soldiers were required to protect
the population. As the number of soldiers declined, so did the Army's need to
buy food and supplies from local farmers and merchants. At that same time,
further north, New Mexico and Colorado were experiencing a substantial influx
of settlers and a resultant increase in irrigation from the Rio Grande, both of
which had profound impacts on the El Paso-Juarez water supply.
IV. TROUBLE OVER THE Rio GRANDE AT EL PASO

Upstream in the San Luis Valley, the first permanent Mexican settlements
did not appear until the 1850's.2 For the next two decades, there was a small, but
steady, migration of American settlers to the San Luis Valley. It was not until
the late 1870's when the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad reached the San Luis
Valley that many people moved to the valley and the large canal-building era
began." By 1889, some 1,200 miles of canals had been constructed in the San
Luis Valley and were supplying irrigation water to 300,000 acres.' By 1880, in
New Mexico upstream of San Marcial, the irrigation that the Indians had started
and the Spanish settlers had continued had grown to some 183,000 irrigated
acres."

The mid-1880's were wetter than average and, as a consequence, the effect
of increased irrigation in the basin was not immediately apparent in southern
New Mexico and El Paso. With the onset of a series of dry years in the late
1880's, however, water shortages occurred throughout the basin, and the shortages in the El Paso/Juarez area became pronounced and severe.'
As a typical western stream, the Rio Grande is fed by snowmelt and late
season rains. The bulk of the water supply is available only during the short
spring runoff. Late season flows are typically small unless supplemented by
infrequent rains. Given the nature of the river, seasonal water supply shortages
were neither rare nor unexpected. In 1878, the Hatch Report warned that problems over water would grow in the future because the Rio Grande did not al-

31. See Joint Investigation, supra note 10, at 72. The Southern Pacific, the Santa Fe, and the
Mexican Central Railroads reached El Paso in 1881, and the Texas Pacific reached El Paso in 1882.
See Joint Investigation, supra note 10, at 72.
32. See S. Doc. No. 55-229, at 54 (1898).

33.

See id. at 55.

34.

See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., DIVIDING THE WATERS - A CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 19 (1966); Douglas Robert Littlefield, Interstate Water
Conflicts, Compromises, and Compacts: The Rio Grande, 1880-1938 43 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California (Los Angeles)) (on file with the Denver Public Library).
35. See HUNDLEY, supra note 34, at 19.
36. See HUNDLEY, supra note 34, at 20-21; Littlefield, supra note 34, at 13-14.
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ways carry enough water to irrigate the El-Paso Valley." This statement reflected
both the history of recurring droughts and the region's growing population. And,
it was in 1880, only two years after the report, that citizens of San Elizario and
Isleta, Texas, sought government help to offset reduced water supplies blamed
on excessive Mexican diversions." The series of wet years in the mid-1880's
relieved the shortage, and no further action was taken on these requests.
The issue of water shortages was revived with the onset of the 1888 drought,
at which time Colonel Anson Mills of the Army Corps of Engineers proposed
construction of a dam just upstream of El Paso to store 1.65 million acre-feet of
flood waters to serve both the United States and Mexico. Mills pressed his idea
with the Department of State and Congress. As a result, in 1890 Congress
passed a joint resolution authorizing President Benjamin Harrison to negotiate
with Mexico for the construction of an international dam across the Rio Grande
near El Paso and the establishment of a joint international commission to resolve
boundary issues. 9
Little progress was made on negotiations until the severe drought of 1894.
At that time, Mexico, with the encouragement and support of El Pasoans,
pressed its complaints over water shortages in Washington, D.C. In September
of 1894, the Mexican Foreign Minister complained that increased upstream
diversions in the United States made farming in Juarez very difficult, if not impossible. With little response from Washington, in October of 1895, Mexico's
Foreign Minister wrote Secretary of State Richard Olney to complain of the
nearly complete lack of water in 1894 and 1895. He went on to suggest that the
1848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hildago, ' the 1853 Gadsden Treaty," the 1884 Convention between the United States and Mexico,42 and international law were all
being violated by the United States' failure to protect the rights of Mexican citizens."
Apparently alarmed by Mexico's claim, Secretary Olney sought the advice
of Attorney General Judson Harmon. General Harmon's opinion of December
12, 1895," concluded that the United States had not violated the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hildago because it had not impaired the navigability of the Rio
Grande, and that was the only right the treaty created or protected with respect

37. See H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 45-84, at 5-6 (1878).
38. See Littlefield, supra note 34, at 14.
39. See id. at 26-27; HUNDLEY, supra note 34, at 21-22.
40. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement between the United States of
America and the United Mexican States, Concluded at Guadalupe Hidalgo February 2, 1848,
February 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ diplomacy/
guadhida.htm [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo].
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to the Rio Grande." Concerning international law, he concluded, "[t]he fundamental principle of international law is the absolute sovereignty of every nation,
as against all others, within its own territory."'' While General Harmon concluded that "the rules, principles, and precedents of international law impose no
liability upon the United States," he did state that "whether the circumstances
make it possible or proper to take any action from considerations of comity,"
was not an issue within his province.'7 In so stating, he in effect suggested that
the President and the Department of State make whatever agreements they felt
appropriate as a matter of comity.
A. The ProposedSolution: An InternationalDam
Pressure to resolve the international problem prompted Secretary Olney to
act on the Congressional Resolution of April 29, 1890." He negotiated with his
Mexican counterpart, Matias Romero, and on May 6, 1896, they entered into a
protocol that called upon Colonel Anson Mills and Sefior Don F. Javier Osorno,
members of the International Boundary Commission (the "I.B.C.")," to make an
investigation and prepare a report on the water supply. The report was to address: (1) the amount of water taken from the Rio Grande by irrigation canals in
the United States; (2) the average amount of water in the Rio Grande, year by
year, before and after the construction of those canals; and (3) whether a dam
across the Rio Grande near El Paso, or elsewhere, would be the best means to
regulate the Rio Grande and secure for the inhabitants of both countries their
legal and equitable rights and interests to the water."
The Mills and Osorno report only considered the dam near El Paso. This
decision was influenced, at least in part, by growing controversy over a proposed dam near Elephant Butte being promoted by the Rio Grande Dam and
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Irrigation Company (the "Rio Grande Company")." On the previous February 1,
1895, the Department of Interior approved the Rio Grande Company's application for a right of way for a dam near Elephant Butte in the New Mexico Territory. The prospectus for the company stated it would build the world's largest
artificial lake to impound 253,370 acre-feet of water to be used for colonization
and irrigation of lands downstream to Fort Quitman, Texas. Mexico promptly
filed a protest to the proposed dam, and requested that the United States government suspend all work on it." In response, Secretary Olney did secure the
suspension of any action on pending applications for rights to use public lands
that involved diversion of water from the Rio Grande and its tributaries in Colorado and in the New Mexico Territory." Because the Rio Grande Company's
application had previously been approved, however, it was not affected by the
suspension.
In November 1896, the I.B.C. made its report recommending the construction of an international reservoir capable of storing some 535,000 acre-feet 3.5
miles above El Paso." Impetus to the treaty negotiations for construction of the
dam and enhanced water delivery to Mexico was provided by a January 5, 1897,
letter from Mexico's Foreign Minister Romero to Secretary Olney asserting that
Mexico had sustained $35 million in damages from increased water diversions
in the United States." Included in the letter was a draft convention calling for the
prompt construction of an international dam at El Paso, with all costs to be
borne by the United States in compensation for past damages to Mexico and its
citizens. 7 He suggested that the water stored by the dam be allocated equally
between the United States and Mexico."
The difficulty then faced by the United States was the proposed dam at Elephant Butte. If that dam were built, there would not be a reliable water supply
for the proposed international dam at El Paso. On the other hand, the international dam would do nothing to alleviate the water shortages experienced by
farmers in the Rincon and Mesilla Valleys in New Mexico, and would flood a
substantial portion of the Mesilla Valley. Thus, resolution of the disputes with
Mexico had serious national implications that first had to be addressed.
In May of 1897, the United States filed suit against the Rio Grande Company to prevent its construction of a reservoir near Elephant Butte." Funding
from the Project's backers dried up while the litigation went on, and after five
years of litigation and five years without construction, the United States canceled the previously-issued authorization for the dam under its own terms. And,
in 1909, the United States Supreme Court sustained the cancellation.' While
well received in El Paso and Juarez, this development did little to solve the in-
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creasingly-bitter disputes over water between farmers in New Mexico and in El
Paso. Since water storage was the only practical means to address both problems, the United States essentially put the international dispute on hold while
working to solve then domestic dispute between New Mexico and Texas.
B. The Twelfth InternationalIrrigationCongress-A Deal is Made
While the United States was litigating with the Rio Grande Company, numerous attempts were made to settle the case, but none were successful. The
United States' interest in settlement waned considerably after the Reclamation
Act of 19026 was enacted: at that time, the newly-created Reclamation Service
began studying the relative merits of a dam at Elephant Butte versus an international dam at El Paso. " The Reclamation Service concluded that a site a short
distance downstream from the Rio Grande Company's proposed reservoir site
near Elephant Butte was the preferred location for a large reservoir. 3 Acting on
this recommendation, in 1902, the Reclamation Service directed engineer Benjamin Hall to prepare a complete engineering proposal for the dam and reservoir.
While Hall was doing his work and the United States battled the Rio Grande
Company, Mexico continued to press its demands for a solution to the Juarez
water shortages. On June 3, 1904, the Mexican Ambassador to the United States,
M. de Aspiroz, formally protested the continuing water shortage at Juarez. The
Ambassador told the new United States Secretary of State, John Hay, that
American diversions from the Rio Grande had caused the population of Juarez
to decline from 18,630 to some 8,814 by 1896.5 He reiterated Mexico's claim
for $35 million in damages, stated that the damages were continuing to mount,
and pressed for a quick solution either by money damages or the international
dam's construction.On the heels of this protest, in October 1904, Hall completed his report on
the proposed reservoir near Elephant Butte. The report, titled "A Discussion of
Past and Present Plans for Irrigation of the Rio Grande Valley," concluded that a
reservoir at Elephant Butte could store 2,000,000 acre-feet, an amount adequate
to provide a reliable yield of 600,000 acre-feet during most years. 7 He reported
that the water supply could irrigate 180,000 acres, that the dam could store three
or four times more water than the international dam, that less water would be
lost to spills, and that no farm lands in the Mesilla Valley would be flooded.'
Hall's proposal contemplated a new reclamation project to be named the
"Rio Grande Project." Its features would include the Elephant Butte Reservoir, a
major diversion dam at Leasburg to serve the Mesilla Valley. The Project would
also be capable of providing water to El Paso and Mexico." Before the Recla61.
62.
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mation Service could provide water to El Paso, however, it would be necessary
to amend the 1902 Reclamation Act to include Texas, and before water could be
provided to Mexico, it would be necessary to negotiate an international treaty."0
The Reclamation Act of 1902 called for the proceeds from public land sales
to be placed in a revolving fund for use in constructing reservoirs. Farmers receiving irrigation water from the reclamation projects would pay for the projects
over a term of years, and the funds repaid would be used to build new projects.
As the United States, however, acquired no public land when Texas was annexed into the United States in 1845, Texas was not among the states originally
included within the 1902 Reclamation Act.
In the months that followed the release of Hall's report, Hall and other Reclamation Service engineers traveled through southern New Mexico and El Paso
promoting the plan. Hall was well aware that the International Irrigation Congress, a potent force in securing federal government involvement in the reclamation of arid lands, would hold its Twelfth International Irrigation Congress
(the "Irrigation Congress") in El Paso in November 1904.' He correctly recognized that support by the Irrigation Congress would be crucial to the success of
the Rio Grande Project, and therefore set about securing approval from the organization."2
New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico were all well represented at the Irrigation
Congress. After extensive private consultations between the Reclamation Service and Texas' representatives, including Congressmen William R. Smith and
John H. Stephens, the Texans were convinced that Elephant Butte Dam would
meet El Paso's needs," and agreed to support the Reclamation Service's proposal. At the Irrigation Congress, Frederick Newell, Chief Engineer of the Reclamation Service, introduced discussion of the Rio Grande Project." In his remarks, Newell made clear that the Reclamation Service wanted the Project to
solve both the dispute between New Mexico and Texas and the international
dispute with Mexico."
After Newell's introductory remarks to the Irrigation Congress, Hall described the Rio Grande Project. He emphasized that the plan would apportion
the Project's water by providing for the irrigation of some 110,000 acres in New
Mexico, 20,000 acres in Texas above El Paso, and 50,000 acres below El Paso
on both sides of the river." The allocation of water to Texas would be subject to
whatever amount of water was eventually provided to Mexico." Hall claimed
that this allocation would still provide the El Paso Valley and Mexico with as
much water as would have been provided by the proposed international dam
near El Paso."
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Hall, a careful engineer, was aware of the potential connection between
groundwater and stream flows. He did not want a dispute over groundwater to
delay or defeat the proposed project. Accordingly, in 1904, Hall commissioned a
groundwater study by Professor Charles S. Slicther. His report was presented to
the Irrigation Congress following Hall's presentation on the Rio Grande
Project. 9 Slicther concluded that above "the Pass," the groundwater supply was
comprised of water contributed by the river or lost by the river.' Since there was
little groundwater flow below "the Pass," Hall believed the apportionment to
Texas could be based upon surface flows at El Paso."
Both Texans in El Paso and New Mexicans in the Mesilla Valley enthusiastically received Hall's proposal.' The president of the El Paso Chamber of
Commerce endorsed the plan and declared that an international dam had been
superseded by the Reclamation Service's proposal." The New Mexico delegate,
after making clear that northern New Mexico did not relinquish any of its claims
to divert, store, and use waters of the Rio Grande, introduced a resolution to
approve the proposal.' The resolution stated, in part, that the Elephant Butte
Dam would provide "an equitable distribution of the waters of the Rio Grande
with due regard to the rights of New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico."'" The resolution passed unanimously with the Mexican delegates abstaining because they
lacked time to consult with their government."
On the last day of the Irrigation Congress, the Mexican delegates provided a
qualified endorsement for the Elephant Butte Reservoir:
The undersigned Mexican delegates to the Irrigation congress have had
no time to make a comparison of the two projects to store the waters of
the Rio Grande, the International dam project and Elephant Butte Dam
project, but assume, for actual purposes, that the data given by Mr. Hall
... are correct and that it is thoroughly practicable to bring to the site
of the old Mexican dam [the Acequia Madre], above El Paso, the water
necessary for the areas that were previously irrigated, and that said
quantity of water will be given to Mexico, without cost, at that point,
surveys to be made by the engineers of the United States reclamation
service to determine the number of acres upon the Mexican side of the
Rio Grande which can be irrigated, said surveys to be subject to the approval of the Mexican government. Under those considerations, the
Mexican delegation endorses the Elephant Butte Dam project, as explained by Mr. Hall, said endorsement to be subjected to the approval
of the Mexican government, as the delegates have no instructions what-
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ever, as stated yesterday at convention hall by the delegate from Tlaxcala, Sr. Carranza."
The Texas and New Mexico representatives approved the Mexican position." At
this point, efforts turned to securing the necessary congressional action to implement the agreement.
The burden of passing legislation to extend the 1902 Reclamation Act to
cover Texas fell largely to the Texas delegation because New Mexico, as a territory, had only one non-voting representative in Congress. Accordingly, in
January 1905, El Paso Congressman William R. Smith introduced a bill (H.R.
17939) entitled:
A bill relating to the construction of a dam and reservoir on the Rio
Grande, in New Mexico, for the purpose of impounding of the flood
waters of said river for the purpose of irrigation, and providing for the
distribution of said stored waters among the irrigable lands in New
Mexico, Texas and the Republic of Mexico, and to provide for a treaty
for the settlement of certain alleged claims of the citizens of Mexico
against the United States of America."
This title in and of itself, as observed by Douglas Littlefield, and particularly
the phrase: ".

.

. and providing for the distribution of said stored water among

the irrigable lands in New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico" strongly suggested that
the intent of the bill was to apportion Rio Grande waters, but subsequent legislative debates clarified that its purpose was to divide the river based on Hall's
ideas and the 1904 Compromise.'
H.R. 17939 quickly passed out of committee and just as quickly ran into
snags in the full House. The chief issues in the House were funding, so-called
"prior rights," the interstate dispute between New Mexico and Texas, and the
settlement of the Mexican claims." The debates in the House gave Texas Congressmen Albert Burleson and John R. Stephens the opportunity to explain the
legislation. Burleson explained that the bill would enact the compromise reached
at the 1904 Irrigation Congress. He stated:
The controversy raged for years and years before the Foreign Affairs
Committee. Last year an international irrigation congress was convened
in the city of El Paso, and as a result of the action taken by that congress the people of the Territory of New Mexico and the people of the
State of Texas living at and below the city of El Paso, and many Mexican citizens who are interested, all united upon the proposition embodied in this bill as the most feasible and practical means of settling this
long-drawn-out controversy. 2
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Likewise, Representative Stephens, formerly a strong proponent of the international dam and an equally strong opponent of the original Elephant Butte
Dam, explained the bill's purpose as follows:
I will state that the irrigation congress held last year at El Paso, the
delegates from New Mexico, composed of Mr. [Bernard S.] Rodey, the
governor, and other prominent citizens of New Mexico, and a committee from El Paso and old Mexico met in that congress and agreed upon
and adopted a series of resolutions [namely, the 1904 Compromise].
The main features have been embodied in this bill. The Delegate from
New Mexico [Rodey] has been before the committee-the committee
reporting this bill-frequently, and I know that he has expressed himself as favoring its passage. I was a member of the irrigation congress
at El Paso last November, and was present at the discussions when
these agreements were made, and I wish to state that a full understanding was reached by all the parties at interest.9"
The allocation of water to Mexico was so controversial that it was not included in the bill finally passed by the House. The bill did, however, contain
language calling for the recognition of "prior rights."" The New Mexicans were
alarmed by the prior rights language because they feared the bill would abrogate
the 1904 Compromise and result in more water being delivered to senior water
users in Texas and Mexico." Although they strenuously protested this language,
they found no allies for their cause, and H.R. 17939 passed the House with the
recognition of the prior rights language intact.'
In the Senate, however, New Mexico found a powerful ally against the recognition of prior rights in Colorado Senator Henry M. Teller. Senator Teller was
more than sympathetic to New Mexico's concerns because, at that time, Colorado was being sued by Kansas in the United States Supreme Court for alleged
improper depletions to the Arkansas River, an interstate stream arising in Colorado. 7 Colorado, as the site of the headwaters of at least four major interstate
streams, had no interest in legislation recognizing downstream prior water
rights. In fact, Colorado's defense against Kansas relied, in part, on the opinion
of Attorney General Harmon declaring that a sovereign had total control over
any stream within its borders."
Teller's efforts to change the bill in the Senate were successful. He secured
the passage of an amendment to H.R. 17939 that deleted everything after the
enacting clause and replaced it with his own bill that did not include recognition
of prior rights." The amended bill, which extended the 1902 Reclamation Act to
the project lands in Texas, was passed by the Senate, concurred in by the House,
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and signed into law on February 25, 1905 by President Theodore Roosevelt.'m
That bill stated:
That the provisions of the reclamation act approved June seventeenth,
nineteen hundred and two, shall be extended for the purposes of this act
to the portion of the State of Texas bordering upon the Rio Grande
which can be irrigated from a dam to be constructed near Engle, in the
Territory of New Mexico, on the Rio Grande, to store the flood waters
of that river, and if there shall be ascertained to be sufficient land in
New Mexico and in Texas which can be supplied with the stored water
at a cost which shall render the project feasible and return to the reclamation fund the cost of the enterprise, then the Secretary of the Interior
may proceed with the work of constructing a dam on the Rio Grande as
part of the general system of irrigation, should all other conditions as
regards feasibility be found satisfactory.' °'
The bill, while apparently simple, contained important provisions. Douglas
Littlefield summarized its effect:
First, when construed with the bill's legislative history, the Reclamation extension act gave congressional authority to the 1904 National Irrigation Congress compromise to build Elephant Butte Dam and to
water irrigable lands along the Rio Grande below the dam. Second, the
act provided that if the secretary of the interior determined there were
enough lands in New Mexico, and Texas that would benefit from Elephant Butte Dam and that the cost of building the dam and irrigation
works would be returned to the Reclamation Fund, he could proceed
with the project "should all other conditions as regards feasibility be
found satisfactory .... The feasibility requirement also meant that the
irrigable lands would have to be precisely fixed by Reclamation Service surveys, and the specific lands to be watered would be identified by
the secretary of the interior based on those surveys. In effect this created an interstate apportionment between New Mexico and Texas based
on Hall's Irrigation Congress proposal ....That Congress intended to
sanction such an apportionment is all the more apparent from the legislative debates leading up to the new law's enactment. "2
C. Negotiations With Mexico-The 1906 Convention
Senator Teller's amendment to H.R. 17939 did not address the allocation of
water to Mexico. Under the 1904 Compromise, however, whatever water was
allocated to Mexico would come directly from the overall allocation to Texas.''
The Reclamation Service's estimates of irrigable acreage below El Paso did not
specify the amount of acreage in Mexico or Texas, but the Mexican delegation
to the Irrigation Congress had deferred to the Reclamation Service for determination of irrigable acreage in Mexico."
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The federal government was slow to address the allocation of water to
Mexico; this, in turn, delayed the Rio Grande Project. Residents of the El Paso
area had a great interest in speeding up the Project due to the continuous insecurity in their water supply. Accordingly, H.D. Slater, one of El Paso's leading
citizens and editor of the El Paso Herald,began to press for a prompt treaty with
Mexico. '
Mr. Slater did not lack self-confidence. In the face of indecision by the
United States government, he wrote to Frederick Newell, the Reclamation
Service's Chief Engineer, with his ideas for an international treaty, and volunteered to assist with the international discussions.' Newell did not encourage
Slater; nevertheless, undeterred, Slater sent Morris Bien, the Reclamation Service's legal counsel, his suggestions for a treaty, along with a draft explanatory
letter to Secretary of the Interior, Ethan A. Hitchcock. In that draft letter, Slater
argued that comity and good will required that some water be provided to Mexico. 7 He argued that Elephant Butte Dam could serve 180,000 acres, 110,000 in
New Mexico and 70,000 "south of the New Mexico line ..... He suggested that
Mexico receive a water supply of 2.5 acre-feet per acre for 22,000 acres, or approximately 55,000 acre-feet."' Finally, Slater argued that the deliveries to
Mexico should be without charge to compensate for past damages."'
Bien asked Benjamin Hall for his thoughts on Slater's proposal for a treaty.
Bien also asked Hall to prepare a tentative schedule of deliveries of water to
Mexico based upon the assumptions contained in Slater's proposal for a treaty."'
In response, Hall prepared a table of deliveries to Mexico proportional to the
deliveries contemplated
for the New Mexico and Texas lands to be watered by
7
the Project.
With the imprimatur of Bien and Hall, Slater began informal negotiations
with his contacts from Mexico. Mexico responded that the proposed treaty generally conformed to the agreement reached at the Irrigation Congress."' Mexico
also informed Slater that it would not pay anything toward the proposed dam or
the water it would provide.'" Moreover, Mexico thought its allocation should be
based upon a survey of irrigable lands in Mexico, as had been agreed at the Irrigation Congress."'
Slater realized that a survey of irrigable lands in Mexico would further delay
the Project. Accordingly, he pressed for a settlement based upon the 1896 Report of the International Boundary (Water) Commission."' That report had concluded that before large-scale upstream development in the United States, the
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Mexican canals near Juarez had a combined capacity of 300 cubic feet per second and irrigation for about 100 days annually."' This translated into nearly
60,000 acre-feet-an amount remarkably close to Slater's original proposal.
As revised by Bien, the draft treaty called for the United States to build Elephant Butte Reservoir and to deliver 60,000 acre-feet annually to Mexico in the
bed of the Rio Grande."' The deliveries to Mexico were to be in the same proportion as deliveries to the El Paso side of the Rio Grande, except in the case of
drought, when the United States and Mexico would share equally in any reductions."' The draft treaty also stated that the delivery of water to Mexico was not a
recognition of Mexico's claims, and in exchange for the water, Mexico waived
all claims to damages and all claims to waters of the Rio Grande above Fort
Quitman.' '
Bien's draft treaty was approved by Secretary of State Elihu Root and, in
late 1905, it was sent to the Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Joaquin
D. Casasus.' In March 1906, Casasus replied by requesting the annual delivery
of 75,000 acre-feet to be measured at the head of the Acequia Madre, and that
Mexico be guaranteed one-half of all stream flows from reservoir spills, excess
releases, or inflow between Juarez and Fort Quitman.'- The United States refused to yield on these points, and by late May 1906, the Mexican Ambassador
had, nevertheless, signed the treaty.'2' The Senate advised ratification of the
treaty on June 26, 1906;' 2' the President ratified it on December 26, 1906; and
after the exchange of ratifications, the treaty was proclaimed by the President on
January 16, 1907.
2

The treaty itself is quite short, consisting of only six articles and states:
The United States of America and the United States of Mexico being desirous to provide for the equitable distribution of the waters of
the Rio Grande for irrigation purposes, and to remove all causes of
controversy between them in respect thereto, and being moved by considerations of international comity, have resolved to conclude a Convention for these purposes and have named as their Plenipotentiaries:
The President of the United States of America, Elihu Root, Secretary of State of the United States; and
The President of the United States of Mexico, His Excellency Sefior
Don Joaqufn D. Casasds, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of Mexico at Washington;
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Who, after having exhibited their respective full powers, which
were found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following
articles:
ARTICLE I
After the completion of the proposed storage dam near Engle, New
Mexico, and the distributing system auxiliary thereto, and as soon as
water shall be available in said system for the purpose, the United
States shall deliver to Mexico a total of 60,000 acre-feet of water annually, in the bed of the Rio Grande at the point where the head works of
the Acequia Madre, known as the Old Mexico Canal, now exist above
the city of Juarez, Mexico.
ARTICLE II
The delivery of the said amount of water shall be assured by the
United States and shall be distributed through the year in the same proportions as the water supply proposed to be furnished from the said irrigation system to lands in the United States in the vicinity of El Paso,
Texas, according to the following schedule, as nearly as may be possible:

Acre-Feet Per

Corresponding

Month

Cubic Feet of Water

0

0

February

1,090

47,480,400

March

5,460

237,837,600

April

12,000

522,720,000

May

12,000

522,720,000

June

12,000

522,720,000

July

8,180

356,320,800

August

4,370

190,357,200

September

3,270

142,441,200

October

1,090

47,480,400

November

540

23,522,400

December

0

0

Year Total

60,000

2,613,600,000

January
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In case, however, of extraordinary drought or serious accident to the
irrigation system in the United States, the amount delivered to the
Mexican Canal shall be diminished in the same proportion as the water
delivered to lands under said irrigation system in the United States.
ARTICLE III
The said delivery shall be made without cost to Mexico, and the
United States agrees to pay the whole cost of storing the said quantity
of water to be delivered to Mexico, of conveying the same to the international line, of measuring the said water, and of delivering it in the
river bed above the head of the Mexican Canal. It is understood that the
United States assumes no obligation beyond the delivering of the water
in the bed of the river above the head of the Mexican Canal.
ARTICLE IV
The delivery of water as herein provided is not to be construed as a
recognition by the United States of any claim on the part of Mexico to
the said waters; and it is agreed that in consideration of such delivery of
water, Mexico waives any and all claims to the waters of the Rio
Grande for any purpose whatever between the head of the present
Mexican Canal and Fort Quitman, Texas, and also declares fully settled
and disposed of, and hereby waives, all claims heretofore asserted or
existing, or that may hereafter arise, or be asserted, against the United
States on account of any damages alleged to have been sustained by the
owners of land in Mexico, by reason of the diversion by citizens of the
United States of waters of the Rio Grande.
ARTICLE V
The United States, in entering into this treaty, does not thereby concede, expressly or by implication, any legal basis for any claims heretofore asserted or which may be hereafter asserted by reason of any
losses incurred by the owners of land in Mexico due or alleged to be
due to the diversion of the waters of the Rio Grande within the United
States; nor does the United States in any way concede the establishment of any general principle or precedent by the concluding of this
treaty. The understanding of both parties is that the arrangement contemplated by the treaty extends only to the portion of the Rio Grande
which forms the international boundary from the head of the Mexican
Canal down to Fort Quitman, Texas, and in no other case.
ARTICLE VI
The present Convention shall be ratified by both contracting parties
in accordance with their constitutional procedure, and the ratifications
shall be exchanged at Washington as soon as possible.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have
signed the Convention both in the English and Spanish languages and
have thereunto affixed their seals.
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Done in duplicate at the City of Washington, this 21" day of May, one
thousand nine hundred and six.
ELIHU ROOT [Seal]
JOAQUIN D. CASASUS [Seal].'
Article II, the heart of the international apportionment, contains the schedule
for delivery of water to Mexico. It calls for the delivery of 60,000 acre-feet between February and November "distributed throughout the year in the same
proportions as the water supply proposed [for] ... the lands in the United States
in the vicinity of El Paso, Texas .......
Article II appears to be the combined
work product of H.D. Slater, Morris Bien, and Benjamin Hall. Slater apparently
conceived the basis for the quantification, based upon the 1896 I.B.C. Report on
an international dam at El Paso. Hall devised the schedule and place of delivery,
and Bien authored the provisions for sharing shortages in times of drought.''
Article III provides that the water deliveries are at the United States' cost
and the water is to be delivered in the Rio Grande at the head of the Mexican
Canal.'2 ' This means that the United States (the Rio Grande Project) bears all
delivery losses (if any), but has no obligation to ensure further delivery to the
Acequia Madre."'
Articles IV and V contain the parties' legal disclaimers. In Article IV, the
United States denies the treaty is a recognition of claim by Mexico to waters of
the Rio Grande. Mexico, meanwhile, waives any and all claims to water from
the Rio Grande between the headgate of the Mexican Canal downstream to Fort
Quitman and any damage claims on account of diversions from the Rio Grande
by citizens of the United States.'3°
Article V contains the United States' denial of any legal basis for any claims
that had been asserted or could thereafter be asserted by reason of any losses
incurred by Mexican landowners on account of diversions from the Rio Grande
within the United States."' It also contains the United States' denial that the
treaty establishes any sort of general principle or precedent."2 Finally, it makes
clear that the treaty only covers the portion of the Rio Grande from the international boundary downstream to Fort Quitman, Texas, and nothing else."'
While the treaty itself is quite simple, it contains no discussion for the bases
of the quantification or the distribution of deliveries. The basis for these provisions seems clear enough from the underlying historical documents. The meaning of the terms in Article II concerning proportional reduction in water deliveries, apparently drafted by Bien, is more elusive. The language of Article II
does not define "extraordinary drought." On its face, the treaty appears to con-
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template a proportional reduction in deliveries. Since the Project lands receive
more than the 2.5 acre-feet per acre that formed the basis for the allocation to
Mexico, the threshold question is whether the proportional reduction in deliveries occurs when the Project lands receive anything less than a full supply, or
only when the Project land would otherwise receive less than the 2.5 acre-feet
per acre at the river headgate that was allocated to Mexico. The term "extraordinary drought" and the underlying impetus for of the treaty, namely comity, favor
the latter interpretation.
V. COMPLETING THE NEW MEXICO-TEXAS APPORTIONMENT
The ratification of the 1906 Treaty preceded completion of plans for the Rio
Grande Project. The federal legislation authorizing the Project did not specify
the precise lands to be irrigated in New Mexico or Texas." Thus, once the treaty
with Mexico was concluded, the task of identifying the lands to be supplied
water in New Mexico and Texas remained, as did the final configuration of the
Project's diversion dams and conveyance channels.
To formalize the water supply for the Rio Grande Project, on January 3,
1906, Hall notified the New Mexico Territorial Irrigation Engineer of the Reclamation Service's intent to appropriate 730,000 acre-feet annually for the Rio
Grande Project to be stored in Elephant Butte Reservoir."' Two years later, the
Reclamation Service increased its request by seeking all of the thenunappropriated water of the Rio Grande."h
The Rio Grande Project presented an enormous opportunity for profit from
speculative land sales, and land speculation was rife throughout the Mesilla and
Rincon Valleys in advance of the Project.' The owners of lands to be flooded by
Elephant Butte Reservoir sought such large sums for their land that in many
cases the United States was required to condemn the land."' Water user associations were formed both in New Mexico and Texas to contract for water deliveries and Project repayment. Eager landowners in New Mexico pledged to bring
124,000 acres of land into irrigation by the Project, while their counterparts in
Texas pledged to bring 59,000 acres of land into the Project. "' While these
pledges were more than sufficient to support a determination that the Project
was feasible, they also began the posturing over water allocation. '"
Land without water in the Elephant Butte-to-Fort Quitman section of the Rio
Grande was worth very little compared to lands to be served by the Project. '
What lands would be served by the Project was, of course, a function of how the
Reclamation Service decided to deliver Project water. If the river channel and
irrigation canals from the river were the method used, less land could be served
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than by canals built on the mesas above the valleys."' The Rio Grande Company
had recognized this fact back in 1895, and had proposed the construction of a
"high-line" canal to serve the mesa lands. That canal had a total service area of
some 530,000 acres of lands on the mesas and in the river valley."'
The land speculators, alleged to be real estate companies in New Mexico
and Texas, knew their land values would vastly increase if served by the Rio
Grande Project.'" Thus, they relentlessly pressured the Reclamation Service to
include a high-line canal in the Project. They argued that the revenue from hydro-electric power generation along such a canal would more than offset its
added cost of getting water to the mesas."' The Reclamation Service was skeptical of the scheme, perhaps because it viewed it simply as a vehicle for further
land speculation. Nonetheless, to satisfy public pressure, it twice commissioned
engineering studies of a high-line canal to assess its feasibility."'
The first such study was performed by a board of engineers appointed by
Newell."' The board considered a high-line canal from the Leasburg Diversion
Dam down the east side of the Mesilla Valley southeast of Las Cruces, New
Mexico, at which point the fall would permit the generation of hydro-power and
some water could be returned to the river for downstream irrigation."' Water not
released there would be carried in the canal to a point near El Paso, where it
would again generate power, and the remaining water would be returned to the
river."'
The board of engineers rejected this high-line canal proposal."' They concluded that use of a high-line canal would leave the river dry for years at a time,
causing substantial deterioration of the channel."' Such channel deterioration
would mean that in years of high flows the channel could not carry the water
and there would be substantial damage to Project lands and facilities. The only
way to prevent this, without the substantial cost of building and maintaining an
artificial channel, was to use the river as the means to deliver Project water."2
Thus, in their December 1913 report to Newell, the board of engineers rejected
the high-line canal and recommended the river be used to carry Project water."'
The board's recommendations did not lay the matter to rest. By the spring of
1914, New Mexico water users began pressing Project Manager, L.M. Lawson,
to consider building a high-line canal along a new route."' Their request was
apparently motivated by the fear that without a high-line canal, New Mexico
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would not get the acreage contemplated in the 1904 Compromise."' The Reclamation Service's response was twofold. First, it advised New Mexico water
users that under their contract with the Secretary of the Interior, the Reclamation
Service was entitled to determine the lands actually to be irrigated."' Second, it
asserted that the contract entitled the Secretary of Interior to limit the area
served by the Project."7 Thus, the Reclamation Service would determine the
lands to be provided Project water based upon the economic location of canals
and the land area that could be served with the Project's water supply."'
The next effort to revive a high-line canal came from El Paso. The City of El
Paso, in cooperation with other water users, submitted a new engineering proposal for a high-line canal to the Reclamation Service in 1914."' That proposal
would have increased the Project's service area to 225,000 acres and permitted
the delivery of 22,400 to 44,800 acre-feet annually to the City of El Paso."' In
response, a new board of engineers was appointed by the Reclamation Service
and requested to study the proposal."'
In November 1919, this board reported that a high-line canal and associated
power plants were not economically feasible."2 The board also rejected supplying water to the City of El Paso because the board estimated that El Paso ultimately might need 45,000 acre-feet annually, or some 8.7% of the Project's
water supply.'63 To meet that demand, a corresponding decrease of 13,500 acres
to the Project's service area would be required." Last, but not least, the board
concluded that the anticipated safe annual yield of Elephant Butte Reservoir was
only 720,000 acre-feet."' This was only enough water to supply 155,000 acres in
the United States. When the 60,000 acre-feet for irrigation of 25,000 acres in
Mexico was considered, the total acreage to be served was 180,000., which was
the amount Hall had estimated for the entire Rio Grande Project."' Thus, without
taking land out of irrigation, no Project water could be provided to El Paso.
While this decision finally laid to rest the high-line canal issue, it did not
resolve the acreage allocation between New Mexico and Texas. That allocation
was not resolved until some years later, when the Elephant Butte Reservoir District ("EBID") (for New Mexico), and the El Paso Water Improvement District
No. I (for Texas) ("El Paso District"), entered into agreements approving an
allocation of Project costs and irrigable acreage between them."' The first of
three agreements was made in 1929, arising from the need to authorize additional funds to complete portions of the Rio Grande Project. '" The 1929 agree-
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ment confirmed that EBID would have 88,000 irrigable acres and the El Paso
District would have 67,000 irrigable acres.' When the 25,000 acres allocated to
Mexico were included, the total irrigable land was 180,000 acres, essentially
equal to Hall's estimate.' °
In 1938, a new interdistrict agreement was made to facilitate the 1938 Rio
Grande Compact.'7 The 1938 agreement, according to Douglas Littlefield, was
intended by the Rio Grande Compact Commissioners to cover the apportionment of the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte Reservoir so that that issue did
not have to be addressed in the Rio Grande Compact.72 The 1938 agreement
fixed the districts' respective irrigated acreage and apportioned the water and
costs on the basis of 88,000 acres or 56.8% to EBID and 67,000 acres or 43.2%
to the El Paso District.' This allocation is essentially the same agreement the
1904 Compromise from the Irrigation Congress that formed the basis for the
authorization of the Rio Grande Project."'
VI. CONCLUSION

At the end of the 19 Century, most of the increase in water demand on the
Rio Grande occurred in Colorado and was for irrigation use. In the last two decades of the 20"h Century, the explosive growth in the Upper Rio Grande Basin
has been in the urban areas, including Las Cruces, El Paso, and Juarez. That
growth is taxing the region's limited water supply and causing serious conflict
between municipal water utilities, agricultural water users, and state and federal
governments over the use and control of the Rio Grande Project facilities and
water supply. In addition, the region has increasingly relied upon groundwater to
meet its current water demands, resulting in a material groundwater overdraft
with all of its attendant problems. The divergent interests of the EBID, the El
Paso District, the states of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas, the United States,
and the Republic of Mexico complicate the adjustment of these water supply
problems. It appears, however, that the fundamental bases for resolving these
disputes are found in the 1906 Convention and the allocation of water between
Texas and New Mexico that made possible the 1906 Convention.
1h

While the fray continues downstream of Elephant Butte Reservoir, upstream
water users in New Mexico and Colorado cast a wary eye on their brethren below Elephant Butte Reservoir. They have learned through hard experience that
downstream water users prefer to solve their problems at the cost of those upstream. The history and present state of water development in the Upper Rio
Grande make clear that eternal vigilance is the price for owning a water right.
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MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT: STRICT CRIMINAL
LIABILITY FOR NON-HUNTING, HUMAN CAUSED
BIRD DEATHS

LARRY MARTIN CORCORAN*

PROLOGUE

You operate an electrical utility in remote, treeless areas of the American
Southwest. Migratory birds find your electrical distribution poles convenient
surrogates for trees. Unfortunately, 38 of the birds manage to electrocute themselves over the course of two and one-half years. You are convicted of a federal
crime, violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA),' on account of the
birds' deaths.Over 5000 migratory birds are found dead at the base of your radio transmission towers in the middle of the Great Plains. The birds were attracted by
lights on the towers. The birds died when they collided with the towers and
tower guy wires which were obscured by fog and blowing snow.' You are not
prosecuted, and some courts have expressed misgivings about any effort being
made to prosecute you.
I. INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 1918 in order to protect
and preserve populations of migratory birds.' No migratory bird may be killed

Trial Attorney, Environmental Crimes Section, Environment and Natural Resources
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
The author thanks John T. Webb, Assistant Chief of the Wildlife and Marine Resources
Section, whose advice, encouragement, guidance, and wisdom made this article possible; Elinor
Colbourn, Senior Trial Attorney of the Wildlife and Marine Resources Section, whose review made
this article more accurate and readable, and assured the parallel construction of compound
statements including this one; and Albert M. Manville II, Ph.D., Wildlife Biologist, United States
Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of Migratory Bird Management, whose guidance to sources of data
also made this article possible. Any lingering deficiencies are entirely the responsibility of the
author.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the
views of the Department of Justice or of any other agency.
I. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See also Migratory Bird Conservation
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 7150) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (defining "migratory birds" for the MBTA); 50
C.F.R. § 10.13 (2000) (listing all species of migratory birds protected by the MBTA).
2. This situation arose in the case of the Moon Lake ElectricalAssociation in Colorado. See
United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 45 F. Supp.2d 1070, 1071 (D. Colo. 1999).
3. The described incident actually occurred on the night of January 22, 1998. See THE
TOPEKA
CAPITAL JOURNAL
(Jan. 30,
1998), (revisited
on
Feb.
13, 2001)
<http://www.cjponline.constories/013098/kanbirds.html>.
4. For a discussion of the origins of the MBTA and a detailed description of its requirements,
see Larry Martin Corcoran & Elinor Colbourn, Shocked, Crushed and Poisoned: Criminal
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unless authorized by the Secretary of the Interior.' Violations of the MBTA are
criminal offenses;' most are strict liability misdemeanors.'
Pursuant to the MBTA, millions of migratory birds are lawfully killed annually by hunters' pursuant to regulations or permits issued by the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).' However, it is estimated that hundreds of
millions of additional migratory birds are killed annually, without any legal
authority.'" Some of the causes of such deaths have been prosecuted, e.g., deaths
caused by illegal hunting, by ingestion of pesticides or poisons," and by electrocution. However, other, more destructive causes of migratory bird deaths have
not been prosecuted, e.g., deaths caused by impacts with automobiles, airplanes,
and towers. Some courts have even suggested that prosecution of such killings
may not be brought under the MBTA.'2
After a brief summary, in Part II, of the consistent judicial interpretation of
the MBTA as a strict liability criminal statute, Part III discusses the meaning of
strict criminal liability, and the ambiguities inherent in use of it or other conclusory terms to describe the scienter requirements of any criminal statute.

Enforcement In Non-Hunting Cases Under the Migratory Bird Treaties, 77 DENY. U. L. REV., 361,
361-79 (Parts Iand II) (2000).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a). Sections 704 and 712 of the MBTA authorize the Secretary of the
Interior to promulgate regulations to implement the MBTA and its underlying conventions.
6. See id. § 707. As one federal judge stated, "My experience at the bar was that one jail
sentence was worth 100 consent decrees and that fines are meaningless because the defendant in the
end is always reimbursed by the proceeds of his wrongdoing or by his company down the line."
Steven Zipperman, Comment, The Park Doctrine - Application of Strict Criminal Liability to
Corporate Individuals For Violation of Environmental Crimes, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
123, 153 (1991) (citing Barry C. Groveman & John L. Segal, Pollution Police Pursue Chemical
Criminals,55 Bus. Soc'Y REV. 39, 42 (1985)).
7. See 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) & (c). Commercial violations and certain baiting violations are not
strict liability offenses. See id. §§ 704(b) (baiting violations), 707(b) (commercial transactions). For
cases holding the MBTA is a strict liability statute, see infra Part II (MBTA Misdemeanor's Held to
Be Strict Liability Crimes).
8. Hunters killed an estimated 16.57 million ducks. 3.13 million geese, and 369,000 coots
during the 1998 waterfowl season. ELWOOD M. MARTIN & PAUL I. PADDING, U. S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV., OFFICE OF MIGRATORY BIRD MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, Harvest

Surveys Section (July, 1999). Ducks, geese, and coots are only some of the birds legally killed
pursuant to permits. Those numbers reported by Martin and Padding are comparable to data reported
by Banks for the late 1960s and early 1970s, at which time he estimated that hunting accounted for
about 60 percent of total migratory bird mortality, while impacts with human constructions
accounted for approximately 31.6 percent, and poison or pollution accounted for only 1.8 percent.
See RICHARD. C. BANKS, HUMAN RELATED MORTALITY OF BIRDS IN THE UNITED STATES, U.S.
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. SPECIAL SCIENTIFIC REPORT-WILDLIFE 215, 14, tbl. 10 (1979)

(120,539,500 birds taken by hunting out of a total of 196,887,810 human caused fatalities). In light
of more recent estimates of non-hunting bird fatalities, it appears the number of non-hunting
fatalities is much higher and, consequently, a larger percentage of the total number of migratory bird
deaths are caused by humans. See infra Part VII.A (Foreseeable bird deaths).
9. See Migratory Bird Hunting regulations, 50 C.F.R. Part 20 (2000). See also Migratory
Bird Permits, 50 C.F.R. Part 21 (2000).
10. See BANKS, supra note 8, at 5; infra Part VII.A (Foreseeable bird deaths).
11. See, e.g., infra Part V (Judicial Uneasiness With Strict Criminal Liability). See also
Corcoran & Colboum, supra note 4, at 389-391 (Part III.B.1.).
12. See, e.g., infra Part V (Judicial Uneasiness With Strict Criminal Liability).
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Part IV describes judicial acceptance of strict criminal liability, especially by
the United States Supreme Court, even for felonies and even in its strictest form,
that in which the defendant neither knows of nor intends the circumstances
which make him or her criminally liable.
Part V describes the uneasiness often expressed when courts are called upon
to enforce strict criminal liability, while Part VI describes various means courts
have used to limit and ameliorate its effects. Part VI also discusses the limitations and deficiencies in the theories and defenses used by courts to limit strict
criminal liability, including the theory of proximate causation put forward by
recent court opinions. The theories generally incorporate requirements of foreseeability, avoidability, and voluntary assumption of risks.
Part VII presents data which demonstrates that the circumstances in which
courts have expressed reluctance to apply strict criminal liability under the
MBTA (e.g., impacts with automobiles, aircraft, and fixed objects) are more
foreseeable and avoidable than are many other forms of indirect migratory birds
deaths caused by humans for which courts have imposed MBTA liability (e.g.,
electrocution and poisoning by pesticides).'
Part VIII describes ongoing administrative initiatives under the authority of
the MBTA to reduce foreseeable and avoidable deaths of migratory birds caused
by impacts with human constructions.
The data and analysis in this article lead to a conclusion that the courts'
efforts to limit strict liability, including the suggested use of proximate causation, is misguided policy-making that is based upon erroneous factual assumptions and that is better left to the democratic processes of legislation and regulation.

13. Birds are killed by other non-hunting trauma, including logging and farming. This article
focuses on traumatic bird deaths for which data exists that can be compared with courts' expressions
of concern about MiBTA application. However, there is no reason to believe that, were data
available, the conclusions of this article would not be equally applicable to other common sources of
traumatic bird deaths. For a discussion of issues relating to bird deaths caused by timber harvesting,
see Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 4 at 319-393 (Part III.B.2 and 3).
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II. MBTA MISDEMEANORS HELD TO BE STRICT LIABILITY CRIMES"

That the MBTA imposes strict criminal liability was first affirmed in 1939,
in United States v. Reese."
There appears no sound basis here for an interpretation that the Congress intended to place upon the Government the extreme difficulty of
proving guilty knowledge ... on the part of persons violating the express language of the applicable regulations promulgated pursuant to
the statute [MBTA]; but it is more reasonable to presume that Congress
intended to require that hunters shall investigate at their peril conditions
surrounding the fields in which they seek their quarry."
Since 1939, the federal courts of appeal have almost uniformly held the
misdemeanor provision of the MBTA, Section 707(a), to be a strict liability
criminal statute.'7

14. For policy arguments for and against strict liability under the MBTA, compare Steven
Margolin, Liability Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 7 ECOLOGY L. Q. 989, 996-999 (1979)
(advocating strict liability), with M. Lanier Woodrum, The Courts Take Flight: Scienter and the
MigratoryBird Treaty Act, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 241, 243-48 (1979) (opposing a strict liability
interpretation). Woodrum's premise, that Congress did not intend the MBTA to be a strict liability
crime, has since been disproved by Congress in its statements in connection with amendments to the
felony and the baiting provisions of the MBTA. See S. REP. No. 99-445, at 16 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128 ("Nothing in this amendment [tothe felony provision) is intended to
alter the 'strict liability' standard for misdemeanor prosecutions under 16 U.S.C. § 707(a), a standard
which has been upheld in many Federal court decisions."); S. REP. No. 105-366, at 1-2 (1998)
("General Statement and Background") (when Congress added the scienter requirement for MBTA
felony offenses it "expressly reinforced the strict liability standard for misdemeanors ....
");S. REP.
No. 105-366, at 2-3 (1998) ("Summary and Objectives of the Legislation") ("The elimination of
strict liability, however, applies only to hunting with bait or over baited areas, and is not intended in
any way to reflect upon the general application of strict liability under the MBTA."). Nevertheless,
the force of the policy arguments against imposing strict liability remain.
15. 27 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Tenn. 1939).
16. Reese, 27 F. Supp. at 835.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Scienter is not an element of criminal liability under the
Act's misdemeanor provisions."); United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 431, 435 n.4 (8' Cir. 1986)
("[Ilit is not necessary to prove that a defendant violated the Migratory Bird Treaty Act with specific
intent or guilty knowledge."); United States v. Chandler, 753 F.2d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[A]
hunter is strictly liable for shooting on or over a baited area."); United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d
1102, 1104-05 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that scienter is not a required element for a conviction under
the MBTA). Limited exceptions to the uniform affirmation of strict criminal liability under the
MBTA were the Sixth Circuit's rejection of the original MBTA strict liability felony provision and
the Fifth Circuit's rejection of strict liability for hunting over or with the aid of bait. See United
States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d 910,
912-13 (5th Cir. 1978). Although no other Circuit joined the Sixth or Fifth Circuits, in each instance
Congress amended the MBTA to require scienter. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 704(b) (2000) (baiting
provisions); 16 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (felony provision) (2000).
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11.

MEANING OF STRICT LIABILITY

A. Classic Descriptionof Strict Liability

"Ordinarily, a criminal offense requires both a voluntary act (actus
reus) and a culpable state of mind (mens rea).' '
The Supreme Court has observed that "[tihe existence of a mens rea is the
rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence.""
However, for some crimes a culpable mental state, or mens rea, is not required for a conviction. One category of such crimes is known under the name
of "strict liability." Examples of strict liability crimes include sales of alcohol to
vulnerable groups, sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs, narcotics transactions, and child pornography.' In recent years, the list has expanded to include
reporting violations."

18. Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402 (1993) (citing Gerhard O.W. Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42
MINN. L. REV. 1043, 1052 (1958)). See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52
(1952) ("Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evilmeaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and
early root in American soil."). But see Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998) ("[T]he
background presumption that every citizen knows the law makes it unnecessary to adduce specific
evidence to prove that 'an evil-meaning mind' directed the 'evil-doing hand."'). "Primitive English
law 'started from a basis bordering on absolute liability.'" Dennis Jenkins, CriminalProsecutionand
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: An Analysis of the Constitution and Criminal Intent in an
Environmental Context, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 595, 596 n.5 (1997) (quoting Francis B.
Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 977 (1932)). The need for an actus reas has a
Constitutional foundation in the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 533 (1968) ("[C]riminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has committed some
act.... has committed some actus reas") (interpreting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
19. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500
(1951))).
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in
mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.
Morissette 342 U.S. at 250. See also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)
("[Climinal offenses requiring no mens tea have a 'generally disfavored status."') (quoting United
States Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 438).
20. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 406, n.29. Much of Levenson's footnote is derived from a
1933 list of strict liability public welfare offenses by Francis B. Sayre. See id. supra note 18, at 406,
n.29 (citing Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 73 (1933)). See also
Robert J. Jossen, Strict Liability in Criminal Cases-The Present Day Implications of Dotterweich
and Park, in CRIMINAL LAW AND URBAN PROBLEMS 1985, at 33, 39-40 (PLI Litig. & Admin.

Practice Course Handbook Series No. C4-4174, Dec. 16, 1985) (citing other examples of strict
liability crimes including transportation of dangerous products, dumping of hazardous wastes,
fishing in international waters, Occupational Health and Safety Act violations).
21. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 413 n.76 (citing the Tobacco Adjustment Act of 1984, 7
U.S.C. § 509 (Supp. 11 1990) (imposing imprisonment up to five years for failure to comply with
tobacco manufacturer's reporting requirements)). It has been said that felony murder is a form of
strict criminal liability in that criminal liability is imposed regardless of whether or not deaths were a
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Strict criminal liability means criminal prosecution without proof of mens
rea, without proof of guilty knowledge or of evil or wrongful purpose-the defendant may not even know the facts that subject him or her to criminal
liability." Strict criminal liability has also been described as a no-fault crime,
allowing conviction without proof of any fault on the part of the defendant.23 In
this sense, strict liability is absolute liability."s Absolute criminal liability can
convict the morally blameless or "innocent"" and, perhaps, has been best described by the statement that, "If a principle is at work here, it is the principle of
'tough luck."'..
B. Ambiguities In Strict Criminal Liability Overlap with Other Mens Rea
A more accurate description of strict criminal liability is that it removes the
requirement of proof of the defendant's knowledge of one or more key or "mate

foreseeable consequence of the illegal crimes being committed. Levenson, supra note 18, at 423
n.113; id. at 425 n.125.
22. See also Zipperman, supra note 5, at 127 (strict criminal liability can hold one "liable,
although he is not only not charged with moral wrongdoing, but has not even departed in any way
from a reasonable standard of intent or care.") (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 536 (5th ed. 1984)). See, e.g.,United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250,
252-53 (1922); Jossen, supra note 20, at 35.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 610 (1971) (quoting Balint, 342 U.S. at
254) (explaining that strict liability may expose those who are "innocent" actors to a criminal
penalty).
24. See United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652, 660 (5th Cir. 1976); Levenson, supra
note 18, at 417. "Absolute liability" means criminal liability without regard to the defendant's
knowledge or intentions and may be a technically accurate description of a strict liability crime, but
it probably is generally not an accurate description of what a prosecutor is willing to prosecute. See
id. at 417 n.86 (suggesting "absolute liability", more precisely describes situations in commonwealth
countries in which Parliament expressly states that no mens rea is required and that no defense based
on mens rea will be permitted) (citing C.B. Cato, Strict Liability and the Half-Way House, 1981 N.Z.
L.J. 294, 294 n.6 (1981)). But see Levenson, supra note 18, at 415 ("The prosecution proposed to
hold Keating 'responsible for an offense which, no matter how careful, no matter how honest, no
matter how decent and law abiding he may be, he could not by the most diligent effort know
about."') (quoting prosecution argument in Respondent's Brief at 18-20, People v. Keating, No. BA
025236 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1991)). Strict liability in tort is rarely absolute. See KEETON, supra note 22,
§ 79, at 559-60.
25. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 413 (listing convictions of persons without knowledge of
their own wrongdoing, including a widow convicted of adultery after being erroneously informed
that her husband was dead, Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889), and also a farmer convicted of
trespass after relying on faulty government survey report, State v. Gould, 40 Iowa 372 (1875)). See
generally KEETON, supra note 22, § 75, at 535 (distinguishing the criminal law "fault" connotation
of moral blame from tort law "fault" which means only a departure from a required standard of
conduct even if innocent or beyond defendant's control).
26. Stanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 267 (1987). See also Mark
Kelman, Strict Liability: An Unorthodox View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUST. 1512, 1515
(Standford H. Kadish ed., 1983) ("[T]here is no reason to believe that he is anything worse than
unlucky, and no reason to single him out for disapproval.").
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rial" elements of the crime." The requirement for some knowledge distinguishes
strict liability from absolute liability. Strict liability crimes are also kin to the
related doctrines of vicarious criminal liability"8 and responsible corporate officer"9 which can impose a duty to ascertain relevant facts and to undertake action
to prevent violations.'
Strict criminal liability is similar to negligent crimes in that negligent crimes
do not require any particular state of mind on the part of the defendant" but,

27. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 418 n.90 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(4), 2.05
(1962)). In the course of rejecting a strict criminal liability interpretation of the National Firearms
Act 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1994), the Supreme Court stated that "the term 'strict liability' is really
a misnomer," and that, in interpreting public welfare offenses, it has generally "avoided construing
criminal statutes to impose a rigorous form of strict liability." Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,
607 n.3 (1994). In Staples, the Court stated expressly that "different elements of the same offense
can require different mental states." Id. at 609. Courts have also interpreted a strict criminal liability
provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) (1994), to
include a knowledge component. See Zipperman, supra note 5, at 159 n.257. Strict liability in tort
also requires some amount of knowledge. Prosser and Keeton observe that, absent a contrary
statutory provision:
[Sitrict liability will never be found unless the defendant is aware of the
abnormally dangerous condition or activity, and has voluntarily engaged in or
permitted it. Mere negligent failure to discover or prevent it is not enough,
although it may, of course, be an independent basis of liability . . . . What is
meant is that he is liable although (I) he did not intend an invasion on the basis of
which liability could be imposed and (2) he was not negligent in proximately
causing the harm.
27. KEETON, supra note 22. § 79, at 559 (footnote omitted).
28. See KEETON, supra note 22, § 81, at 582 (stating that "[v]icarious liability is now quite
generally recognized as a form of strict liability" in torts.) (footnote omitted); Levenson, supra note
18, at 417 n.86 ("Vicarious liability refers to a respondeat superior notion that a supervising
individual or corporation may be criminally liable for another's act without knowledge of the
wrongful conduct of the responsible party.") (citations omitted).
29. See Avo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d at 661-62 (relying on responsible corporate officer analysis in
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 676 (1975)).
30. See infra notes 53-57 and 66-67, and accompanying text (discussing Unites States v. Park,
421 U.S. 658 (1975), and United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)).
31. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 420 n.98. The negligent defendant may be totally unaware
of risks created by his or her activities, but the law holds him or her responsible for his or her
disregard of the rights of and risks to others. See Levenson, supra note 18. at 420 n.97.
Again where one deals with others and his mere negligence may be dangerous to
them, as in selling diseased food or poison, the policy of the law may, in order to
stimulate proper care, require the punishment of the negligent person though he
be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells.
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1922) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (affirming
strict criminal liability for narcotics sale). In terms of the defendant's lack of knowledge, the
negligence described by the Balint court is indistinguishable from a strict liability crime, but the
burden of proof and the defenses available differ for strict criminal liability and for negligent crimes.
"Park established that the failure of a manager to act, when he or she had the authority and
responsibility to act, will result in a violation. This description of duty and breach invites a standard
negligence analysis." Zipperman, supra note 5, at 132 (citing Park, 421 U.S. at 671). Still, "[tihe
Park doctrine contains an inherent ambiguity as to whether a corporate officer is strictly liable
merely because he or she possesses the power to correct a violation, or whether the prosecution must
show the violation of a negligence standard." Zipperman, supra note 5, at 133.
"Thus, any differences between the theories of negligence and strict liability are
insignificant in practice." Id. at 134. "In practice, negligence statutes frequently become the
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rather, only require a failure to meet a standard of conduct that is expected of the
defendant regardless of his or her state of mind."
In the end, the phrase "strict liability" is misleading and overused. Descriptive phrases such as "absolute liability," "strict liability," "negligence," "knowingly," "general intent," "wilfully" and "specific intent" give a mistaken impression that there are discrete levels of mens rea or criminal intent, analogous to
physical quantum states, into which any given crime may be placed without
overlapping adjacent, but separate, levels of mens rea. Instead, different levels
of criminal mens rea are more numerous and, in practice, tend to merge into a
continuum of mental states." On one end of the continuum are crimes for which
the prosecution must prove the defendant acted with knowledge that the results
were prohibited by a statute of which the defendant knew and which he or she
intended to violate.' At the other end of the continuum are crimes, much more
common in theory than in practice, for which the defendant need only be proven
to have caused a prohibited result, regardless of the defendant's knowledge,
intention, ability to avoid the result, or even extraordinary efforts to prevent and
avoid the result.
An example of the overlap in terminology, and consequential ambiguities, is
in the use of "knowingly" and "willfully" to describe mens rea.3 In different
contexts, "willfully" means anything from an act simply done "voluntarily and
intentionally" without any bad purpose or knowledge of illegality," to an act
functional equivalent of strict liability statutes. When the public welfare is at stake, courts often
apply strict liability, but call it negligence." Zipperman, supra note 5, at 148.
32. One authority has stated that the difference between strict criminal liability and negligent
crimes "is that, as long as the crime is a non-strict liability crime [i.e., negligence], the issue is
decided by a tribunal which both hears the evidence and sets the standard [of conduct] in the
defendant's case." Levenson, supra note 18, at 420 n.102 (quoting Alan Saltzman, Strict Criminal
Liability and the United States Constitution: Substantive Criminal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L.
REV. 1571, 1584 (1978)). Apparently, the Supreme Court agrees. See United States v. Morissette,
342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) ("The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a
guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction . . . and to circumscribe the freedom
heretofore allowed juries.").
33. See United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 432 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986) (describing a
"continuum of strict liability crimes"). The United States Sentencing Guidelines describe a portion
of the continuum in the policy statement on regulatory offenses which describes four categories of
technical recordkeeping offenses: failure to fill out a form intentionally but without knowledge or
intent that substantive harm result; the same failure may carry a substantial likelihood of harm or
make the harm more likely; the failure may have actually led to substantive harm; and the failure
may have been intended to conceal harm that had occurred. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 1A4(f) (1999).
34. See generally United States v. Moskowitz, 883 F.2d 1142, 1149-50 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding
that a willful violation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(h)(2),
required both knowing acts (voluntary and intentional and not accidental), and knowledge that the
regulations prohibited the acts).
35. "Much confusion exists over the precise meaning of mens rea today because 'not all
lawyers and judges assign the term . . . a normative meaning."' Jenkins, supra note 18, at 596 n.8
(citing Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The
EnvironmentalExample, 25 ENVTL. L. 1165, 1167 n.10 (1995)).
36.

8TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7.02 cmt. (1996); 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.5 cmt.

(1997) ("willfulness" as a description of an "intentional mental state" connotes an act "done on
purpose; it does not suggest the act was committed for a particular purpose, evil in nature") (quoting
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done with knowledge of wrongfulness but not of illegality," to an act done "voluntarily and intentionally with the purpose of violating a known legal duty," as
in tax cases,' or even an act done knowing the actions were illegal." Similarly,
"knowingly" means anything from an act done without any bad purpose or
knowledge of illegality,"° to a possessory act done with knowledge of the nature
of the material possessed (e.g., the age of persons depicted in sexually explicit
material) but not necessarily knowledge of its illegality," to an act done knowing
it was forbidden by law, albeit the defendant may not have known the particular
law." The Ninth Circuit has observed that "the difference [between willfully and
knowingly] appears to be more one of semantics than actual substance."'" Similarly, courts use the term "strict liability" to describe a continuum of mental
states also described by the terms "absolute liability," "negligence,"- and
"knowingly.""
Appellate courts' pattern jury instructions discourage use of ambiguous
terminology such as "general intent," "specific intent," and "willfully."' Properly, a court should focus on the mens rea required for each individual element
of the offense." Nevertheless, courts continue to characterize statutes as a whole.
Consequently, the degree of concern that a court may show for the imposition of

S. REP. No. 95-605, at 58-59 (1977)). See also 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.5 cmt. (1997) ("In
many cases.... the concept of willfulness will be adequately explained in other instructions defining
'knowingly,' 'intentionally,' or 'deliberately."'). "The word 'willful,' even in criminal statutes,
means no more than that the person charged with the duty knows what he is doing. It does not mean
that, in addition, he must suppose that he is breaking the law." 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.5 cmt.
(1997) (quoting Judge Learned Hand in American Surety Co. v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605. 606 (2nd Cir.
1925)).
37. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1998) (proof of knowledge of the
law is not required because of the "background presumption that every citizen knows the law").
38. See 8TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7.02 cmt. (1996); 9th Cir. Crim. Jury Instr. 5.5 cmt.
(1997).
39. See 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.5 cmt. (1997) (in context of 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994)).
40. See 8TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7.03 cmt. (1996); 9th Cir. Crim. Jury Instr. 5.6 cmt.
(1997).
41. See 8TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7.03 cmt. (1996) (citing United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994)).
42. See 8TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7.03 cmt. (1996) (citing Liparota v. United States, 471
U.S. 419, 434 (1985)).
43. See 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.5 cmt. (1997) (quoting United States v. Sirhan, 504
F.2d 818, 820 n.3 (9th Cir. 1974)).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
45. Courts uncomfortable with strict liability often adopt defenses and burdens of presenting
evidence normally applicable to negligent crimes. See infra Part VI (Defenses, Limitations, and
Ameliorations to Strict Liability).
46. 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.4 cmt. (1997) ("recommends avoiding instructions that
distinguish between 'specific intent' and 'general intent'"); id. at 5.5 (recommends no instruction
defining willfully); id. at 5.6 (instruction may be appropriate but it is reversible error to give
knowingly instruction in money laundering cases); 8TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7.01 cmt. (1996) (no
specific intent instruction recommended), id. at 7.02 (no willfully instruction recommended except
in tax cases and odometer fraud cases), id. at 7.03 (no knowingly instruction recommended).
47. See, e.g., 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5.4 cmt. (1997) ("Accordingly, the judge should
determine the requisite mental state as to each element of the charged offense and instruct thereon.");
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 (1994) (public welfare offenses eliminate the
requirement of mens rea with respect to an element of a crime).
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strict criminal liability depends on what form of "strict liability" it is imposing
from the outset.
IV. JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF STRICT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Strict criminal liability has been upheld by courts,' including the United
States Supreme Court, in even its strictest forms. Although the Supreme Court
has described strict criminal liability as "generally disfavored,'"' it does not "invariably offend constitutional requirements.""0
The Supreme Court has endorsed the application of strict criminal liability in
which absolutely no mens rea was required," i.e., absolute liability. At other
times the Supreme Court has affirmed criminal liability under statutes that
omitted the mens rea requirement for one or more elements of the offense but
not for all the elements. It described some of those cases as "strict liability"
offenses and others as "knowing" offenses but the results were similar for the
defendants. The point of these cases is that Congress may Constitutionally omit
the requirement for mens rea from criminal statutes, regardless of whether the
offenses are or are not characterized as "strict liability" crimes. Cases in which
the Supreme Court has upheld the omission of mens rea from criminal statutes
include the following:"2
United States v. Park,5" reinstated a misdemeanor" conviction of a "responsible corporate officer" for adulterated food stored in a contaminated warehouse. Although there was evidence that the defendant knew
of the problem, the Supreme Court stated, without reservations, that the
Act did not condition criminal liability upon the defendant's "awareness of some wrongdoing" or "conscious fraud."5 The defendant need
only have been in a position with responsibility and authority to pre-

48. See, e.g., United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 435-36 (3d. Cir. 1986). See also supra Part H (MBTA Misdemeanors
Held To Be Strict Liability Crimes).
49. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437-38 (1978).
50. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
52. Except as otherwise noted, the maximum penalties described for the listed Supreme Court
cases are taken from Engler, 806 F.2d at 435.
53. 421 U.S. 658 (1975). One commentator has argued that reliance on Park or Dotterweich,
in the context of strict liability, as opposed to vicarious liability crimes, is misplaced since the
question involved in those cases was extension of existing strict liability under the FDCA rather than
the initial imposition of strict liability. See Woodrum, supra note 14, at 249 n.81 (describing Park
and Dotterwiech as cases of vicarious liability in which the liability happened to be strict liability).
However, one can also argue that, instead of being held vicariously liable for the violations of their
subordinates, the corporate officers were being held strictly liable for failing to perform a statutory
duty of their own, such as to prevent the violations. See Zipperman, supra note 6, at 129.
54. The maximum possible imprisonment for a federal misdemeanor conviction is one year,
and it may be less. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6)-(8) (1994) (classification of misdemeanor offenses);
id. § 358 l(b)(6)-(8) (maximum terms of imprisonment for misdemeanors).
55. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1975) (citing United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277 (1943)).
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vent or correct the violation and failed to do so." The statute imposed
"a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations . . . [and] a duty to
implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur.""
United States v. InternationalMinerals & Chemical Corp.," reinstated
an information which failed to charge a "'knowing violation' of the
regulation.... that required hazardous materials to be listed on shipping
papers. Relying on Balint and Freed, the Court stated that the probability of regulations is so great that anyone aware of his or her possession
of hazardous materials "must be presumed to be aware of the regulation.""' The Court also held that the defendant would not be guilty if, in
good faith, the defendant thought it was shipping an innocuous substance such as distilled water."'
United States v. Freed," reinstated an indictment, charging possession
of an unregistered destructive device, specifically hand grenades, that
had no allegation that the defendant knew them to be unregistered."
The maximum penalty was $10,000, ten years in prison, or both.
United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Company,' reinstated an information charging the defendant with holding food under unsanitary conditions, the court observing that "[iut is settled law in the area of food
and drug regulation that a guilty intent is not always a prerequisite to
the imposition of criminal sanctions."

56. See, e.g., Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74. Park specified two requirements for criminal
responsibility of persons not directly responsible for the criminal act: (1) the superior must occupy a
position of "responsibility and authority" with regard to the act, and (2) must have had the power to
prevent it through the exercise of the "highest standard of foresight and vigilance." Developments in
the Law-CorporateCrime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through CriminalSanction, 92 HARV.
L. REv. 1243, 1262-63 (1979) (quoting Park,421 U.S. at 672-674).
57. Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
58. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
59. International Minerals,402 U.S. at 559.
60. Id. at 565. The Supreme Court also recited the maxim that "ignorance of the law is no
excuse." Id. at 562. The Supreme Court does not explain why, if ignorance of the law is truly no
excuse, there is any need for a presumption of knowledge of regulations based on the knowing
possession of "dangerous or deleterious devices or products ...." Id. at 565. Cf. Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (finding a due process notice requirement is a precondition
"where a person, wholly passive and unaware of any wrongdoing, is brought to the bar of justice for
condemnation in a criminal case."). International Minerals illustrates the converse of the paradox
described by Jenkins: "Although the criminal law generally sought to punish only the morally
blameworthy, the law, in a confusing and ill-defined paradox, also generally held that ignorance of
the law was no excuse from criminal liability." Jenkins, supra note 18, at 597.
61. InternationalMinerals, 402 U.S. at 563-64. Although the Court expressly distinguished
InternationalMinerals and Freed from strict liability offenses, both the InternationalMinerals and
Freed decisions presumed knowledge of regulations, based upon the defendant's knowledge of the
nature of the items possessed, and dispensed with any requirement to prove the defendant acted with
a bad or guilty intent.
62. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
63. Only the manufacturer or importer could register. Freed,401 U.S. at 603-604.
64. 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964). The issue in Wiesenfeld Warehouse was whether the statute was
vague and whether the District Court had correctly interpreted the statute. See id at 89-91.
Consequently, the Supreme Court's discussion of the requisite intent was dicta.
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Williams v. North Carolina,' affirmed a conviction for bigamy, with no
proof that the defendants knew that North Carolina would not recognize their Nebraska divorces. The maximum penalty was ten years in

prison.
United States v. Dotterweich," reinstated a misdemeanor conviction for
misbranded and adulterated drugs. The defendant's mens rea was not
an issue in the Supreme Court but the Court described the statute under
which he was convicted as being of a type that "dispenses with the
conventional requirement for criminal conduct--awareness of some
wrongdoing." 6'
United States v. Balint," reinstated an indictment, charging selling of a
derivative of opium, that had no allegation that the defendant knew it to
be a prohibited drug. The maximum penalty was five years in prison.
Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry. v. United States,' affirmed a penalty for failure to properly maintain rail car couplers and brakes, even
though the defendant exercised reasonable care, had no knowledge the
cars were out of repair, and had no intention to violate the law.7' Although the case was a civil proceeding, the reasoning of the Supreme
Court did not distinguish between civil and criminal proceedings."
Shevlin-Carpenter Company v. Minnesota," affirmed a conviction for
trespass, in the form of timber cutting, even though the defendant "had
reasonable ground for believing authority had been granted, and honestly acted on such belief."" The penalty for the corporate defendant

65. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
66. 320 U.S. 277 (1943); see also supra note 53 (discussing whether Parkand Dotterweich are
appropriate precedents for interpreting strict criminal liability).
67. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943).
68. 258 U.S. 250 (1922). See also United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922)
(reinstating indictment for unlawful selling of narcotics by a physician writing prescriptions; "If the
offense be a statutory one, and intent or knowledge is not made an element of it, the indictment need
not charge such knowledge or intent.").
69. 220 U.S. 559 (1911).
70. See id. at 569.
71.
"The power of the legislature to declare an offense, and to exclude the elements of
knowledge and due diligence from any inquiry as to its commission, cannot, we think, be
questioned." Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 220 U.S. at 578 (citations omitted). See also id. at
579.
72. 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
73. Shelvin-Carpenter,218 U.S. at 64 (quoting State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 102 Minn. 470,
479, 113 N.W. 634, 638 (1907)). In Shevlin-Carpenter,the Supreme Court articulated a conclusive
argument that "innocence cannot be asserted of an action which violates existing law, and ignorance
of the law will not excuse." Id. at 68. The problem in the Shevlin-Carpenterreasoning is that the
defendant was reasonably mistaken as to the factual status of his permit, not the legal consequences
of those facts. The Court did not rely on the reasoning of Shevlin-Carpenterin its Balint decision, in
which it described potential "innocent" sellers of drugs, something impossible under the ShevlinCarpenterreasoning that there can be no "innocent" law-breakers. See Balint, 258 U.S. at 254
(describing potential "innocent" sellers of drugs).
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was double damages in the amount of $14,664.12" but the penalty for
an individual could include up to two years in prison.'
Certain themes, not always consistent, can be derived from the Supreme
Court cases. The offenses were often labeled as public welfare, safety, or morals
statutes." The Court was usually but not always of the opinion that the affected
public either should have been aware that there would be laws or regulations
that should be consulted," or had knowingly assumed a risk." The Court has
Note however that, today, environmental and wildlife permits are treated as an extension
of regulatory law and, as such, their interpretation are matters of law and not of fact. See, e.g.,
United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1287 (9th Cir. 1993).
74. Shelvin-Carpenter,218 U.S. at 64.
75. See id. at 62 n.I.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (public safety); Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 238 (1945) ("public policy ...bearing upon the integrity of family
life ....
");United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) ("phases of the lives and health
of people which ... are largely beyond self-protection"); Balint, 258 U.S. at 252-53 ("maintenance
of a public policy" by police power to control a "noxious" substance); Shevlin-Carpenter,218 U.S.
at 68 ("the public welfare has made it necessary to declare a crime"). See also Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 (1994) (describing "public welfare offenses"); United States v. AyoGonzalez, 536 F.2d 652, 660 (5th Cir. 1976) ("the Act is based on strong policy considerations").
77. See, e.g., United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565
(1971) ("[A]nyone who is aware that he is in possession of [dangerous materials] .. . must be
presumed to be aware of the regulation."); Freed, 401 U.S. at 609 ("[Olne would hardly be surprised
to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act."). See also Balint, 258 U.S. at 254
("Doubtless considerations as to the opportunity of the seller to find out the fact" were included by
Congress in its calculus in electing strict criminal liability); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425,
435-36 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The capture and sale of species protected by the MBTA is not 'conduct that
is wholly passive,' but more closely resembles conduct 'that one would hardly be surprised to learn.
. .is not innocent."') (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920)); Ayo-Gonzalez, 536
F.2d at 660 ("[L]awmakers clearly thought it highly unlikely that purely innocent violations would
occur."). See also Staples, 511 U.S. at 611 (possession of guns, even though arguably "dangerous,"
would not alert owners to likelihood of strict regulation). The Supreme Court has had a similar focus
- on the likelihood that a defendant might know regulations exist - in its decisions that decline to
interpret criminal statutes as imposing strict liability. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419, 432-33 (1985) (distinguishing a strict liability public welfare offense as one in which "Congress
has rendered criminal a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent
public regulation and may seriously threaten the community's health and safety"); Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 227 (1957) (finding strict criminal liability violated due process "where no
showing is made of the probability of such knowledge" that a felon must register if remaining in Los
Angeles more than five days).
Recently, two Supreme Court justices have expressed a desire to limit the application of
the public welfare doctrine to individual factual situations arising under the criminal statutes instead
of to the statutes as a whole. See Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000) (Justices Thomas
and O'Connor dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Thomas authored the Staples opinion that
declined to apply the public welfare doctrine to regulation of admittedly dangerous implements, such
as guns, if the implements were in common use. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 611. Justice O'Connor
authored a concurring opinion in Sweet Home that elaborated the use of proximate causation to limit
strict criminal liability. See Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515
U.S. 687, 708-714 (1995) (Justice O'Connor, concurring).
78. "The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are
beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has
a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises
whose services and products affect the health and well-being of the public that supports them."
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975); Balint, 258 U.S. at 252-54 (defendant to act
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consistently held that Congress may balance the possible injustice of subjecting
an innocent actor to criminal liability against the evil of exposing innocent
members of the public to the danger being regulated. "In the interest of the
larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relationship to a public danger.'" 9 The same
rationale supports omission of a mens rea requirement in other areas of government regulations, including environmental and wildlife regulation. '
The Supreme Court has also accepted the difficulty of proving scienter as an
appropriate consideration in the calculus by Congress." In general, the Court has
not seen the role of courts to be protection of the innocent persons swept up in

(selling) and to ascertain facts "at his peril"); Shevlin -Carpenter Co., 218 U.S. at 69 ("When the
permit was issued, plaintiffs in error knew the limitations of it, and they took it at the risk and
consequences of transgression"). The requirement that the defendant subject to strict liability
voluntarily assume a position of responsibility for a foreseeable risk is also a foundation for strict
liability in tort. See KEETON, supra note 22, § 79, at 559.
("It is quite conceivable that Congress, contemplating the inevitable hardship of such injuries
[caused by the prohibited conduct], and hoping to diminish the economic loss to the community
resulting from them, should deem it wise to impose their burdens upon those who could measurably
control their causes, instead of upon those who are in the main helpless in that regard.").
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) ("The accused, if he does not
will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might
reasonably expect ... from one who assumed his responsibilities."). But see Liparota, 471 U.S. at
432-33 (describes most "public welfare offenses" as having "rendered criminal a type of conduct
that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously
threaten the community's health or safety"). The Liparota characterization may be difficult to square
with Williams, 325 U.S. at 227, 239, which upheld a felony conviction for bigamous cohabitation in
North Carolina following valid Nevada divorces.
79. United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964) (quoting Dotterweich,
320 U.S. at 281). See, e.g., Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 ("Balancing relative hardships, Congress
has preferred to place it upon those who have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of the
existence of conditions imposed for the protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce,
rather than to throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless.").
Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 ("Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an
innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug,
and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided. Doubtless considerations as to
the opportunity of the seller to find out the fact and the difficulty of proof of knowledge contributed
to this conclusion."). See also Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry.,, 220 U.S. at 575 ("its harshness is
no concern to the courts").
Perhaps the reader's most intimate experience with strict criminal liability is with driving
faster than the speed limit, inadvertently of course, for which it is particularly apt to say that the risks
of the illegal conduct "include the possibility of physical or moral harm, and the possibility that a
culpable defendant would escape punishment by feigning ignorance or mistake." Levenson, supra
note 18, at 424.
80. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 282-83 & n.2 (in the context of drug regulation, Congress
has observed that, for regulations enforced only by fines, "[clorporations carrying on an illicit trade
would be subject only to . . .a 'license fee' for the conduct of an illegitimate business.") (citing
H.Rep. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., p.4).
81. See, e.g., Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 ("Doubtless considerations as to the opportunity of the
seller to find out the fact... " were weighed by Congress); Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 218 U.S. at 69
("[W]hether wilful, accidental, or involuntary [is] equally difficult to establish ....
").See also AyoGonzalez, 536 F.2d at 660 ("Moreover, it is appropriate to note that prosecutions under section 1081
would be extremely difficult if the government had to prove willfulness or even negligence.").
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the net that Congress cast." Quite the contrary, the Court has emphasized the
primacy of implementing the intent of Congress."
The ripple, or perhaps the rapids, in the smooth flow of the Supreme Court's
opinions was its decision in United States v. Morissette" In Morissette, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for taking $84 worth of spent shell casings
from a posted artillery range." Without contradiction, Morissette denied any
criminal intent in taking the casings, which he believed to be abandoned. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction." In a frequently quoted passage, the
Supreme Court described strict criminal liability cases as ones in which "penalties commonly are relatively small,"88 a demonstratively inaccurate description

82. But see infra Part VI. (Defenses, Limitations and Ameliorations to Strict Liability).
83. See, e.g., Balint, 258 U.S. at 252-53 (whether scienter is an element of a statutory criminal
offense "is a question of legislative intent to be construed by the court"). See also Liparota, 471 U.S.
at 424 ("The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature,
particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute.") (citing to United
States v. Hudson, II U.S. 32 (1812)); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 1986)
("We agree with the district court that to supply an element of specific intent here would be
impermissible 'judicial legislation."'); Stepniewski v. Gagnon, 732 F.2d 567, 571 (7th Cir. 1984)
("A state's decisions regarding which actions or activities will give rise to strict criminal liability rest
within that state's sound legislative discretion."); Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d at 658 ("The question,
then, is primarily one of legislative intent, but the result must comport with fundamental
constitutional standards.").
84. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
85. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 247, 276.
86. See id. at 248-49.
87. See id. at 276.
88. Id. at 256.
The industrial revolution multiplied the number of workmen exposed to injury
from increasingly powerful and complex mechanisms . . . . Traffic of velocities,
volumes and variety unheard of came to subject the wayfarer to intolerable
casualty risks .... Congestion of cities and crowding of quarters called for health
and welfare regulations ....
[W]ide distribution of goods became an instrument
of wide distribution of harm . . . . Such dangers have engendered increasingly
numerous and detailed regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of
particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health,
safety or welfare.
Id. at 253-254.
[L]awmakers, whether wisely or not, have sought to make such regulations more
effective by invoking criminal sanctions . . . aptly called 'public welfare offenses'
. . . Many of these offenses are not in the nature of positive aggressions or
invasions, with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of
neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty. Many
violations of such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to person or
property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to
minimize .... In this respect, whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the
same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence,
legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify
intent as a necessary element. The accused, if he does not will the violation,
usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might
reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one
who assumed his responsibilities. Also, penalties commonly are relatively small,
and conviction does no grave damage to an offender's reputation.
Id. at 254-56. For examples of cases and authorities citing or quoting Morissette, see Levenson,
supra note 18, at 419 n.93; United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1985); AyoGonzalez, 536 F.2d at 657-58.
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of the Supreme Court's own affirmations of strict criminal liability in the cases
listed above." In fact, the Morissette decision turned not on the magnitude of the
criminal penalties, for Morissette was convicted of a misdemeanor violation,"
but rather on statutory interpretation." The Supreme Court treated the offense as
one based on common law antecedents, for which the Court will not dispense
with mens rea absent a clear intent by Congress to do so, rather than a public
welfare offense. 2 Thus, properly interpreted, Morissette is an expression of
courts' reluctance to interpret ambiguous criminal statutes as imposing strict
liability; it is not an expression of a limit on the power of Congress to impose
strict liability.
V. JUDICIAL UNEASINESS WITH STRICT CRIMINAL LIABILITY

The justification for strict criminal liability is that it shifts the risks of dangerous activity to those best able to prevent a mishap.93 As Dean Roscoe Pound

Sometimes, the reliance on Morissette appears to be deliberately selective. For example,
the Supreme Court in Staples cited and relied upon the Morissette description of commonly small
penalities, and with citations to numerous state court cases, but ignored the many Supreme Court
affirmations of strict criminal liability, with the exception of a single "but see" citation to Balint. See
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616-619 (1994).
89. See supra Part IV (Judicial Acceptance of Strict Criminal Liability). See also Levenson,
supra note 18, at 404 n.16 ("Furthermore, the Supreme Court has fostered a misperception that
culpability is irrelevant because of the absence of severe penalties."); id. at n. 17 (listing federal and
state strict criminal liability felony cases in which maximum sentences could have been as much as
five or ten years in prison for narcotics, pornography, securities fraud, bribery, bank loan, and
criminal syndicalism offenses). Furthermore, as many have observed, even a misdemeanor
conviction can have a significant effect upon one's reputation. See United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d
425, 434 (3rd Cir. 1986) ("The differences between the objective penalties of the misdemeanor and
felony provisions of the Act is, for due process purposes, de minimus.").
90. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 248. Morissette was sentenced to two months imprisonment or
a fine of $200. Id. The maximum penalty provided by the statute was one year imprisonment or a
fine of up to $1000. See id. n.2.
91. See id. at 263-73. See also, Jenkins, supra note 18, at 620 (stating that Morissette stands
for the proposition that Congressional intent must be determined when criminal intent is omitted);
Stepniewski v. Gagnon, 732 F.2d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that the Morissette Court
enunciated factors as general policy concerns which explain the historical development of strict
liability crimes). Morissette established an interpretative presumption that crimes having their origin
in the common law will not be construed as eliminating the element of a mens rea absent a clear
intent by Congress to eliminate the element. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 437 (1978). See also Morissette, 342 U.S. at 265 ("[I]t is significant that we have not
found, nor has our attention been directed to, any instance in which Congress has expressly
eliminated the mental element from a crime taken over from the common law.").
92. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252-53 ("However, the Balint and Behrman offenses belong to
a category of another character, with very different antecedents and origins. The crimes there
involved depend on no mental element but consist only of forbidden acts or omissions.").
93. This rationale for strict criminal liability parallels the rational for strict tort liability. The
foundation for strict liability in tort is that the defendant has possession and power to control. See
KEETON, supra note 22, at 541 (discussing strict liability for damages caused by trespassing
livestock). In the case of strict liability in tort, the public policy at play is that the person who
brought into the community an unusual, abnormal, or unnatural activity should bear the costs of
misadventure regardless of fault. See id. § 75, at 536-537.
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said: "'[Strict liability] statutes are not meant to punish the vicious will but to
put pressure upon the thoughtless and inefficient to do their whole duty in the
interest of public health or safety or morals."'" The Supreme Court has voiced a
similar rationale:
The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to
prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and
no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed
his responsibilities."
It is frequently argued, with good cause, that sweeping up the innocent' with
the guilty, as is the case for strict liability without defenses, does not serve the
objective of shifting risks to those best able to prevent mishap, nor does it serve
any other reasonable societal purpose."
Whatever value strict criminal liability may have against those with the
ability to prevent harm, there is no utility when all reasonable means and care
have been taken and the activities are commonly accepted as necessary to modem society." Therefore, "[s]trict liability laws are inefficient because they tend
Strict liability in tort is essentially a cost-shifting provision that does not depend upon the
degree of care but simply on the defendant's choice to undertake the activity. See id. § 78, at 556
("The point is that certain conditions and activities may be so hazardous to another or to the public
generally and of such relative infrequent occurrence to justify allocating the risk of loss to the
enterpriser engaging in such conduct as a cost of doing business."). Thus, even in the absence of
culpability on the part of the defendant, a rational societal purpose is served. In contrast, strict
criminal liability does not shift the burden of misadventure from the victim to the initiator of the
activity. If there is also no means by which even the most careful defendant could have avoided
misadventure, then strict criminal liability serves no purpose other than to frighten citizens into
avoiding activities that are useful or even necessary to a modem society.
94. Levenson, supra note 18, at 419 n.95 (quoting ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE
COMMON LAW 52 (1921)).
95. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256).
96. For examples of "innocent" defendants in strict criminal liability cases, see Levenson,
supra note 18, at 403 n.6 (citing cases concerning reliance on state licensed personnel, and longstanding practices and directions by a supervisor in the defendant's government office). Although
beyond the scope of this article, corporate officers and supervisors without knowledge of their
subordinates' wrongdoing are not "innocent." One of the most succinct explanations for why they
are not innocent was given in an early English criminal case against corporate directors who were
ignorant of illegal disposal of waste. "'[I]f persons for their own advantage employ servants to
conduct works, they must be answerable for what is done by those servants."' Zipperman, supra note
6, at 125 (quoting Rex v. Medley, 172 Eng. Rep. 1246, 1250 (K.B. 1834)). See also United States v.
Parfait Powder Puff Co., 163 F.2d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1947) (a responsible party may not avoid
criminal liability by delegating responsibility to a subordinate).
97. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 425 ("Opponents of the strict liability doctrine argue that
its justifications are inconsistent with both utilitarian and retributivist theories of punishment."). The
statement assumes that retribution remains an acceptable basis for punishment. In Morissette,
discussing the historical requirement for scienter, the Supreme Court quoted its previous observation
that: "'Retribution is no longer the dominate objective of the criminal law ....
We also there
referred to a prevalent modem philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offenders
and not merely the crime." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251 n.5 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247 (1949)).
98. Levenson observed: "If the defendant crosses those limits, intentionally or unintentionally,
society will seek to punish the defendant's behavior. The strict liability doctrine thereby serves an
important function of setting firm limits on conduct that society is loath to tolerate." Levenson,
supra note 18, at 424. That may be true in the instance Levenson gives as an example, felony
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to over-deter individuals' behavior."" In addition, strict criminal liability reverses the classic principle of the common law that "it is better that ten guilty
persons escape than one innocent person suffer."'" For these reasons, many
courts have expressed misgivings about the application of strict criminal liability,' including under the MBTA."2 Perhaps most frequently cited concerning the
extent of MBTA strict liability are the Second Circuit decision in United States
v. FMC Corp., 3 and two federal district court cases.'
In FMC Corp., the court affirmed MBTA misdemeanor convictions for bird
deaths resulting from FMC's discharge of wastewater, from pesticide manufacturing, into a pond that attracted migratory birds.' °' After migratory birds were
found dead at the pond, FMC attempted various measures to scare the birds

murder, but for felony murder, the defendant normally undertakes to commit some felony requiring a
wrongful intent. In other cases, the quoted rationale misses the point that, in the course of seeking to
brand conduct society is loath to tolerate, Congress may also punish activity that is useful and
necessary to a modem society that may inevitably kill some birds regardless of the degree of care
and attention exercised by those undertaking the activity.
99. Levenson, supra note 18, at 426, 427 n. 137 (quoting Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the
Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109). While it may be true that strict criminal liability may
overdeter, the objection does not address the question of whether it is for Congress to make the
policy judgment or for the courts.
100. Levenson, supra note 18, at 427 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTON, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 73 (2d ed. 1972)); see Zipperman, supra note 6, at 140-41 (same).
101. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256 (Courts have construed public welfare statutes that are
silent as to intent as dispensing with the intent requirement but "[t]his has not, however, been
without expressions of misgiving.").
102. For example, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Van Fossan, affirmed a conviction
for poisoning pigeons that the city authorities had ordered the defendant to remove. See United
States v. Van Fossan, 899 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1990). The Court observed that:
People who assault federal officers commit a federal crime without knowing that
the victim is a federal officer ... perhaps those who assault birds need not know
the victims are migratory. On the other hand, an attack on a person is
presumptively criminal, and the offender has no compelling interest in which
body of law supplies the penalty.
Van Fossan, 899 F.2d at 639 (citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit, in the course of affirming a
conviction for hunting on a baited field, observed that strict liability is a harsh rule, which can
ensnare the subjectively innocent, but that it is for Congress and the Secretary of the Interior to
change it. See United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984) ("We concede that [strict
liability] is a harsh rule and trust that prosecution will take place in the exercise of sound discretion
only."). See also United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d 955, 958 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The hunter is therefore
placed in a precarious position. He must determine the intent of the individual who seeded the area
before undertaking the hunt and, if he errs in that determination, he is criminally responsible. A
subjectively 'innocent' person can unwittingly run afoul of the regulation.").
103. 572 F.2d 902 (2nd Cit. 1978). For discussions of United States v. FMC Corp., see George
Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 188-89, 191-92, 196 (1979), Scott Finet, Habitat Protection
and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 17 nn.72-73, 18 nn.75-76 (1996), and
Benjamin Means, ProhibitingConduct, Not Consequences: The Limited Reach of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 823, 825 nn.l 1-13 (1998).
104. See United States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742, 744 (D. Idaho 1989); United States v.
Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 536 (E.D. Cal.), affd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978). For
discussions of Corbin Farm, see Coggins & Patti, supra note 103, at 185-87, 191-92; Finet, supra
note 103, at 16 n.69, 18 n.75, and Means, supra note 103, at 825 nn.l 1-12.
105. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905,908.
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away from the pond, including Styrofoam floats, loud cannon explosions, and
guards.'- Neighbors complained of the noise, and the guards fell asleep and neglected their duties ....
.FMC argue[d] that it had no intention to kill birds, that it
took no affirmative act to do so, possessed no scienter, and thus should not be
held liable under the Act.'"'
The Second Circuit rejected FMC's arguments, quoting from Morissette
that, "[tihe criminal law may punish 'neglect where the law requires care, or
inaction where it imposes a duty."'"' Analogizing to strict liability in tort, the
court noted that FMC was engaged in the manufacture of a dangerous pesticide
and, therefore, Congress in the MBTA reasonably held such persons strictly
accountable for unforeseeable consequences of this extra-hazardous activity.'
Nonetheless, the court was careful to note that "[imposing strict liability on
FMC in this case does not dictate that every death of a bird will result in imposing strict criminal liability on some party ....The court also noted that
"[c]ertainly construction that would bring every killing within the statute, such
as deaths caused by automobiles, airplanes, for] plate glass modem office
buildings ... would offend reason and common sense.""' The court noted that,
in any event, "'(a)n innocent technical violation ... can be taken care of by the

106. See id.
at 905.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 906.
109. Id. at 907 (quoting United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952)).
110. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 907-08. The Supreme Court's opinion in Staples v. United
States described "'deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials' [as things that] put
their owners on notice that they stand 'in responsible relation to a public danger."' Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1994) (quoting United States v. International Minerals & Chem.
Group, 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) and United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943)).
However, dangerousness alone is not sufficient to assume that Congress intended to impose strict
liability. The appropriateness of the things to their neighborhood is also important to strict liability
analysis because, as the Supreme Court stated, "[elven dangerous items can, in some cases, be so
commonplace and generally available that we would not consider them to alert individuals to the
likelihood of strict regulation." Id. at 611. Curiously, in light of the MBTA's strict criminal liability
for hunting violations, the Supreme Court held that the destructive potential of guns does not put
their owners on notice of potential regulations. See id. at 610-11.
The real meaning of Staples is that guns will not be treated as drugs were treated in Balint,
no matter how destructive they may be. A defendant need not know the nature of drugs he or she
possesses but he or she must know the nature of any firearm in order to be criminally liable for
violating any regulations applicable to the type of firearm. Compare Staples, 511 U.S. at 611, with
Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 ("[The Narcotic Act's] manifest purpose is to require every person dealing in
drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes within the inhibition of the statute,
and if he sells the inhibited drug in ignorance of its character, to penalize him."). The logic of the
distinction may be lost on a generation that grew up with widespread use of both drugs and guns,
and with frequent debates over whether to increase or loosen the regulation of each, as it would have
been lost on those who grew up in an era (not long before the Court issued its decision in Balint)
devoid of any regulation of drugs.
11. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 908.
112. See id. at 905. Expressions of concern over the complexity of the law, prosecutorial
discretion, and mens rea or scienter requirements are a frequent theme in environmental criminal
law. The relationship of the myths to empirical reality has recently been examined by Kathleen F.
Brickey, The Rhetoric of Environmental Crime: Culpability, Discretion, and StructuralReform, 84
IOWA L. REV. 115 (1998).
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imposition of a small or nominal fine' [and] [s]uch situations properly can be
left to the sound discretion of prosecutors and the courts .....
Commentators have observed that the Second Circuit relied upon the ultra
hazardous nature of pesticide manufacture, and that in future MBTA cases the
Second Circuit may not deem criminal seemingly less-hazardous activities that
result in unintended deaths of migratory birds."' However, as noted by at least
one authority, the Second Circuit's list of presumably non-hazardous activities
itself is subject to question. For example, "a motor vehicle is a dangerous instrumentality and its operation is a task demanding constant alertness; if the
motorist's attention wanders, the death of a bird or other living thing is not a
bizarre occurrence."" '
In United States v. Rollins,"' Rollins had sprayed a field of alfalfa using a
registered pesticide, Furadan, which he had used before without problem.'" Unfortunately, on the instance at issue, geese ingested alfalfa and pesticide and
died."' The District Court focused on the reasonableness of Rollin's actions and
the foreseeability of the outcome."9 The court concluded that the MBTA was
vague and failed to give Rollins fair notice that poisoning migratory birds by
pesticide, used in accordance with label instructions, is a crime.'20 Rollins clearly
turned on the court's view that the outcome of the defendant's actions was not
foreseeable rather than whether the outcome of "dead birds" was a violation of
the MBTA.
In United States v. Corbin Farm Service,'2' the United States charged a pesticide dealer, his employee, an aerial spray operator, and the owner of the field
sprayed, with 10 counts for bird deaths resulting from the single application of
pesticides to an alfalfa field.'"2 In considering pretrial motions to dismiss, the
court held that:

113. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905 (quoting United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.
D. Ky. 1939)).
114.

See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL

WILDLIFE LAW 76-78 (3d ed. 1997); Coggins & Patti, supra note 103, at 190-92; Margolin, supra
note 14, at 992-6, 999-1001; Betsy Vencil, The Migratory Bird Treaty Act-Protecting Wildlife on
Our National Refuges-California'sKesterson Reservoir, a Case in Point, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J.
609, 616-25 (1986); Woodrum, supra note 14, at 248-52.
115. Coggins & Patti, supra note 103, at 192. See also infra Part VII (Bird Deaths Caused By
Instrumentalities of Modem Civilization Are Foreseeable and Avoidable). Lower courts are not
alone in their solicitude to automobile drivers. In Staples, the Supreme Court suggested that it would
not accept strict criminal liability for automobile emission control violations absent a clear
expression of Congressional intent. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 614. The Court's suggestion in Staples
is inconsistent with the prevalence of strict criminal liability for speeding violations and with the
Court's decision in Chicago, B., & Q. Ry. v. United States, in which it held that the defendant's
reasonable care and ignorance of deficiencies in train car repairs was no defense to an enforcement
action. See Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 568-70,579 (1911).
116. 706 F. Supp. 742 (D. Idaho 1989).
117. See Rollins, 706 F. Supp. at 743.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 743-44
120. See id. at 744-45.
121. 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal. 1978), aft'd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
122. See Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 515.
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The instant case is one in which the guilty act alone is sufficient to
make out the crime. When dealing with pesticides, the public is put on
notice that it should exercise care to prevent injury to the environment
and to other persons; a requirement of reasonable care under the circumstances of this case does not offend the Constitution. If defendants
acted with reasonable care or if they were powerless to prevent the
violation, then a very different question would be presented.'"
Thus, the District Court in Corbin Farm based its decision on the known hazards
of pesticides and the foreseeable consequences, as had the Second Circuit in
FMC Corp. It made explicit the reasonable care standard implicit in Rollins,
thereby raising the possibility of a due care defense.''
VI. DEFENSES, LIMITATIONS, AND AMELIORATIONS TO STRICT
LIABILITY
In an effort to ameliorate the harsh effects of strict criminal liability with
respect to the "innocent," courts have relied upon a number of theories and defenses, including reinterpretation of the statute,'" due process, proximate causation,' " minimal punishment, good faith, due care, impossibility, and relying on
prosecutorial discretion."' Often courts use defenses to obtain "justice" in indi-

123. Id. at 536 (citing United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1964)).
124. See BEAN, supra note 114, at 76-78; Coggins & Patti, supra note 103, at 186-87;
Margolin, supra note 14, at 994-96, 999-1001; Woodrum, supra note 14, at 252-53.
125. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 429 & n.148 (citing examples of cases reading an intent
requirement in statutory crimes).
126. See infra Part VLC (Proximate Causation).
127. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 432-33. Arguably, still other defenses could be raised. For
example, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause might be invoked to bar particularly severe
punishment of a defendant the court views as innocent of wrongdoing. See, e.g., Stepniewski v.
Gagnon, 732 F.2d 567, 571 n.3 (1984) (the Cruel and Unusual Clause "proscribes punishment
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime .... ") (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 667 (1977)). The ambiguity of the terms "severe punishment" and "innocence" leave a great
deal of room for creativity. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 227, 229 (1957)
(describing a $250 fine and three years probation as "heavy criminal penalties").
In at least two situations, the Supreme Court has observed that a number of related theories
have been used independently and together to adjust the balance between protecting the innocent and
convicting the corrupt.
The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress
have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the
tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious,
moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This process of
adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the States.
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (quoting Powell v. State of Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 53536 (1968)). One might add good faith to the list.
An additional defense to strict liability in tort is performance of a public duty. See
KEETON, supra note 22, § 79, at 567. An analogous issue under the MBTA remains undecided, that
being whether government contractors share the federal government's immunity from prosecution.
See Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551, 1555 (11 th Cir. 1997) ("It [the MBTA] does not apply to
the federal government."); Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d
110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997) ("MBTA does not appear to apply to the activities of federal government
agencies."); Curry v. United States Forest Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541, 548 (W.D. Pa. 1997) ("The
MBTA, by its plain language, does not subject the federal government to its prohibitions").
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vidual cases while still upholding a strict liability interpretation of the criminal
statute."'
A. Reinterpretation
Although most courts have consistently held the MBTA criminal provisions
to be strict liability crimes, some courts have struggled with whether to read an
intent requirement into the MBTA criminal provisions.
In the course of rejecting a due process challenge to the MBTA, the Third
Circuit held that, if there were a due process problem, it would be "impermissible 'judicial legislation"' to correct the statute by adding an intent element to the
MBTA felony provision. "' On the other hand, in reviewing a misdemeanor conviction for violation of baiting regulations, the Fifth Circuit chose to part company with every other Circuit Court of Appeals and to interpret MBTA regulations as requiring elements of intent."' Significantly, in both instances in which a
federal circuit court expressed objections to the absence of scienter in a MBTA
prosecution, Congress has amended the statute, even when the weight of judicial
authority supported strict criminal liability under the MBTA°"'

However, in a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
MBTA does apply to federal government officials, at least in some instances. See Humane Soc'y of
the United States v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (MBTA prohibitions against harming
birds apply to the federal government but the criminal sanctions do not).
128. Apparently even the most ardent supporters of the MBTA among environmentalists are
not prepared to argue for strict criminal liability in all instances. For example, environmentalists
have challenged the FWS for not restricting loggers but has not argued for an elimination of bird
mortality, instead arguing for a significant reduction. See, e.g., Submission to the Commission on
Environmental Cooperation Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, submitted by Alliance for the Rockies, etaL, November 17, 1999,
Section 6, page 17 (ID: SEM-99-002) ("FWS has the flexibility to craft regulations that implement
and enforce the MBTA in a way that significantly reduces the impacts of logging operations on
migratory birds while allowing logging, an activity that the Submitting Parties recognize as an
economically
valuable
use
of
forests."),
<http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides.registry/
registrytext.efm?%varlan=english&documentid=220>.
129. United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425,431 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Engler,
627 F. Supp. 196, 199 (M. D. Pa. 1985).
130. See United States v. Delahoussaye, 572 F.2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1978). The Fifth Circuit's
decision was based in part on a desire not to see judges as defendants in MBTA prosecutions. See
Delahoussave, 573 F.2d at 912-13 ("Any other interpretation would simply render criminal
conviction an unavoidable occasional consequence of duck hunting and deny the sport to those such
as, say, judges who might find such a consequence unacceptable."). At least one court has also read
an intent requirement into the MBTA in instances of indirect action modifying habitat, such as,
logging. See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1579 (S.D. Ind. 1996) ("The
MBTA does not apply to other activities [other than those intended to harm birds] that result in
unintended deaths of migratory birds."). However, other courts addressing logging have not relied
upon the defendant's intention, but, instead, rely solely on the purported indirect nature of the harm
to birds. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir.1991) ("[Precedent
does] not suggest that habitat destruction, leading indirectly to bird deaths, amounts to the 'taking' of
migratory birds within the meaning of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.").
131. Compare Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Section 501, Pub. L. No. 99-645,
100 Stat. 3582, 3590 (1986) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) felony provision to include requirement
for knowledge), with supra note 17 (cases affirming strict MBTA criminal liability).
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B. Due Process

The Due Process Clause contains basically four requirements for criminal statutes. Due process: (1) prohibits statutes from shifting burdens of
proof onto defendants; (2) prohibits the punishment of wholly passive
conduct; (3) protects against vague and overbroad statutes; and (4) requires that statutes give fair warnings of prohibited conduct. 'The due
process clause imposes little other restraint on the state's power to define criminal acts.'

. .

. Essentially, the more a regulation prohibits what

an average citizen would consider wholly innocent behavior, the more
likely a legislature must require knowledge of the law as an element of
the crime. "2
Due process challenges to strict criminal liability have focused on the sec-

ond (punishment of passive conduct) and fourth (fair warning) requirements of
due process.
Perhaps the leading case for the due process defense to strict criminal liability was Lambert v. California.'"Lambert was a resident of Los Angeles for over
seven years and, during that time, she was convicted of forgery, a felony.'" The
Los Angeles Municipal Code made it unlawful for any felon to stay in Los Angeles for more than five days without registering, "' which Lambert failed to do.'"
She was convicted of failing to register, fined $250, and placed on probation for
three years. ' The Supreme Court characterized Lambert's conduct as "wholly
passive-mere failure to register. It is unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of
his deed ..... Stating that a requirement of notice is engrained in the concept of
due process, the Court held that the registration requirement violated due process, in the absence of either proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of the
requirement or that she had an opportunity to register and avoid criminal penalties once she learned of the ordinance.'" One might ask whether the result would

132. Jenkins, supra note 18, at 600-01 (internal citations omitted); accord Stepniewski, 732
F.2d at 571. But see United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985) (MBTA felony
provision was a strict liability crime but, as such, it violated due process because the penalty was not
"relatively small" and a conviction might "gravely besmirch" the defendant's reputation). Taking
exception to the Sixth Circuit's conclusions, the Third Circuit found no due process problem with
strict criminal liability. See Engler, 806 F.2d at 433. Significantly, affirming the strict criminal
liability, the Third Circuit rejected the prosecution's concession that the absence of a scienter
requirement in the MBTA felony provision violated due process. See id.
133. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
134. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 226.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 227.
138. Id. at 228.
139. See id. at 228-29. In a subsequent opinion, the Supreme Court described its Lambert
decision as holding "that a person could not be punished for a 'crime' of omission, if that person did
not know, and the State had taken no reasonable steps to inform him, of his duty to act and of the
criminal penalty for failure to do so." Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 n.27 (1968). Although not
mentioned by the Court in the quoted passage, in Lambert, the Court's concern that the defendant,
upon learning of the registration requirement, was unable to register without risking a criminal
penalty suggests Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issues were coupled with the due process
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have been the same if Lambert had moved into Los Angeles (active conduct)
after conviction of a felony, or if her felony conviction had been for child molesting."0
In United States v. Engler," the Third Circuit reviewed a conviction under
the original, strict liability felony provision of the MBTA, for sale of bird parts.
In a very thoroughly reasoned opinion, the Third Circuit observed that the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed felony convictions in strict liability criminal prosecutions."' From its review of the Supreme Court cases, the Third Circuit discerned criteria for distinguishing permissible and impermissible use of
strict liability in criminal cases, particularly in light of United States v. Freed.
There [in Freed], the Court distinguished two types of strict liability
crimes. Strict liability for omissions which are not "per se blameworthy" may violate due process because such derelictions are "'unlike the
commission of acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that
should alert the doer to the consequences of his deed."' By contrast,
due process is not violated by the imposition of strict liability as part of
"a regulatory measure in the interest of public safety, which may well
be premised on the theory that one would hardly be surprised to learn
that [the prohibited conduct] is not an innocent act.""'
In Lambert terms, Engler's conduct was active and such that Engler should
have known there would be regulations governing his trade.
C. Proximate Causation
The Supreme Court has observed that:
In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events,
and beyond. But any attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis
would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would 'set
society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation.""

notice problem. See Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229 ("this appellant . . . was given no opportunity to
comply with the law and avoid its penalty, even though her default was entirely innocent.").
140. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14072(i) (Supp. 2000) (knowing failure of certain sexual offenders to
register with the FBI is punishable by up to one year in prison and, for second offenses, by up to 10
years). Justice Frankfurter, writing in dissent in Lambert, said "I feel confident that the present
decision will turn out to be an isolated deviation from the strong current of precedents-a derelict on
the waters of the law." Lambert, 355 U.S. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
141. 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986).
142. See Engler, 806 F.2d at 433-36 (citing United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971)
(possession of unregistered firearm); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (bigamous
cohabitation); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (shipment of misbranded or
adulterated drugs; felony for subsequent offenses); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)
(unlawful drug sale); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910) (cutting timber on
state lands)).
143. Engler, 806 F.2d at 435 (quoting United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 608, 609 (1971))
(internal citations omitted).
144. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266 n.10 (1992) (quoting
KEETON, supra note 22, § 41, at 264 (quoting North v. Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 245, 59 N.W. 1012
(1894))).
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Proximate causation is a tool courts use to "limit a person's responsibility
for the consequences of that person's own acts.'""
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home,'" an Endangered Species Act (ESA)" case, proponents of logging challenged ESA regulations which expanded the statutory
definition of harm to include significant "habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife ..... In responding to the dissent's contention that the ESA provisions could encompass remote and unforeseeable
consequences, the majority of the Supreme Court suggested that proximate causation would be required.''
We do not agree with the dissent that the regulation covers results that
are not "even foreseeable... no matter how long the chain of causality
between modification and injury." Respondents have suggested no reason why either the "knowingly violates" or the "otherwise violates"
provision of the statute - or the "harm" regulation itself - should not
be read to incorporate ordinary requirements of proximate causation
and foreseeability."0

145. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268. Holmes listed three reasons for requiring proximate causation in
civil cases, two of which also have application to criminal case: "First, the less direct the injury is,
the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiffs damages attributable to the
violation, as distinct from other, independent factors .... And, finally, the need to grapple with these
problems [of remote causation] is unjustified by the general interest in deterring injurious conduct..
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269.
146. 515 U.S. 687 (1995), For discussion of the Sweet Home decision and its implications, see
generally Tara L. Mueller, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities: When Is Habitat
Modification A Take?, 3 HASTINGS W.N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 333 (1996).
147. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531- 1544 (1994). The ESA includes a general
intent crime requiring knowing conduct. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 696 n.9 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§
1540(a)(1), (b)(1)). The ESA also includes a strict liability civil penalty provision applicable to "any
person who otherwise violates" the Act. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 696 n.9 (citing 16 U.S.C. §
1540(a)( 1)).
148. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 691-92.
149. See id. at 696 n.9. The foreseeability (and avoidability) analysis introduced by proximate
cause analysis relates to outcomes of actions and is distinct from the foreseeability of the existence
of regulations by one possessing or using deleterious materials. See supra Part IV (Judicial
Acceptance of Strict Criminal Liability) (discussing rationales used by courts affirming strict
criminal liability).
150. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 696 n.9. See also id. at 700, n.13 (the regulation is subject to
"ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability"). Justice O'Connor, in a
concurring opinion, agreed that criminal liability is limited by proximate causation. See id. at 709
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("the regulation's application is limited by ordinary principles of
proximate causation, which introduce notions of foreseeability."). Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia,
joined by two others, agreed that criminal liability is limited by proximate causation under the ESA
but he differed as to the meaning of proximate cause. See id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In fact
'proximate' causation simply means 'direct' causation.") (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1103
(5th ed. 1979)).
Additional insight into the thinking of the Supreme Court on proximate cause can be
gotten by examining its decision in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Company, 513 U.S. 527 (1995), an admiralty tort case. Justice O'Connor authored the Grubart
opinion. She also wrote a concurring opinion in Sweet Home that discussed proximate causation at
length. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court did not explain
the limits imposed by proximate causation but, in Grubart, it did describe those limits as being less
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Recently, in United States v. Moon Lake ElectricalAss'n.,"' an MBTA case
involving arguably unintended bird deaths, a district court invoked proximate
causation. Moon Lake was charged with electrocution of migratory birds, caused
by Moon Lake's failure to install inexpensive protective devices on 2,450 power
poles. 2 Although the court affirmed that the MBTA imposes strict liability, the
court went on to state "the government must prove that Moon Lake's power
lines constitute the cause in fact, as well as the proximate cause, of death .....
[T]he government must prove proximate causation, also known as "legal causation," beyond a reasonable doubt. In this context, "proximate
cause" is generally defined as "that which, in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the accident could not have happened, if the
injury be one which might be reasonably anticipated or foreseen as a
natural consequence of the wrongful act.","'
Application of proximate causation (foreseeability) to MBTA offenses is an
avenue courts may use to solve the dilemma of "absurd and unintended
results""' that may "offend reason and common sense.".... For the traditional
direct harm cases, such as hunting, poaching, and trapping, harm is intended
and, therefore, extremely foreseeable. For the indirect harm cases, proximate
causation analysis provides a method for distinguishing foreseeable harms, for
which defendants may reasonably be held accountable, from unforeseeably remote harms, for which some courts do not believe persons may reasonably be
held accountable."'

stringent than those proposed by Grubart which were that the harm be close in time and space to the
activity that caused it: that it must occur "reasonably contemporaneously" with the negligent conduct
and within reach of the device causing the harm. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 536.
151. 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999).
152. See Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2dat 1071.
153. Id. at 1077.
154. Id. at 1085 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (6th Ed. 1990)). The court in Moon
Lake relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Sweet Home. See id. at 1077 (citing Sweet Home,
515 U.S. at 692).
155. Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1085.
156. United States v. FMC, 572 F.2d 902, 905 (1978). Related to proximate cause is the
absence of the actus reas, as when the defendant acted involuntarily. See Levenson, supra note 18, at
431 (giving as an example an epileptic's actions during a seizure). Levenson states that British courts
have used the absence of an actus reas to avoid strict liability for serious crimes, for example when
another slips narcotics into the defendant's bag without the defendant's knowledge). See Levenson,
supra note 18, at 431 n.156 (citing Regina v. Warner, [1968] 2 W.L.R. 1303, 1345 (Eng.)). See also
KEETON, supra note 22, § 79, at 563-64 (defendant is not strictly liable in tort for forces of nature
and independent actions of third persons or animals not reasonably foreseeable).
157. Notwithstanding that MBTA crimes have no requirement for scienter, a proximate
causation requirement introduces an element of knowledge. A person's knowledge or opportunities
for knowledge become very relevant to the ability to foresee and avoid bird mortality. The following
are some examples of evidence that might be available to prove a defendant's knowledge and
opportunities for knowledge: government, educational, or industry training programs;
announcements and articles in publications and trade journals; prior experience and reports,
including accident and incident reports; discussions or inquiries with regulatory authorities; and
permits and permit applications.
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The court in Moon Lake indicated that it would observe the same limits on
the MBTA as the Second Circuit in FMC Corp., albeit under the different theory
of proximate causation.
Because the death of a protected bird is generally not a probable consequence of driving an automobile, piloting an airplane, maintaining an
office building, or living in a residential dwelling with a picture window, such activities would not normally result in liability under §
707(a), even if such activities would cause the death of protected birds.
Proper application of the law to an MBTA prosecution, therefore,
should not lead to absurd results."
To the extent that proximate cause limits criminal liability to reasonably
foreseeable and avoidable consequences,"' it adds nothing to the many alternative theories for limiting strict criminal liability, e.g., due process, due care, etc.
The theory offers no new criteria for distinguishing reasonably foreseeable migratory bird deaths caused by cars, planes, and towers from unexpected bird
deaths caused by other less predictable causes such as the pesticides used by the
defendant in FMC. Fundamentally, proximate causation is "in the eye of the
beholder."'" After all is said and done, proximate cause is as much a policy decision to cut off the chain of causation as it is a determination of "proximate" as
opposed to "remote" causes. ' As a policy decision, proximate causation en-

158. Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. See Margolin, supra note 14, at 1007 (endorsing "the
Model Penal Code proposal that the actual result be a 'probable consequence of the actor's
conduct'). See also infra note 201 (probability of bird death or injury was only 0.0064 per pole per
year).
159. For a description of different proximate cause tests, see Stephen Scallan, Proximate Cause
Under RICO, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 455, 458-59 (1996) (analyzing "last human wrongdoer test," "cause
and condition test," "justly attachable test," and Palsgrafforeseeability analysis).
Judge Andrews' dissent in Palsgraf argued that one owes a duty not to individual
foreseeable victims, but to the public at large:
Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary
danger, not to protect A. B, or C alone .... Every one owes to the world at large
the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of
others ....
Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected
to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would
generally be thought the danger zone.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102-03 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
160. Mueller. supra note 146, at 338-39 (observing that proximate causation is especially in the
eye of the beholder when framed in terms of "foreseeability" rather than "duty" or "remote" cause,
and that the close connection between the erosion and the death of fish in the Sweet Home case
would have been obvious to anyone with a minimal understanding of basic ecology). For a mindbending essay on how dependent criminal liability is upon perception, or what the author calls "pathdependence," see Leo Katz, Proximate Cause in Michael Moore's Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1513 (1994). Among other things, Mr. Katz describes the dramatically different treatment we
accord deaths caused by "ducking" and deaths caused by "shielding." See id. at 1516-17 (describing
and quoting Christopher Boorse & Roy A. Sorensen, Ducking Harm, 85 J. PHIL. 115 (1988)). An
example is the different treatment accorded death caused by a bear capturing a camper left by her
faster companion and death caused by a camper throwing his companion to the bear in order to save
himself. Id. (citing Boorse & Sorensen at 115-16).
161. See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) ("At bottom,
the notion of proximate cause reflects 'ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively
possible and convenient."') (quoting KEETON, supra note 22, § 41, at 264)). Although Holmes was a
civil case, its description of proximate cause is equally applicable to strict criminal liability. "[T]he
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croaches on the prerogative of Congress to make national policy'62 or the discretion of the prosecutor to enforce the law.
D. Minimal Punishment

One way to mitigate the injustice of strict criminal liability, in the absence of
defenses to weed out the "innocent," would be to exercise discretion in sentencing. Such an approach has been recommended by several commentators"'
although even minimal punishment is cold consolation for the defendant who
could not reasonably foresee the criminal liability or was powerless to prevent
it.",
The reliance on light punishment, or prosecutorial discretion, is often invoked by courts, United States v. FMC Corp.,6 and by Congress but it has not
been universally persuasive. In United States v. Rollins,' the United States District Court for Idaho expressly rejected the reasoning of the Second Circuit in
FMC Corp. with the observation that, "[w]ith deference to the respected tradition of the Second Circuit, a violation of due process cannot be cured by light
punishment .....
The definition of minimum and severe criminal penalties is highly subjective. For example, in Lambert, the U.S. Supreme Court described a $250 fine
and three-year probation as "heavy criminal penalties."" In order to eliminate
the subjectiveness and the disparity in sentences, Congress enacted the United
States Sentencing Guidelines." The Guidelines attempt to foreclose sentencing
discretion for most federal crimes,' ° albeit not for MBTA strict liability
offenses,'' in part because the Guidelines understandably assume that those
awaiting sentencing after conviction are not innocent."2

proximate cause inquiry is based on an unpredictable ... policy analysis, performed on a case-bycase basis. Relying on such a policy-based analysis to limit liability for harm is inappropriate when
Congress has already made the hard policy choice ... " Mueller, supranote 146, at 341. As used in
tons, proximate cause is also ordinarily a policy limitation. See KEETON, supra note 22, § 79, at 560.
162. See Mueller, supra note 146, at 340-41 (in the context of the ESA and the Sweet Home
decision, but equally applicable to the judicial limits on MBTA strict liability: "Congress has already
made the hard policy choice ... it is improper for the courts to arrogate to themselves the authority
to limit an individual's liability .... ).
163. See Levenson, supranote 18, at 433 n.168.
164. Cf Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) ("Even one day in prison would be a
cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold.").
165. 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978). For a discussion of FMC, see supra notes 103-115 and
accompanying text.
166. 706 F. Supp. 742 (D. Idaho 1989).
167. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. at 745.
168. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957).
169. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1998).
170. See U.S.S.G. § 1A3 (1998).
171. MBTA strict liability offenses are petty offenses to which the Guidelines do not apply.
Compare Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (maximum
sentence for MBTA strict liability misdemeanors is 6 months), with 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(7) (1994)
(defining as Class B misdemeanors offenses for which the maximum sentence is 6 months) and
U.S.S.G. § IB.1.9 (Guidelines are not applicable to Class B misdemeanors).
172. The Sentencing Commission treated technical and administrative regulatory offenses as
being of four types, beginning with failure to comply without knowledge or intent, and progressing
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E. Good Faith, Due Care, and Impossibility
Good faith is not generally recognized as a defense to strict criminal liability.' 7' Although not used as a defense in MBTA cases, good faith or due care has
been suggested as a defense in dicta."' Introduction of a good faith defense shifts
strict criminal liability in the direction of negligence because it makes the reasonableness of the defendant's actions and omissions an issue."'
An extreme form of a "due care" defense is impossibility. The U.S. Supreme

Court implicitly recognized a "powerless to protect against" defense to strict
criminal liability in United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co."' The Court did
not discuss or rule on the possible defense other than to state that "it involves
factual proof to be raised defensively at a trial on the merits""' and, therefore,
was not before the court.
In United States v. Park,"' the U.S. Supreme Court expressly recognized an
affirmative defense of objective impossibility.

to violations with knowledge or intent of consequences. See U.S.S.G. § IA4(f) (Regulatory
Offenses). The Guidelines make no reference to inadvertent offenses or offenses that occurred
notwithstanding the exercise of due care or even extreme care by the defendant.
For environmental offenses, the Sentencing Guidelines expressly assume knowing conduct
and, for misdemeanors, allow an unlimited reduction of the sentence in cases involving negligent
conduct. See id. § 2QI.3, comment (n.3). There is not a similar provision for wildlife offenses or
environmental felonies. See id. §§ 2QI (Environment), 2Q2.1 (Offenses Involving Fish, Wildlife,
and Plants).
173. See, e.g., United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 622-23 (1st Cir. 1974) (looking
at the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407, prosecution: "we reject the existence of any generalized 'due
care' defense that would allow a polluter to avoid conviction on the ground that he took precautions
conforming to industry-wide or commonly accepted standards"); Levenson, supra note 18, at 417
(stating that because liability is imposed irrespective of the defendant's knowledge or intentions,
"the strict liability doctrine traditionally rejects even a reasonable mistake of a fact or circumstance
material to a finding of guilt"). Arguably, one could distinguish White Fuel in a future case in which
a defendant exceeded commonly accepted standards and took all reasonable steps to use
extraordinary care.
For a case in which good faith was recognized as a defense to strict criminal liability, see
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kantor). Kantor was a
child pornography case and was unique in that the absence of a good faith defense raised serious
First Amendment issues. Id. at 540-42. The Ninth Circuit observed that the case involved an actress
who "allegedly engaged in a deliberate and successful effort to deceive the entire industry .
Id.
at 543. For a thorough discussion of Kantor and of a proposal for application of a good faith defense
to strict liability crimes, see generally Levenson, supra note 18.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 519 (E.D. Cal.), affid on
other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978). See discussion of Corbin Farm, supra notes 121-124
and accompanying text.
175. See Levenson, supra note 18, at 405 n.22 ("The good faith defense essentially transforms a
strict liability crime into a negligence offense, in which the defendant must prove reasonable conduct
under the circumstances."). Strict criminal liability with a good faith defense would differ from a
negligence offense in that the defendant would bear the burden of presenting evidence of his or her
good faith even in the absence of any prosecution evidence of negligence while, for a negligence
offense, the prosecution must present a prima facie case of negligence that necessarily denies the
defendant's good faith. Id. at 405-06.
176. 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964).
177. Id.
178. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
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The theory upon which responsible corporate agents are held criminally
accountable for "causing" violations of the Act permits a claim that a
defendant was "powerless" to prevent or correct the violation to "be
raised defensively at a trial on the merits." [But] the defendant has the
burden of coming forward with evidence .... "'
A few lower court decisions have considered and rejected the impossibility
defense in opinions elaborating the high hurdle a defendant must clear to present
the defense."' In United States v. Gel Spice Co., Inc."' the court noted that "impossibility is an affirmative defense, ....
available only to individuals and not to
corporations,'9 and that: "To establish the impossibility defense the corporate
officer must introduce evidence that he exercised extraordinary care, but was
nevertheless unable to prevent violations of the Act."' "
In a pair of 1976 cases,"' the Ninth Circuit accepted the concept of an affirmative defense of impossibility"' but held that the defendants had failed to
present sufficient evidence to submit the defense to the fact finder.' 7 In United
States v. Y.Hata, the court held that (1) "the duty .. .to 'remedy violations

when they occur' includes the duty to consider and experiment"' with commonplace devices "long before" government inspections uncover violations,"' and
(2) the defendants failed to offer proof that "they planned and attempted to install" corrections or that those plans and attempts were frustrated by their inability to obtain materials." In other words, the "defendant could have attempted to
prevent the injury earlier.""'
In United States v. Starr, the court held that the "duty of 'foresight and
vigilance' requires the defendant to foresee and prepare" for natural and artificial occurrences."' For example, an infestation of mice fleeing freshly plowed
fields could be anticipated with "a minimum of foresight," and, consequently,
179. Park, 421 U.S. at 673 (quoting Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. at 91). Park
described the impossibility defense as resting on the responsible corporate officer theory. The theory
for criminal liability for responsible corporate officers is essentially the same as the rationale for
strict criminal liability of individuals. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Consequently, the
impossibility defense should be available to individuals who are not corporate officers.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Gel Spice Co., 601 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
181. 601 F. Supp. at 1207 (involving the prosecution of company, its president, and its vicepresident for rodent contamination of warehoused food).
182. Gel Spice, 601 F. Supp. at 1213 n.7.
183. Id. at 1212-13.
184. Id.at 1213.
185. United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1976) (affirming conviction related
to bird infestation in food warehouse); United States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976)
(affirming conviction for mice infestation and contamination in warehoused food caused when
plowing of adjacent field drove out mice).
186. See Hata, 535 F.2d at 510 (requiring "sufficient appropriate facts" before allowing the
defense of "objective impossibility"); Starr, 535 F.2d at 515 (placing an additional burden on
government only if defendant offers to prove impossibility).
187. See Hata, 535 F.2d at 511; Starr,535 F.2d at 515.
188. Hata,535 F.2d at 511 (citation omitted) (finding a large wire mesh enclosure is a common
device) (quoting United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975)).
189. Id. at 511-512.
190. Jossen, supranote 20, at 41.
191. Starr,535 F.2d at 515 (quoting Park, 421 U.S. at 673).

1999l

MIGRATORY BIRD TREATYACT

preventing the infestation was not objectively impossible.'9 Responding to the
defendant's complaint that he was the victim of a janitor's failure to carry out
the defendant's instructions, the court stated, "The standard of 'foresight and
vigilance' encompasses a duty to anticipate and counteract the shortcomings of

delegees.' '3

It has been said that, as applied to indirect actors such as corporate supervisors, the impossibility defense converts strict criminal liability into a "standard
of extraordinary care.'"
F. ProsecutorialDiscretion
Courts have expressly relied upon prosecutorial discretion to ameliorate the
harsh results that might result from rigid application of strict criminal liability.
"In such matters the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges,
and the ultimate judgment of juries must be trusted. Our system of criminal justice necessarily depends on 'conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers.'"'"
Reliance on prosecutorial discretion is often invoked by courts and Congress, but it has not been universally persuasive nor accepted without misgivings. ' " That courts have, in some cases, rejected strict criminal liability is evi-

192. Id. at 515. For a case that recognized the possibility of a defense based on intervening acts
of third parties, arguably a form of an impossibility defense, see United States v. White Fuel Corp.,
498 F.2d 619, 623-24 (1st Cir. 1974) (rejecting due care as a defense to Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407,
strict criminal liability but, in dicta, recognizing defenses based on intervening acts of third parties
as a defense).
193. Starr, 535 F.2d at 515-16.
194. See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanction, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1243, 1264-65 (April 1979). Some commentators
have argued that Park creates a standard of negligence which must be shown before the defendant
can be prosecuted under strict liability theory. See Park, 421 U.S. at 678-79 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Jossen, supra note 20, at 41-42 (citing Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liabili,,93 YALE L.J. 609, 67071 (1984)). However, the impossibility defense is an affirmative defense. Then again, if Park
introduces a standard of negligence, the burden of coming forward with the evidence of due care or
impossibility is on the defendant. See Park, 421 U.S. at 673.
195. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (quoting Nash v. United States.
299 U.S. 373, 378 (1913)). See also United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902. 905 (2d Cir. 1978)
(stating that innocent technical violations can be handled through prosecutorial and court discretion).
The propriety of eliminating scienter or mens rea in statutes designed to serve a
regulatory purpose has again been recognized by the Supreme Court . . . . An
expansive statute under which the prosecution encounters such reduced obstacles
imposes a heavy responsibility upon the prosecutor. Many are his potential targets
and few are the standards by which the exercise of his discretion can be
measured. . . . Whatever his decision, it is likely to be one in keeping with the
political realities within which he functions. This is a part of the price that this
type of statute compels us to pay.
Zipperman, supra note 6, at 135 (quoting United States v. Chamay, 537 F.2d 341, 357 (9th Cir.)
(Sneed, J., concurring), cert. denied, Davis v. United States, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976)).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 45 F. Supp.2d 1070, 1084 (D. Colo.
1999) ("While prosecutors necessarily enjoy much discretion, proper construction of a criminal
statute cannot depend upon the good will of those who must enforce it."). For other factors limiting
unreasonable prosecutions, see Margolin, supra note 14, at 1006-1009 (allocation of burden of
proof, causation, judicial and prosecutorial discretion, jury nullification).
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dence that they could not and did not rely on prosecutorial discretion." However, whatever may be the validity of the misgivings, it must be recognized that,
to date, prosecutorial discretion alone has prevented the bringing of prosecutions
for the very situations that have given courts the most pause under the MBTA,
i.e., migratory birds killed by automobiles, aircraft, and towers.
VII. BIRD DEATHS CAUSED BY INSTRUMENTALITIES OF MODERN CIVILIZATION
ARE FORESEEABLE AND AVOIDABLE

Whatever theories the more restrictive courts use to limit strict criminal
liability, be they due process, proximate cause, due care, impossibility, etc., the
underlying requirements to imposition of strict criminal liability are that (1) the
consequences of the acts for which a defendant is to be held criminally liable
must (a) be foreseeable, and (b) be avoidable, and (2) the defendant must have
voluntarily assumed the risk of the consequences by volitional act or omission.
Objective data indicates that these criteria are met for human-caused nonhunting migratory bird deaths, including those as to which courts have expressed
reservations concerning MBTA liability.
A. Foreseeable

Empirical data does not support statements that migratory bird deaths are not
a probable or foreseeable consequence of operating an automobile, an airplane

197. Levenson observes that "[mluch of strict liability law, including the Kantor case, has
evolved from unrestrained prosecutorial discretion." Levenson, supra note 18, at 432. Levenson
attributes lapses in the quality of prosecutorial discretion to intense public scrutiny and to the desire
of prosecutors for a favorable "conviction box score." Id. at 433. While such factors may influence
prosecutors to make decisions they would not otherwise make, it is just as likely that those factors
will deter difficult or unpopular prosecutions of serious wrongs. Any effort to limit discretion will
harm those who are presently protected by exercise of that discretion. Consider, for example, the
widespread dissatisfaction of federal judges with the limits imposed on their discretion by the United
States Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., John M. Dick, Allowing Sentence Bargainsto Fall Outside
of the Guidelines Without Valid Departures:It Is Time For the Commission To Act, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 1017, 1034 (1997); Doris Marie Provine, Too Many Black Men: The Sentencing Judge's
Dilemma, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 823, 827, 833, 841 (1998) (stating that "judicial dismay with
current policy is widespread and sincere[;]" that judicial criticism is based on the limitation of
judicial discretion, the inducement to circumvent, the privacy of key decisions, and disparate and
harsh results; and that a 1996 Federal Judicial Center survey found over two-thirds of judges said the
mandatory guidelines were unnecessary); Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 365, 366 (1992) (stating that "[olne
would think that most Americans, judges and legislators as well as members of the Sentencing
Commission, would be embarrassed by this implacable urge to incarcerate, by the overwhelming
desire to ignore the good that people have done and probably will do" and that "use of the guidelines
does tend to deaden the sense that a judge must treat each defendant as a unique human being").
The author's experience is that prosecutorial discretion is most often exercised to require
more than the minimum required proof, e.g., proof of knowledge of the facts for a MBTA strict
liability offense, and proof of knowledge of the legal requirements for "knowing" offenses such as
ESA offenses or most environmental crimes. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U. S. ATTORNEY'S
MANUAL, § 9-27.220 cmt (2000) (Principles of Federal Prosecution-Grounds for Commencing or
Declining Prosecution) (Federal prosecutors are not to initiate a prosecution unless they believe that
"admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction" but that "does
not mean that he/she necessarily should initiate or recommend prosecution.").

1999]

MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT

or a tower.'9' Empirical data shows such bird deaths are foreseeable, and that
some are more numerous'" than are bird deaths from causes for which courts
have imposed MBTA strict liability, e.g., pesticide applications' and power
lines."0 The following are conservative or even very conservative estimates of
bird mortality from different causes other than habitat degradation and destruction. 0Domestic and feral cats: 100's millions per year. A four year study by
the University of Wisconsin found that domestic cats killed between
7.8 and 219 million birds each year in just the rural areas of that State. 2'

198. In addition, bird fatalities caused by modem instrumentalities other than firearms are not
only foreseeable, they are also a significant concern to regulatory authorities charged with protecting
migratory bird species.
"Regarding the big picture, we are most concerned about the cumulative impacts of all
towers on birds, combined with all the other things that kill them: habitat degradation and loss,
pesticides, glass windows, domestic cats, power lines, wind generators, cars, aircraft, oil spills, and
such." Dr. Albert M. Manville II, quoted by Chris Tollefson, Service to Host Workshop on Fatal
Bird Collisions with Communications Towers (revisited on Feb. 13, 2001) <http://www.fws.gov/
r9extaff/pr995 I.html>.
199. That something is a foreseeable consequence of action does not mean that it is a probable
outcome. When courts speak of probable consequences and probable cause, they are applying a
value judgment. In terms of scientific risk analysis, probability is a statistical measure of the number
of times an outcome will occur for a given number of times a causative action takes place. See
generally., ROBERT E. MEGILL, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK ANALYSIS, Penn Well Books, Tulsa,

Oklahoma (2d ed. 1984) (defining probability and distinguishing outcomes with discrete
distributions from continuous or nondiscrete distributions such as occur in instances of bird
collisions). For example, a jet engine failure may occur once in every 20,000 hours of operation or
an auto accident may occur once in every 40,000 miles of operation. A given, objective, statistical
probability of an outcome may be subjectively "probable" to one court but unlikely to another.
The bird kills from different causes listed in the subsequent text of this article represent
totals and not probabilities. Nevertheless, they illustrate the relative magnitude of the threat
presented by different causes of bird deaths. The objective of the MBTA was to preserve bird
populations. For some probability calculations, see infra note 201 (probability of bird death or injury
upon which criminal liability was established in Moon Lake was 0.0064 birds per pole per year) and
note 230 (probability of fatal bird collision with a communication tower is 82 birds per tower per
year).
200. See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
201. See United States v. Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp.2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999). The Moon Lake
case is unique in providing sufficient information to calculate the probability of bird death or injury.
The prosecution was based on the death or injury of 38 birds by 2450 unprotected poles during 29
months. See id. at 1071. Consequently, the probability of a bird being killed or injured by any one
pole in any year was only 0.0064, or about two-thirds of one percent. That is an understatement of
the probability, inasmuch as the prosecution was limited to bird deaths or injuries that could be
conclusively proven, but it is the probability relied upon by the court. See, e.g., Ted Williams,
Zapped!, AUDUBON MAGAZINE, Jan./Feb. 2000, at 32, 34 (reporting at least 170 raptor carcasses
were recovered under Moon Lake lines over an unspecified period). Data to be developed as part of
the plea agreement will allow a more accurate calculation of a presumably higher probability. See
infra notes 262-63 and accompanying text (describing Moon Lake plea agreement and MOU).
202. Most of the data in the text of this section were located by Albert M. Manville II, Ph.D,
and John Trapp, Wildlife Biologists, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, whose assistance the
author gratefully acknowledges.
203. See John S. Coleman and Stanley A. Temple, On the Prowl, Wisconsin Natural Resources
Magazine (Dec. 1996) (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.wnrmag.com/stories/1996/dec96/
cats.htm> (intermediate estimate was that cats kill 38.7 million birds per year in rural Wisconsin).
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Building window impacts: 97 million to 970 million per year at a rate
of one to ten
per building per year.:.2 "[B]irds do not recognize glass as
2°
a barrier.
Pesticide ingestion: 67 million per year.2"
Cars and trucks: 57 million in the contiguous United States, or one per
car every three years. 7
Communication tower impacts: 4-5 million per year. 0"' This estimate
may be low by an order of magnitude, i.e., the actual fatalities may be
40 to 50 million birds each year.:

Coleman and Temple estimated that there are between 1.4 and 2.0 million feral cats in rural
Wisconsin alone. See id. See also John .S.Coleman et al., Cats and Wildlife: A Conservation
Dilemma (revisited on Feb. 14, 2001) <http://wildlife.wisc.edu/extension/catfly3.htm> ("Worldwide,
cats may have been involved in the extinction of more bird species than any other cause, except
habitat destruction."). Coleman and Temple identified a number of advantages enjoyed by domestic
cats and some feral cats, especially that supplemental feeding by humans means cat populations and
predation will not fall as bird prey are exterminated. See id. Cats also harm predatory animals by
reducing the number of their prey, i.e., reducing their food supply. See id.
204. Daniel Klem, Jr., Collisions Between Birds and Windows: Mortality and Prevention, 61 J.
FIELD ORNITHOL., Winter 1990, at 120, 123-25 (reporting that at least one-half of all bird strikes
against windows are fatal to the birds, regardless of size) [hereinafter Collisions]. See also T. 0.
Connell, Glass Windows and Bird Deaths, Proceedings N. Am. Omithological Conference, St.
Louis, Missouri. (Apr. 8, 1998) (describes study consistent with Klem's results and gives reasons
why his own results may have under-reported actual bird deaths) (on file with author); Erica H.
Dunn, Bird Mortalityfrom Striking Residential Windows in Winter, 64 J.FIELD ORNITHOL., Summer
1993, at 302, 308 (estimates a range of window kills per home per year between 0.65 and 7.70,
suggesting Klem's range of I to 10 birds per building per year is realistic); Daniel Klem, Jr., BirdWindow Collisions, 101 THE WILSON BULLETIN, December 1989, at 606, 620 (describing factors
contributing to birds' collisions with windows) [hereinafter Bird-Window Collisions].
205. See Klem, Collisions,supra note 204, at 124.
206. David Pimentel et al., Environmental and Economic Costs of Pesticide Use, 42
BIOSCIENCE 750, 757 (Nov. 1992).
207. See BANKS, supra note 8, at 10 (between 2.7 and 96.25 birds are killed per mile of road
per year, with an estimated median value of 15.1, on 3,786,713 miles of road in 1972); Federal
Highway Administration, Office of Highway Policy Administration, 1996 Highway Statistics
(revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/l996/section5.html> (Tables HM- 10, 12
and 20 state that there were 3,933,985 miles of road in 1996, and Table VM-I states that there were
210,236,393 registered vehicles with an average of 11,807 miles per year driven by each vehicle).
The calculation assumes that the incidence of bird strikes and kills by cars was the same in 1996 as
Banks found in 1972.
More recently, Al Manville has received anecdotal reports of thousands of Cedar
Waxwings killed in the East and Northeast, purportedly because of an attraction to fruiting exotic
plants (e.g., Autumn olive) planted on highway median strips. Interviews with Albert M. Manville II,
Ph.D, Wildlife Biologist, at FWS, Migratory Bird Office (Dec. 21, 1999, Jan. 21, 2000).
208. W.R. Evans and A.M. Manville II (eds.), 2000, Avian Mortality at Communications
Towers, Transcripts of Proceedings of the Workshop on Avian Mortality at Communication Towers,
August
11,
1999, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY,
(revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://migratorybirds.fws.gov/issues/towers/agenda.html>. See also USA Towerkill Summary
(revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.towerkill.com/issues/consum.html> ("it is not hard to imagine
that annual bird mortality at communications towers could be over five million birds a year," but the
scarcity of long-term studies, the total absence of studies at shorter towers, and scavengers removing
kills before discovery means "the annual mortality could be much larger").
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Oil spills and other industrial accidents: variable. Taking the Exxon
Valdez oil spill as an example, more than 36,000 birds representing at
least 90 species were retrieved and stored in the morgue in Valdez following the spill."' Retrieved specimens probably represented only 10 to
30 percent of the actual bird mortality," ' meaning a total of 120,000 to
360,000 were killed.2 2 Richard Banks estimated, in 1972, that such
"large" spills occur only semi-annually, and result in only tens of thousands of birds killed, but that oil sumps or waste pits kill an estimated
1.5 million birds per year."'
Fishing bycatch: hundreds of thousands of seabirds are conservatively
estimated to die each year by drowning, strangulation, or injury from
fishing hooks and longlines."' Illegal use of gill nets adds to the toll."'
Members of 61 different bird species have been killed, of which 25
species (41 percent) have been classified as "threatened" by the World
Conservation Union.' Some species will not survive if the situation
continues, e.g., the Southern Albatross."' "Governments, nongovernmental organizations, and commercial fishery associations are
petitioning for measures to reduce the mortality of seabirds in longline
fisheries in which seabirds are incidentally taken ....

209. Interview with Albert M. Manville II, Ph.D., Wildlife Biologist, at FWS, Migratory Bird
Office (Dec. 21, 1999).
210. Albert M. Manville, II, Cleaning Up an Oil Spill: Some Biological Tools in the Chest of
Cleanup Options, I J. CLEAN TECH. AND ENVTL. SCI. 123, 124 (1991) (in September 1989 alone,
FWS retrieved 36,470 dead birds representing 90 species).
211. John F. Piatt et al., Immediate Impact of the "Exxon Valdez" Oil Spill on Marine Birds,
107 THE AUK 387, 395 (Apr. 1990).
212. See id. (estimating total Exxon Valdez bird kill at 100,000 to 300,000, and that it would
have been greater if it had occurred in summer or autumn); Manville, supra note 210, at 124-25
(subsequent government studies indicated that 350,000 to 390,000 birds died and Manville believed
the cumulative total would exceed 500,000.).
213. BANKS, supra note 8, at 12.
214. Interview with Albert M. Manville II, Ph.D., Wildlife Biologist, at FWS, Migratory Bird
Office, (Feb. 10, 2000) (referencing Constituent Briefing). A single commercial longliner may
deploy as many as 35,000 hooks each day. NIGEL P. BROTHERS ETAL., THE INCIDENTAL CATCH OF
SEABIRDS

BY LONGLINE

FISHERIES:

WORLDWIDE REVIEW AND

TECHNICAL GUIDELINES

FOR

MITIGATION, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, FISHERIES CIRCULAR, No. 937, 1, 1 (1999).
Note that the estimated bird loses due to fishing bycatch are global, unlike the losses from other
causes listed in the text which are in the United States.
215. Manville, supra note 214.
216. Manville, supra note 214.
217. Manville, supra note 214; BROTHERS ETAL., supra note 214, at 26 ("Based on evidence to
hand ... populations of several species of albatrosses, giant petrels and Whitechinned Petrels, were
not sustainable .... ).
218. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FOA), Fisheries Department, The
InternationalPlan of Action for the Reduction of Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries,
Introduction, paragraph I, republished in, National Marine Fisheries Service, Draft National Plan of
Action for the Reduction of Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries,Appendix I (revisited
Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/protectedresources/draftnpa.htm>. See also 64 Fed.Reg.
73017 (Dec. 29, 1999) (announcing availability of National Plan of Action and inviting comments).
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Electrocutions"' and power line impacts: thousands to tens of thousands
per year.' The electric power industry has been aware, for over a century, of the danger posed to birds by its power lines and, for the last 25
years, has promulgated voluminous suggested practices to minimize
bird fatalities.
Wind generator impacts: several thousand per year22 but the potential
for more kills increases as the industry grows.2 '
The Federal Aviation Administration and the National
Wildlife Research Center have documented an average of
over 2500 bird strikes by civilian aircraft each year in the
United States and estimate that the actual number is five
219. Bird electrocutions occur on electric distribution lines that carry 34,500 volts or less, and
not on larger transmission towers, because wires are close enough to each other or to conductors for
the birds to short circuit the lines. See Williams, supra note 201, at 32, 34. There are presently
116,532, 289 distribution poles in the United States. See id. at 36. The introduction of steel poles in
place of present wooden poles is expected to aggravate the problem. See id. at 38.
Power distribution poles are not the only cause of bird electrocutions. For example,
California installed high-voltage fences around its prisons to reduce staffing costs but, as a result,
executed more than 3000 birds in the first five years. See Jack Fischer, Prison Fence Nets Ensure No
Birds Are Erecuted, San Jose Mercury News, April 8, 1998, at IA, available through
<http://www.newslibrary.com>. California officials had not considered the impact of the fences on
birds. Pursuant to an agreement with FWS, California agreed to protect the fences and the birds with
netting. See id The nets were described as 90 percent effective. See id. Although the nets would cost
$3.4 million, the fences were estimated to save California $40 million annually in staff salaries. See
id.
220. Briefing Statement by A.M. Manville II, Jan.
10, 2000 (file name
WPFILES:birddeat.bri.wpd) (on file with author). See also John L. Trapp, Bird Kills at Towers And
Other Human-Made Structures:An Annotated PartialBibliography (1960-1998) (revisited Feb. 14,
2001) <http://migratorybirds.fws.gov/issuestower.html>.
221. See R.R. Olendorff et al., SUGGESTED PRACTICES FOR RAPTOR PROTECTION ON POWER
LINES: THE STATE OF THE ART IN 1996, AVIAN POWER LINE INTERACTION COMM. AND EDISON
ELEC. INST., 1 (1996) (citing investigations of electrocution of eagles in 1970s and subsequently,
"[olver the last 25 years, those efforts have led to a detailed understanding of the biological factors
that attract raptors to power lines, and those harmful interactions that lead to electrocution."); W.M.
Brown et al., MITIGATING BIRD COLLISIONS WITH POWER LINES: THE STATE OF THE ART IN 1994,
AVIAN POWER LINE INTERACTION COMM. AND EDISON ELECTRIC INST., at 1 (1994) (describing
studies of dead birds under telegraph wires as early as 1876, and birds killed by impacts with power
lines as early as 1904).
222. Interview with Albert M. Manville, Ph.D., Wildlife Biologist, at FWS, Migratory Bird
Office (Feb. 23, 2000) (extrapolation based, in part, on NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY
LABORATORY, A PILOT GOLDEN EAGLE POPULATION STUDY IN THE ALTAMONT PASS WIND
RESOURCE AREA, CALIFORNIA, NREI/TP-441-7821, U.S. DEPT. ENERGY (1995)). See also Lisa
Vonderbrueggen, Agencies Say Windmill Firms Should Pay for Bird Habitat Protection, CONTRA
COSTA TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, (from 1992 through January of 1998, 1,025 birds were killed at
Altamont Pass by windmill blades or electrocution; proposal to replace existing wind generators
with 85 percent fewer generators of a more efficient and bird friendly design).
223. Briefing Statement, supra note 220. See also Enron Agrees to Move LA Windmills Away
From Condors' Flight Path, SEAtTLE-DAILY J. COM., Nov. 5, 1999 (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.djc.comnews/enviro/l0060302.html> (in response to National Audubon Society
objections that 200 foot high windmills threatened the 49 remaining wild condors, Enron dropped
plans to build 53 windmills north of Los Angeles in exchange for a lease on land about 20 miles
away).
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times greater, Le., over 12,500 per year.2 Some impacts
involve many birds.' In addition, the Air Force reports its
aircraft average an additional 2,600 birds strikes each
year.'
Communication towers have been an especially foreseeable problem,
having first been documented in the late 1940s.' Bird kills at lighthouses had been noted for centuries and bird kills at tall television towers began to be documented as soon as they began to be constructed in
the 1940s.' In the 1970s, the FWS estimated bird kills at communications towers to be 1.4 million per year based on the 1,100 towers then
in existence. - Today, with nearly 49,000 towers taller than 200 feet,
scientists estimate that more than 4 million birds die in impacts with
communications towers in North America .2" The industry estimates that
224. NWRC-Ohio Field Station, FAA Wildlife Strikes to Civil Aircraft in the United States
(revisited Feb 14, 2001) <http://www.lrbcg.connwrcsandusky/strike.html>. See also Edward C.
Cleary et al., Wildlife Strikes to Civil Aircraft in the United States 1991-1997. FAA Wildl. Aircraft
Strike Database Ser. Rep. 4 (Sept. 1998), at 1-3 (2,421 strikes/year) (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.faa.gov/arp/pdf/strkrpt.pdf>.
225. See, e.g., Transport Canada Transport, Near-Crashes (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/aviation/aerodrme/wildlife/d/d3.htrn>.
Transport Canada has documented over 100 fatal airplane crashes caused by impacts with
aircraft and other crashes for which bird strikes are suspected. See Aircraft Crashes and Loss of Life
(revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.tc.gc.cafaviation/aerodrme/birdstke/wildlife/ d/d2.htm>.
Obviously, there are many other bird strikes fatal only to the birds.
226. See Tamar A. Mehuron, Bird Strike!., 81 AIR FORCE MAG. 6 (June 1998) (revisited Feb.
14, 2001) <http://www.afa.org/magazine/chart/0698chart.html>.
227. See Towerkill.com, Brief Historical Overview (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.towerkill.com/issues/intro.html>. See also Trapp, supra note 220.
228. Albert M. Manville II, Ph.D., The ABC's of Avoiding Bird Collisions At Communication
Towers: The Next Steps, Introduction, presented at the Electric Research Institute's Avian
Interactions Workshop, Dec. 2, 1999, Charleston, S.C, (currently in press) published on the intemet
at (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://migratorybirds.fws.gov/issues/towers/abcs.html>; Towerkill.com,
Brief HistoricalOverview (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.towerkill.com/issues/intro.html>.
229. Chris Tolleson, Service To Host Workshop On Fatal Bird Collisions With
Communications Towers, FWS August 2, 1999 News Release announcing August 11, 1999
Workshop
at
Cornell
University
(revisited
Feb.
14,
2001)
<http://www.fws.gov/r9extaff/pr995 I.html>. See also BANKS, supra note 8, at 10, I1 (stating that
three studies between 1967 and 1973 found estimated annual mortalities per tower between 2,121
and 2,843; the author rounded the number to 2,500 but assumed only one-half of the towers resulted
in bird kills). One million, four hundred thousand bird deaths from 1,100 towers per year works out
to a mortality rate of 1,273 bird deaths for each tower each year.
230. FWS August 2, 1999 News Release announcing August I1, 1999 Workshop at Cornell
University (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.fws.gov/r9extaff/pr9951.html>. See also
discussion supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text (estimating birds killed by impacts with
communications towers); Towerkill.com, USA Towerkill Summary (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.towerkill.com/issues/consum.html> (Federal Aviation Administration Digital Obstacle
File lists 39,530 towers over 200 feet but some towers close together get counted as one). Four
million bird deaths from 49,100 towers per year works out to a mortality rate of 82 bird deaths for
each tower each year. Compare with supra note 201 (probability of bird death or injury in Moon
Lake was only 0.0064 per pole per year).
It is unknown whether linear extrapolation of mortality figures is appropriate. Dr. Charles
Kemper speculates that a recently documented drop in bird mortality at towers may be due to the
dispersal of a fixed population of birds among a greater number of towers. See Wendy K. Weisensel,
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there will be as many as 100,000 new towers in the next decade. Because of Federal Communication Commission mandates to digitalize
all television stations by 2003, at least 1,000 of the new towers will be
over 1000 feet high."' Taller towers create a greater threat to birds because they require more lights and guy wires, increasing the probability
of fatal bird impacts.232 Federal Aviation Administration requirements
for red pilot warning lights on all towers taller than 200 feet increase
the risk because red pulsating lights attract birds more than do white
stobes. "'

Of growing concern are not only the impacts of individual mortality factors
on birds (e.g., tower collisions), but the combined or cumulative impacts of all
mortality factors on bird populations. Currently, more than 200 species of migratory birds (of our 836) are in trouble, 90 listed under ESA (75 endangered, 15
threatened), and 124 on the Service's [FWS] list of non-game species of management concern. Some populations are declining precipitously."
B. Avoidable
In addition to being foreseeable, migratory bird deaths caused by impacts
with human constructions, and other "unintended" causes of bird deaths, are
avoidable.
Cat predation on birds can be reduced by keeping cats indoors." Even when
cats must be allowed outdoors as, for example, on farms to control rodents, the
cats can be kept neutered and well fed, bird feeders and other bird attractions
can be kept away, food sources for strays can be eliminated, and unwanted cats
can be disposed of, rather than being released. 3'
Numerous measures are available to reduce or virtually eliminate bird
23 7
strikes against windows, including: interior covering with translucent material;
removal of attractants such as feeders, watering areas, and nutritious and aesthetic vegetation in front of windows;23' placing netting in front of windows;39

Battered by the Airwaves?, Wis. NAT. RESOURCES MAG. (February 2000) (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.wnrmag.con/stories/2000/feb00/birdtower.htm>. On the other hand, Dr. Kemper
observes that scavenging by predators is an alternative explanation for the absence of bird carcasses
at towers. See id.
231. FWS August 2, 1999 News Release, supra note 229.
232. Id. See also USA Towerkill Summary, supra note 230.
233. FWS August 2, 1999 News Release. supra note 229.
234. Briefing Statement (by A.M. Manville), supra note 220.
235. See, e.g., Coleman, Cats and Wildlife, supra note 203 (section titled "What you can do").
236. See Coleman, Catsand Wildlife, supra note 203 (section titled "What you can do").
237. See Klem, Collisions,supra note 204, at 123. Although not discussed in the literature, one
might expect tinted glass to protect birds by making the glass visible.
238. See Klein, Collisions, supra note 204, at 126; Alternatively, Klem suggests placing
attractants within one foot of windows because birds are drawn first to the attractant and, when
taking flight, have not built up sufficient momentum to sustain serious injury. See Klein, Collisions,
supra note 204, Dunn, on the other hand, prefers moving attractants far from windows. See Dunn,
supra note 204, at 309.
239. See Dunn, supra note 204, at 309 ("installation of plastic garden-protection netting about
25 cm from the window essentially solved ... severe window-strike problems .... The mesh did not
block views substantially.").

1999l

MIGRATORY BIRD TREA TY ACT

placement of vertical strips in front of windows;2" and installation of windows at
an angle to reflect solid objects, such as the ground, instead of surrounding
habitat or sky." These solutions and others are being promoted by the Canadian
based Fatal Light Awareness Program (FLAP), ' which is being actively promoted by the National Audubon Society, Cats Indoors!, and the American Bird
Conservancy.3

Bird impacts with towers can be reduced by co-locating equipment on existing facilities, building towers without guy wires, and eliminating lighting or
using lighting less attractive to birds.2" Even a layperson can read the reports of
bird strikes with communications towers and identify possible ways to reduce
the carnage..2 ' Elimination of guy wires and adjustment of lighting are obvious
solutions.
Numerous measures have been suggested to reduce longline bycatch of seabirds in fisheries, including both technical measures (increase sink rate of bait,
thaw bait, and use of line-setting machine, bait casting machine, below-water
setting chute or funnel, bird-scaring devices, water cannon) and operational
measures (reduce visibility of bait by night setting, reduce attractiveness of vessels to seabirds, and area and seasonal closures).' One can reasonably anticipate
additional solutions as international efforts continue."7

240. See Klem Collisions, supra note 204, at 126.
241. See Klem Collisions, supra note 204, at 127.
242. FLAP, How To Make Your Home, Cottage & School Safe For Birds (revisited Feb. 14,
2001) <http://www.flap.org/how2.htm> (offering the suggestions to hang ribbons, hang silhouettes
so they move, etch images onto exterior glass, use spider web decals). See also Weisenel, sidebar
titled "Prevent bird collisions at home, "supra note 230.
243. See Audubon, Cats Indoors! (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.audubon.org/
bird/cat/>.
244. Tolleson, supra note 229 (quoting Albert M. Manville, Ph.D.). See also Weisensel, supra
note 230 (section titled "Changing lights, heights and designs to make towers less of an attraction").
Certainly, collisions of birds with tall, lighted buildings is of the greatest concern,
with single buildings (e.g. skyscrapers) sometimes accounting for hundreds or
thousands of bird mortalities/year.) Two different types of problems - birds in
daylight disoriented by reflections of plate glass windows, nocturnal migrants
disoriented by interior or exterior lighting of tall buildings, especially in foul
weather; both result in collision with windows or building and death due to blunt
trauma. Both types of mortality can be prevented or minimized.
Email communication from John Trapp, FWS, (Dec. 28, 1999) (on file with author). See also
Towerkill.com, Towerkill Mechanisms (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.towerkill.com/
issues/mech.html>; Paul Kerlinger, Ph.D., Avian Mortality At Communication Towers: A Review of
Recent Literature, Research and Methodology, March 2000, published on the internet at (visited
Feb. 14, 2001) <http://migratorybirds.fws.gov/issues/tblcont.html>.
245. See, e.g., The Topeka Capital Journal, Thousands of Birds Fly To Their Deaths Around
Radio Towers (Jan. 30, 1998) <http:/www.cjonline.com/stories/013098/kan birds.html> (reporting
death of between 5,000 and 10,000 Lapland longspurs from crashing into guy wires, obscured in fog
and snow, after being drawn by bright lights around radio transmission tower near Syracuse, Kansas
on January 22, 1998).
246. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FOA), Fisheries Department, The
InternationalPlan ofAction for the Reduction of Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries,
Technical note on some optional technical and operational measures for reducing the incidential
catch of seabirds, Section II (Technical measures), republished in, National Marine Fisheries
Service, Draft National Plan of Action for the Reduction of Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline
Fisheries, Appendix VI (Future Conferences and Events Related to Seabird-Fishery Interactions)
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The Moon Lake decision was premised on the fact that the bird deaths could
have been avoided. In 1996 the electric power industry said: "[E]lectrocution at
power facilities remains a legitimate concern. Such mortalities can be addressed
by a variety of mitigation measures, through design and retrofitting of existing
lines.' ' 8 The industry produced a 125 page publication of specific recommendations for siting of power lines and design of power poles to minimize the risk of
electrocution to raptors, a migratory bird. 9 The industry also published a 78
page report containing
detailed instructions to reduce deaths caused by migra1
tory bird impacts.
Existing windmills can be and are being replaced by more efficient and birdfriendly designs.2 ' Bird strikes on highways can also often be prevented by adjustments in siting of the roads and bird attractions such as crossing, feeding and
nesting sites."'
Finally, the causes and frequency of bird strikes with aircraft have been
plotted and bird avoidance procedures developed. -

(visited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/protectedresources/draftnpa.html>. See also 64
Fed.Reg. 73017 (Dec. 29, 1999) (announcing availability of National Plan of Action and inviting
comments). For a technical note on some optional technical and operational measures for reducing
the incidental take of seabirds, see Brothers, supranote 214, at 44-84.
247. A series of international meetings were scheduled. United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FOA), Fisheries Department, The International Plan of Action for Reducing
Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries, Introduction, paragraph 1, republished in,
National Marine Fisheries Service, Draft National Plan of Action for the Reduction of Incidental
Catch
of
Seabirds
in
Longline
Fisheries,
Appendix
I
<http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/protectedresources/drafinpa.htm> (listing Wilhelmshaven, Germany on
March 17-19, 2000; Darmouth, Nova Scotia, Canada in April 2000; Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, May 812, 2000).
248. R.R. OLENDORFF, supra note 221, at 6 (emphasis added).
249. See R.R. OLENDORFF, supra note 221.
250. See W.M. BROWN ET AL., supra note 221.
251. Vonderbrueggen, supra note 222 (bird friendly wind turbines have larger but slower
turning blades, are placed on taller towers above the birds' hunting patterns, and have perching spots
eliminated).
252. BANKS, supra note 8, at 9 (citing English studies showing "black spots" of high mortality
associated with open gates, breaks in hedges or walls, and proximity of feeding and resting sites; and
a Texas study showing one-third of all road deaths occurred between daybreak and 8 a.m.).
253. Transport Canada, Aircraft Crashes And Loss Of Life (revisited Feb. 14, 2001)
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/aviation/aerodrme/birdstke/wildlife/d/d2.htm>;
Near Crashes, id., at
<...d/d3.htm>; Species Involved, id. at <...d/dl4.htm> (noting, among other facts, that birds of prey
may attack aircraft while waterfowl generally avoid aircraft); see also Air Force News, Whiteman
Reduces
Bird Strike
Hazard (Nov.
18,
1997)
(revisited
Feb.
14,
2001)
<http://www.af.mil/news/Novl997/n19971118_971462.html>
(reporting successful efforts at
Whiteman Air Force Base to avoid bird strikes between B-2 bombers and a flock of 125,000
Redwing Blackbirds); FAA Aeronautical Information Manual, Ch. 7, Sect. 4-2 (Reducing Bird
Strike Risks) (Jan. 25, 2001) (revisited Feb. 14, 2001) <http://www.faa.gov/ATPubs/AIM>;
Mehuron, supra note 226 (describing use of falcons to drive off large flocks and of remotecontrolled model aircraft broadcasting bird of prey sounds to drive off big birds).
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VIII. THE NEED FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTION
Court opinions have suggested that a distinction may exist between hunting
and non-hunting human-caused bird deaths based on foreseeability, avoidability
and the presence or absence of a volitional act or omission. Objective data indicates that the distinction does not exist and, especially, the distinction does not
exist between non-hunting deaths for which courts have recognized MBTA
criminal liability (e.g., pollution, pesticides, and electrocution) and those for
which courts have expressed reservations (e.g., automobiles, airplanes, towers,
and windows)." Consequently, an intellectually honest, and reasonably objective basis for distinguishing appurtenances of modem society cannot be found in
any of the defenses and theories of criminal law commonly put forward as potential limitations on strict criminal liability, i.e., a basis for distinction cannot be
found in theories of proximate causation, impossibility, good faith or due care,
etc. In addition, the efforts of the courts to fashion such a limitation is an undemocratic interference in the processes of representative government.
If the solution is not to be found in theories or defenses put forward by the
courts, where is it to be found?"' Three examples illustrate a range of democratic
options.
One option is for FWS (the Secretary of the Interior to be precise) to issue
regulations pursuant to the notice and comment, or alternative requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act,"' just as the Secretary now authorizes killing
of migratory birds. 5' By regulation, FWS may, with the collaboration of the

254. One reason courts may discount bird deaths caused by impacts is that the deaths are
usually infrequent and few at any single location. Brothers, et al., addressed this perceptual problem
in the context of seabird bycatch by longline fishing.
Prior to 1988 . . . [flishers had no concept (and many still do not) of bird
populations and the consequences of catching a few individuals. After all, each
fishing vessel may catch only one or two birds a day, sometimes none for many
days and each day the impression is of just as many birds flying around the ship.
It is understandable that fishers had no perception of a problem. Further, they
have little understanding of the population biology of seabirds and why their
practice threatens the survival of albatrosses. Concepts such as delayed maturity,
year-long breeding cycles, biennial breeding and long life spans were not known.
BROTHERS, ETAL,supra note 214, at 46.
255, Coggins & Patti, supra note 103, at 192, suggest criteria for strict criminal liability that
build on and go beyond the decided cases: an act must (1)be purposeful (though not necessarily the
consequences), (2) involve potentially lethal agents (poisons, chain saws, guns, power lines, fire,
etc.), (3) involve some degree of "culpability," and (4) be a reasonably foreseeable cause of bird
mortality in the event the operation goes astray, whether by negligence or by accident. The proposed
criteria do not contribute to a solution. The element of "culpability" is undefined and makes the
criteria rather circular. The other elements seem redundant.
256. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (Administrative Procedure Act); 5 U.S.C.
§§ 561-570 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (negotiated rulemaking procedure); 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (1994
& Supp. IV 1998) (alternative means of dispute resolution in the administrative process).
257. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 704(c), 712 (Supp. 2000) (authorizing Secretary of the Interior to issue
implementing regulations). The court in Moon Lake acknowledged the need for reasonable
regulations. See United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1085 (D.
Colo. 1999) ("Reasonable regulation by the Secretary, in conjunction with proper application of the
law, which includes requiring the prosecution to prove proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt
under § 702(a), can effectively avoid absurd and unintended results."). But see Alaska Fish &
Wildlife Fed'n & Outdoor Council v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 940-41 (9th Cir, 1987) (stating that

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:2

affected public, define and distinguish those migratory bird deaths that are an
unavoidable consequence of the instrumentalities of our modem society, 8 and
those that are both foreseeable and reasonably avoidable. Similarly, permits can
be obtained for many situations not anticipated in the regulations. 2 9 In the course
of applying for such a permit a dialog can also take place. The reasonableness of
any regulation or permit may be reviewed by the courts.26 If there were such a
regulatory scheme in place, anyone who chose to ignore the lawful regulatory
alternatives would act at his or her own peril.
A second, more focused approach is discussion and negotiation with individual industries. As discussed in the preceding Part,"' the electric power industry has been studying the problem and producing recommended practices in
cooperation with FWS for over 25 years. Prosecution arose because Moon Lake
chose not to use technology readily available to minimize bird deaths. Following
the Moon Lake decision, the defendant entered a plea of guilty. As part of the
plea agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was executed that
obligated Moon Lake to develop and implement an "Avian-Protection Plan" to
protect raptors from electrocution and to report and collect birds that might be
electrocuted either during the Plan's implementation or notwithstanding the best
efforts of the Plan.26- The MOU states that so long as Moon Lake is in compliance with the agreement, neither it nor its officers or employees will be subject
to administrative, civil, or criminal prosecution for migratory bird deaths ("unlawful takings of avian species") that may occur. 2" The Moon Lake MOU is

regulations must comport with the most restrictive provisions of the migratory bird conventions).
Because the Canadian convention does not allow taking of game birds during closed seasons nor of
insectivorous birds at any time, one might argue no permits can be issued for "incidental takings"
caused by human constructions.
258. That the instrumentalities are necessary to modem society is implicit in the regulations of
the FCC and FAA which necessitate tall towers with lights that attract birds. See supra notes 231233 and accompanying text. The primary issue is not whether the instrumentalities are necessary, nor
whether bird fatalities are foreseeable. Rather, the issue is the extent to which bird fatalities are
avoidable and how many can be saved.
259. See 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 (2000) (Special Purpose Permits, usually for actions benefiting the
species or research). Although permits can, arguably, be issued for situations not otherwise
anticipated in migratory bird regulations, FWS does not issue permits for bird strike fatalities,
relying instead on cooperation and discretionary enforcement. Interview with Susan Lawrence,
FWS, (Jan. 24, 2000). See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("This Court has
recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or
enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's
absolute discretion.").
260. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994) (judicial review of agency decisions). One hurdle that a
regulatory solution must overcome is the Ninth Circuit decision in Dunkle. See sources and text cited
supra note 257 (describing Dunkle).
261. See discussion supra Part VII.A (Foreseeable bird deaths) and, especially, notes 219-221
and accompanying text.
262. August 16, 1999 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Sections III and IV. The MOU
also contains provisions relating to nests (Section V) and record-keeping (Section VI). In addition to
monitoring compliance, record-keeping could be used for scientific purposes. See Klem, supra note
204, at 127 (describing recovered window-kills as a "valuable but largely neglected ornithological
resource" for anatomical and plumage studies, and for study of geographic distributions and
migration routes).
263. MOU at Section IV.A.2.
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analogous to a permit although, strictly speaking, it is an exercise of agency
enforcement discretion.
Similarly, for communication towers, the FWS is exploring with industry
methods to reduce migratory bird deaths.' Although in early stages, the FWS
anticipates a process of informal discussions, possible research into the problem
and mitigating measures, and guidance memoranda." Canada, which also administers the Migratory Bird Treaty of 1918, is also exploring solutions to "incidental" migratory bird deaths, perhaps analogous to Endangered Species Act
Habitat Conservation Plans.'
A third alternative is for Congress to amend the MBTA. Ultimately, Congress may find it necessary to step in with statutory distinctions among different
means of human-caused bird deaths, just as it did when it added requirements of
knowledge to the MBTA baiting provisions. However, for now it has not, perhaps in recognition of the intensely technical nature of the issues and of the reasonableness of the present collaborative processes employed by FWS, which
assure a thorough exchange of information and encourage full exploration of
and experimentation in what is technically possible with still evolving technology.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The uneasiness that courts and commentators have expressed with strict
criminal liability generally is reasonable but courts often fail to distinguish the
individual cases and crimes swept up in the single term. A different matter are
the anticipatory concerns for MBTA enforcement against some forms of nonhunting, human-caused bird deaths, specifically, impacts with human constructions. There is substantial evidence of a serious threat to migratory birds which
could be reduced by intelligent design, if only the affected industries would
undertake to examine the problem and identify solutions.267
A substantial portion, perhaps the majority of all migratory bird deaths
caused by people are caused by impacts with human constructions. Although a
number of courts have expressed reservations about applying the MBTA to bird
deaths resulting from impacts with human constructions, none of the courts has
articulated any factual distinctions between deaths caused by impacts and deaths
caused by pesticides, pollution, or electrocution. Court's conclusory statements
that impact deaths are not foreseeable or proximately caused are inconsistent
with available data.
Data demonstrate that migratory bird deaths caused by impacts are many
times more common, foreseeable, and avoidable than are deaths caused by pesticides, pollution, or electrocution, each of which causes of bird deaths courts
264. See, e.g., Tolleson, supra note 229; Avian Mortality at Communications Towers, Brochure
announcing August 11, 1999 Workshop at Cornell University as part of the 117th Meeting of the
American Ornithological Union <http://www.fws.gov/r9mbmo/aoubrochure.html>.
265. Interview with Jon Andrew, Chief, FWS Office of Migratory Bird Management (Dec. 17,
1999).
266. Interview with Steve Wendt, Canadian Wildlife Service (Nov. 9, 1999).
267. See discussion supra Part VII (Bird Deaths Caused by Instrumentalities of Modem
Civilization Are Foreseeable and Avoidable).
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have accepted as creating MBTA liability. Consequently, the theories put forward to limit strict criminal liability are inapplicable because the mistaken
premise of each is that the resulting deaths were unforeseeable, unavoidable, or
both. Furthermore, the theories put forward to limit strict criminal liability are
inherently policy judgments which, in a democratic society, are properly made
by the elected branches of government.
Administrative authorities are presently engaged in cooperative efforts to
minimize migratory bird deaths caused by impacts with human constructions.
Those efforts depend upon the sanction of criminal enforcement for those who
refuse to prevent avoidable bird deaths.
That those responsible for migratory bird deaths may chose to ignore the
problem is not a reasonable ground for courts to fashion theories or defenses that
might bar prosecutions. That every last bird death may not be avoidable is not a
reasonable ground to excuse a failure to reduce the number of avoidable bird
deaths. Courts should have no reservations upholding MBTA strict criminal
liability for traumatic migratory bird deaths which data shows are foreseeable
and avoidable.

SHOCKED, CRUSHED AND POISONED: CRIMINAL EN-

FORCEMENT IN NON-HUNTING CASES UNDER THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATIES

LARRY MARTIN CORCORAN AND ELINOR COLBOURN*
I. THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, market hunters or "pot hunters"
killed migratory birds on a vast scale for profit;'[s]ome massacred birds for the
sheer hell of it."' "In danger of extermination" were many bird species valued as
food as well as for their role in destroying insects that damaged vital food crops.'
Sportsmen, farmers, and the general public supported protection of migratory
birds primarily for economic but also for aesthetic reasons.'

Trial Attorney and Senior Trial Attorney, respectively, Wildlife and Marine Resources
Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C. The authors wish to thank John T. Webb, Assistant Chief of the Wildlife and
Marine Resources Section, without whose support, advice, encouragement, guidance, and wisdom
this article would not have been possible, and Robert S. Anderson, Senior Trial Attorney of the
Wildlife and Marine Resources Section whose initiative, direction, and support got this article off the
ground. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not purport to
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1. See United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n., 45 F.Supp. 2d 1070, 1080 (D. Colo. 1999)
(quoting remarks of eight different Senators and Congressmen); see also 55 CONG. REC. 7441 (daily
ed. June 6, 1918) (statement of Rep. Miller).
2. George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 168 (1979). Coggins' account of the historical
evolution of the MBTA is derived from P. MATrHISSEN, WILDLIFE IN AMERICA (1959); J.
TREFETHAN, AN AMERICAN CRUSADE FOR WILDLIFE (1975); and Lund, Early American Wildlife
Law, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703 (1976). See Coggins & Patti, at 167 n.18. See also 56 CONG. REC. 7370
(daily ed. June 4, 1918) (statement of Rep. Raker) ("promiscuous slaughter"); David G. Lombardi,
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Steel Shot Versus Lead Shot For Hunting Migratory Waterfowl, 22
AKRON L. REV. 343 (1989).
3. Convention between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory
Birds, August 16, 1916, preamble, 39 Stat. 1702 (1916) [hereinafter Canadian Convention].
4. See S. REP. No. 65-27, at 2 (1917). The House Report expressed similar concerns and
support. See H.R. REP. No. 65-243, at 2 (1918); see also 16 U.S.C. § 711 (1994) (allowing regulated
breeding and sale of migratory birds "for the purpose of increasing the food supply" - the only
explicit statutory exception to the general prohibitions of the act); discussion infra Part II.A (MBTA
Enactment). The need to feed American soldiers engaged in combat in the Great War was also cited
as a reason for preserving the birds. H.R. REP. No. 65-243, at 2 (1918) ("it will thus contribute
immensely to enlarging and making more secure the crops so necessary to the support and
maintenance of the brave men sent to the battlefield by this Republic").
*
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A. The MigratoryBird Act of 1913
In response to the pressures and concerns described above, Congress enacted
the Migratory Bird Act in 1913.2 The Act provided that all "migratory game and
insectivorous birds [that] . . . do not remain permanently the entire year within
the borders of any State or Territory, shall hereafter be deemed to be within the
custody and protection of the Government of the United States, and shall not be
destroyed or taken contrary to regulations."' The Act authorized and directed the
Department of Agriculture to adopt suitable regulations for closed hunting seasons and also made violations of the regulations petty misdemeanors.
The 1913 Act was challenged immediately as an unauthorized intrusion into
matters reserved to the states by the United States Constitution. Two courts rejected claims that the Act was authorized by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.' The position of the government could not have been helped by its
advocacy. In the first case, United States v. Shauver, the government initially
conceded that the act could not "be sustained under the commerce clause."' In
the second case, United States v. McCullagh, the court believed the government
should not have placed reliance on the commerce clause.'" The appeal of Shauver to the Supreme Court was withdrawn, after having been argued twice," when
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) became law.' 2
B. Treaty Power as the Solution
Secretary of State Robert Lansing and Senator Elihu Root conceived a constitutional solution to the need for federal protection of migratory birds by invoking the treaty power" and negotiating the first of what would become four

5. See Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847-48 (1918). The Act consisted of four
paragraphs inserted into the Bureau of Biological Survey portion of the Department of Agriculture

appropriations bill.
6. Id. at 847.
7. See id. at 847-48; see also Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118, 119-20 (1919) (citing 38
Stat 1960 (1913), as amendedby 38 Stat. 2024 (1914) and 38 Stat. 2032 (1914)).
8. See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 292 (D. Kan. 1915); United States v.

Shauver, 214 F. 154, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1914). More recently, the Supreme Court has said that "the
underlying assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly
flawed." Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64 n.19 (1979) (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979)).

9.

Shauver, 214 F. at 160; U.S. CONST. art.I, § 8, cl. 3 (" The Congress shall have the Power.

to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes").
10. See MeCullagh, 221 F. at 291.
11.
MICHAEL J. BEAN AND MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EvOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE

LAW, 17-18 (3d ed. 1997). Chapter 2 of BEAN & ROWLAND presents an informative discussion of
the development of wildlife law from Roman times to the present.
12. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 1, at 169. Pessimism over the prospects for the Shauver
appeal may have been unfounded. In 1919, the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction under state law
for transportation of wild ducks. See Carey, 250 U.S. at 122. The defendant argued that state law had
been abrogated by the 1913 federal Migratory Bird Act. Id. at 120. The Supreme Court's opinion
never questioned the validity of the 1913 Act but, instead, upheld the state conviction on the ground
that the "provision of the state law is obviously not inconsistent with the federal law." Id. at 121.
13. The treaty power is found in Article 2, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution which provides that: "He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
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bilateral treaties for the protection of migratory birds." On July 7, 1913, the Senate adopted a resolution requesting the President to negotiate treaties for the
protection of migratory birds." The first treaty, the Canadian Convention, was
concluded and ratified in 1916 and sought to protect birds migrating between the
United States and Canada.'" Three further conventions followed with Mexico
(1936)," Japan (1972)," and the former Soviet Union (1976)."
C. The Treaties
The MBTA, which implements these treaties, expressly cites to the conventions for identification of birds covered by the Act,' limits on implementing
regulations,' the scope of misdemeanor criminal violations," and limits on state
or territorial regulations.' Therefore, before addressing the MBTA itself, it is

Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur;" S. REP.
No. 65-27, at 2 (1917) (August 17, 1916 letter, Sen. Lansing to the President).
14. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 169; see also BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 11, at
17-18 (noting Department of Agriculture urged the Department of State to conclude a treaty).
15. See S. REP. No. 65-27, at 2 (1917).
16. See Canadian Convention, supra note 3. On December 14, 1995, the United States and
Canada signed a Protocol amending the Canadian Convention. See S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-28,
August 2, 1996 (Message transmitting Protocol with Protocol attached) [hereinafter Protocol]. The
Senate ratified the Protocol on October 23,1997, but the Protocol does not go into effect until the
Parties exchange instruments of ratification. See Protocol, art. U. Although the Protocol was drafted
to ensure conformity with aboriginal rights in Canada and with subsistence use by indigenous
inhabitants of Alaska, the Protocol effectively rewrote the Convention in order to update it. The
revisions redrafted the list of migratory birds by using current taxonomic classifications (Article I),
added conservation principles to be used in management of migratory bird populations (Article II),
added provisions for preservation and enhancement of the environment (Article IV), and added
educational and other purposes as permissible purposes for taking nests and eggs (Article V). The
Protocol did not alter Article VII of the original Convention which allows either party to issue
permits to kill migratory birds that become seriously injurious to agriculture or to other interests of
any particular community.
17. See Convention between the United States of America and Mexico for the Protection of
Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311 [hereinafter Mexican
Convention].
18. See Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and
Their Environment, March 4, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3329 [hereinafter Japanese Convention].
19. See Convention between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet
Socialist Republics Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment,
November 19, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647 [hereinafter Soviet Convention].
20. See 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994) (referring explicitly to the conventions entered into between
the United States with Great Britain, Mexico, Japan, and the Soviet Union); see also id. § 7150)
(defining "migratory birds" for purposes of the MBTA by reference to the conventions).
21. See id. § 704 (referencing different limitations as "[s]ubject to the provisions and . . .
compatible with the terms of the conventions"); see also id. § 712 (authorizing regulations as
necessary to implement the conventions but without the explicit limitations on compatibility written
into 16 U.S.C. § 704).
22. See id. § 707 ("any person ... who shall violate or fail to comply with any regulation
made pursuant to this subchapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor").
23. See id. § 708.
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well to review the provisions of the underlying conventions and particularly the
more significant differences among these provisions."
1. Reasons for the Conventions.
The preamble to the Canadian Convention cited only economic factors as
reasons for its execution, such as the value of migratory birds as food or as
predators of insects that were injurious to crops and to public forests. 2' The
Mexican Convention cited a broader need to utilize migratory birds rationally
"for purposes of sport, food, commerce, and industry. 2' The later Japanese and
Soviet Conventions broadened the list of reasons even further to include noneconomic aesthetic, scientific, and cultural purposes." The evolution of reasons
for the Conventions continues with the recent Canadian Protocol which lists
"conservation principles" to guide actions taken pursuant to that Convention.'
However, the "conservation principles" of the Protocol still have a distinctly
economic flavor, speaking of restoring and maintaining populations and habitat
of healthy migratory bird' populations to maintain a variety of "sustainable uses"
and "harvesting needs."'1
2. Areas of Applicability.
Neither the Canadian Convention nor the Mexican Convention contains any
provisions specifying their geographic coverage. The Japanese and Soviet Conventions expressly define the areas subject to the Conventions as those areas
under the jurisdiction of the respective parties.' The Soviet Convention goes
further in one respect. Article IV.3 of the Soviet Convention allows the parties
to agree on areas of special importance to migratory birds, including areas not
within the jurisdiction of either the United States or the Soviet Union.' The parties are required to ensure that any person subject to their respective jurisdictions

24. See generally Migratory Bird Treaty With Russia: Continued International Wildlife
Protection, 7 ENVTL. L. REP. 10026 (Feb. 1977) (discussing similarities and differences in the
various treaties); see Cyril De Klemm, The International Law of Migratory Species, Migratory
Species in International Law, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 935 (1989) (discussing international treaties
which protect migratory species of fish, birds, and terrestrial animals).
25. See Canadian Convention, supra note 3 ("whereas" paragraphs). In upholding the
constitutionality of the MBTA, the Supreme Court described the Canadian Convention as being
intended to protect birds as a source of food and as consumers of insect pests. See Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
26. Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art. I; see also Canadian Convention, supra note 3
("whereas" paragraphs).
27. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18 (referring specifically in introductory paragraphs
to migratory birds as a recreational, aesthetic, scientific, and economic natural resource); see Soviet
Convention, supra note 19 (referring in the introductory paragraphs to recreational, aesthetic,
scientific, economic, cultural, and ecological values).
28. See Protocol, supra note 16, art. II.
29. See id.
30. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. I; see Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art.
1.4.
31. See Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art. IV.3 (list number II on the "Migratory Bird
Habitat" Appendix).
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will act in accordance with the Convention's principles regarding such "migratory bird habitat.""
3. Protected Birds.
Each Convention addresses the problem of defining exactly which birds are
protected somewhat differently. The Canadian Convention defines "migratory
birds" simply as: migratory game birds, migratory insectivorous birds, and migratory non-game birds." For game birds, the Canadian Convention lists five
families, and for each family it lists the common names of groups or species
included in the family." For insectivorous and non-game birds, however, the
Convention lists the groups or species, but not the families."
The Mexican Convention similarly lists families of birds that "shall be considered migratory," distinguishing migratory game birds from migratory nongame birds.' Unlike the Canadian Convention, however, the Mexican Convention does not elaborate upon the species included in the listed families.3 ' Although the restrictive provisions of the Mexican Convention include a specific
prohibition against killing migratory insectivorous birds," does not define this
group or list any families of insectivorous migratory birds.'9
The Japanese and Soviet Conventions take a different approach to defining
migratory birds. Both define migratory birds to mean species "for which there is
positive evidence of migration between the two countries."" The Japanese Convention also includes species or subspecies common to both countries, even in
the absence of migration.' In contrast, the Soviet Convention includes species or
subspecies common to both countries only if they share a common migration
area, even if the common area is in a third country." In addition, both Conventions include a list of individual species that the parties have determined meet
the definition of "migratory birds.'"3

32. Id.
33. See Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. 1.1, 2, 3.
34. See id. art. 1.1(a) (listing Families Anatidae or waterfowl, Gruidae or cranes, Rallidae or
rails, Limicolae or shorebirds, and Columbidae or pigeons).
35. See id. arts. 1.2, 3.
36. See Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art. IV.
37. See id.
38. See id. art. II(E).
39. See id. art. IV. Pursuant to Article IV of the Mexican Convention, the United States and
Mexico subsequently identified additional migratory birds covered by the Convention but made no
distinction between insectivorous and other migratory birds. See also Coggins & Patti, supra note 2,
at 172 n. 55 (stating that by regulation, the birds were "treated as nongame birds, and protected from
hunting").
40. Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. 1.1 (a); Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art. 1.1

(a).
41. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. 11.1 (b).
1 (a)-(b).
42. See Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art. 1.
43. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. 11.2 and Annex; Soviet Convention, supra
note 19, art. 1.3 and app. Alone among the Conventions, the Soviet Convention expressly provides
for either party to implement more protective measures for listed and unlisted species. See Soviet
Convention, supra note 19, art. VIII (unlisted species), IX (stricter domestic measures).
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4. Restrictions and Exceptions.
Each Convention makes some type of provision for closed seasons and for
prohibitions on killings and/or nest or egg collection." Certain exceptions from
the hunting prohibitions appear in three of the Conventions for certain indigenous persons.45 The Mexican and Japanese Conventions also provide an exception for "private game farms."'

44. See Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. II (establishing certain "close [sic] seasons"
on hunting). For migratory game birds, the Canadian Convention provides for a closed season from
March 10 through September 1, except for certain shorebirds for which the closed season is from
February 1 through August 15. The Canadian Convention also prescribes two special, transitional
closed seasons for species in need of a recovery period, one of 10 years and one of five years. See
Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. 1I (10-year closed season for certain listed species) and art.
IV (5-year closed season or other appropriate regulations for wood duck and eider duck). The
Protocol retains a single closed season from March 10 through September 1 for migratory game
birds. See Protocol, supra note 16, art. 1.1 (a).
The Canadian Convention also prohibits the taking of nests and eggs, except for regulated
scientific or propagative purposes. See Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. V. The Protocol does
not explicitly retain the prohibition on the taking of nests and eggs; it only prohibits their offer for
sale. See Protocol, supra notel6, art. 11.2. However, its express exceptions for the taking of eggs by
indigenous Alaskans and aboriginal Canadians suggests an implicit prohibition on taking eggs. See
Protocol, supra notel6, art. 11.4. In addition, the U.S. regulatory definition of "migratory bird"
presently includes "any part, nest, or egg of any such bird." 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1998).
The Canadian Convention and the Protocol both allow the parties to prescribe hunting
seasons restricted to not more than three and one-half months. See Canadian Convention, supra note
3, art. 11.1; Protocol, supra note 16, art. 1.1.(a).
The Mexican Convention requires the parties to establish closed seasons, during which the
taking of migratory birds, nests, and eggs is prohibited. See Mexican Convention, supra note 17,
arts. 1A, D. Unlike the Canadian Convention, the Mexican Convention does not set forth any
specific closed season, except for wild ducks. See Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art. 1I.D. The
Mexican Convention requires the parties to limit hunting seasons to a maximum of four months, and
the parties agree to prohibit hunting from aircraft. See Mexican Convention, supra note 17, arts. 11.C,
F. Under the Mexican Convention the taking of insectivorous migratory birds is prohibited without
any provision for hunting, which effectively creates an all-year closed season, similar to the
Canadian Convention, but it makes no mention of nests or eggs of insectivorous birds. See Mexican
Convention, supra note 17, art. IH.E. However, the Mexican Convention does not define
insectivorous migratory birds. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
As in other respects, the restrictions and exceptions in the Japanese and Soviet
Conventions follow a different model from the Canadian and Mexican Conventions. Neither the
Japanese nor the Soviet Convention specifies closed seasons. Instead, each contains a general
prohibition on the taking, sale or exchange of migratory birds and eggs followed by a list of
exceptions. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. III. I (a)-(e); Soviet Convention, supra note
19, art. II.l(a)-(d) (includes a prohibition against the disturbance of nesting colonies). Both
Conventions include exceptions allowing indigenous peoples of Alaska, Siberia, or Pacific Trust
Territories to take birds for personal needs. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. 111.1 (e);
Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art. 1I. 1 (c). Both Conventions also excepted regulated hunting
during hunting seasons. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. [11.1 (c); Soviet Convention,
supra note 19, art. 11.1 (b). Instead of setting a maximum duration for the hunting season, the
Japanese and Soviet Conventions simply require that the hunting seasons be established to maintain
migratory bird populations. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. 111.2 (also requires that
hunting seasons be established to avoid principal nesting season); Soviet Convention, supra note 19,
art. 11.2.
45. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. I.1I (e); Soviet Convention, supra note 19,
art. 11.1 (c) (exceptions for indigenous peoples of Alaska, Siberia, or Pacific Trust Territories to take
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The Conventions all provide some type of exception from the taking prohibitions for scientific, propagative, and in some cases educational purposes." The
Canadian and Mexican Conventions also allow action to be taken against injurious birds," and both the Japanese and the Soviet Conventions permit the regulated taking of migratory birds or eggs to protect persons or property."
5. Transportation.
Each of the Conventions contains provisions restricting or regulating the
transportation of migratory birds, eggs, and their parts. The Canadian Convention prohibits the interstate (or inter-province) shipment of migratory birds and
parts during the closed season, except for scientific or propagative purposes, and
prohibits the international trafficking in any birds or eggs taken either during the
closed season or at any time in violation of state or provincial law." The Canadian Convention also requires shipment between the countries of migratory
birds, parts, or eggs to be labeled."
The Mexican Convention prohibits transportation of migratory birds and
parts during the closed season except pursuant to regulations, from private game
farms or when used for scientific purposes, propagative, or museum use. 2 Unlike
the Canadian Convention, the transportation restrictions of the Mexican Convention are not limited to interstate transportation." The Mexican Convention
also requires a permit for transportation of migratory birds and parts between the
countries without restriction to the closed season."

birds for personal needs); Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. 11.1 ("Indians may take at any
time scoters for food but not for sale"), 11.2 (noting that for migratory insectivorous and non-game
birds the closed season is all year, except that Eskimos and Indians may take at any season, for
personal use (not for sale), certain specified non-game birds), 11.3 (describing non-game closed
season and exception for Eskimos and Indians to take auks, auklets, guillemots, murres and puffins).
The Protocol retains the all-year "close" season on insectivorous and non-game migratory birds. See
Protocol, supra note 16. However, the Protocol expands the exception for hunting and egg gathering
by Alaska residents and removes the exception allowing Indians to take scoters. See Protocol, supra
note 16.
46. Mexican Convention, supra note 17, arts. ILA, E; Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art.
Ill. 1 (d).
47. See Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. II; Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art.
ILA; Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. III. 1(a); Soviet convention, supra note 19, art. 11.1(a).
48. See Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. VII. (allowing regulated taking, "under
extraordinary conditions," of birds "seriously injurious to the agricultural or other interests of any
particular community."); Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art. II.E (allowing killing of
insectivorous migratory birds "when they become injurious to agriculture and constitute plagues").
The Mexican Convention does not express any exception for non-insectivorous birds, i.e., all those
listed in the Convention. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing the absence of any
insectivorous birds in the Mexican Convention migratory bird listing).
49. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. 111.1 (b); Soviet Convention, supra note 19,
art. 1.1 (d).
50. See Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. VI.
51. See Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. VI.
52. See Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art. HI.A.
53. See Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art. II.A.
54. See Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art. II.
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The Soviet Convention prohibits the importation and exportation of migratory birds, nests, eggs, and parts, subject to the regulated exceptions allowed for
taking of the same."
The only transportation restrictions in the Japanese Convention relate to
birds in danger of extinction,"8 a category distinct from migratory birds." As to
birds in danger of extinction, the parties are required to control their importation
and exportation."
6. Habitat.
The Convention provisions relating to habitat are becoming increasingly
important as issues are litigated regarding the scope of activities intended to be
prohibited under the MBTA. As with the purposes of the Conventions, over
time the desire to protect both the birds and their habitats became explicit.
The Canadian Convention has no provisions relating to migratory bird
habitat. The Mexican Convention contains only an agreement to establish "refuge zones in which the taking of such birds will be prohibited."' However, both
the Japanese and the Soviet Conventions have a number of provisions relevant
to habitat.
The Japanese and Soviet Conventions obligate the parties to establish refuges and to undertake to preserve and enhance the environment of migratory
birds.' Both Conventions specify steps the parties are to take to protect and enhance the environment of migratory birds, including restricting the importation
of live animals and plants injurious to the birds or their environments, 2 i.e., exotic species.
The Soviet Convention also requires the parties together to identify and list
breeding, wintering, feeding, and moulting areas of special importance in their
jurisdictions. 3 In addition, the Soviet Convention requires the parties to create
lists of "migratory bird habitat" of special importance that are within or outside
their jurisdiction. ' As to the later habitats, the parties are to "undertake measures
necessary to ensure that any citizen or person subject to its jurisdiction will act
in accordance with the principles of this Convention in relation to such areas." '

55. See Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art. .1.
56. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. IV.3.
57. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. V.2 (referring to "migratory birds and birds
in danger of extinction," as two distinct categories).
58. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. IV.3.
59. See infra Part I.B.2 (Habitat Modification by Timber Harvest - No Problem).
60. See Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art. ll.B.
61. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, arts. 111.3 ("sanctuaries"), VI (both as to Article
II migratory birds and Article IV birds in danger of extinction); Soviet Convention, supra note 19,
arts. IV. 1, VH ("preserves, refuges, protected areas").
62. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, arts. VI (b)-(c); Soviet Convention, supra note
19, art. IV.2 (b).
63. See Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art. IV.2(c).
64. See Soviet Convention, supra note 19, arts. IV.2(c) ("list number I"),
IV.3 ("list number

ll").
65.

Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art. IV.3.
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7. Endangered Birds and Research.
Again showing the gradual expansion in breadth of the Conventions, the
later Japanese and Soviet Conventions, in contrast to the earlier Canadian and
Mexican, have provisions relating to birds in danger of extinction.' The later
Conventions require the parties to identify and report to each other species in
danger of extinction." The Japanese Convention requires the parties to control
the importation and exportation of endangered species but does not specify the
nature of the controls." The Soviet Convention requires the parties to take into
account the management plans for any endangered species.'
1I. MBTA IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTIONS

A. MBTA Enactment
The Conventions were not perceived to be self-executing" and Congress has
implemented all four Conventions primarily through the MBTA.
Proponents of the original MBTA focused, as did the initial Conventions,
primarily on the economic benefits derived from migratory birds, including their
value "as a source of food or in destroying insects."" Opponents of the Act generally did not dispute the economic value of migratory birds nor even the need to
conserve them. Instead, opposition arose from a belief that the Act violated

66. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. IV. See also Japanese Convention, supra
note 18, art. V.2 (discussing both "migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction") (emphasis
added).
67. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. IV.2; Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art.
V.2.
68. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. IV.3.
69. See Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art. V.3. Birds in danger of extinction now receive
protection under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 - 1544 (1994 & Supp.
1998), and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
March 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087.
70. For a discussion of the extent to which international treaties are self-executing, see
generally Comment, The Migratory Bird Treaty: Another Feather in the Environmentalist's Cap, 19
S.D. L. REV. 307, 312-16 (1974) (observing that with the exception of Article VII, every reference
in the Canadian Convention to implementing laws or regulations refers to an exception to the
prohibitions of the Convention, and in 195 I, a State Department memorandum used the MBTA as an
example of a self-executing treaty).
The MBTA was enacted in 1918 and amended in 1936, 1960, 1969, 1974, 1978,
71.
1986, 1989, and 1998. In 1939, responsibility for enforcing the statute was shifted to the
U.S. Department of the Interior from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. See 1939 Reorganization
Act Plan No. I,§ 4(f), 53 Stat. 1431, 1434. The MBTA is presently codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703712. Subsequently other statutes were enacted, in whole or in part, to implement the migratory bird
conventions. See Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 715-719c (1994 & Supp. 1998)
(providing for the implementation of the Migratory Bird Convention); Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994 & Supp. 1998); Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668
et seq. (1994).
72. S.REP. No.65-27, at 2 (1917); H.R. REP. No. 65-243, at 2-3 (1918); 55 CONG. REC. 7448
(1918) (statement of Rep. Robbins) (acknowledging the importance of "insectivorous migratory
birds" in protecting food crops).
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states' rights under the constitution,77 and from concerns over the warrantless
search provisions of the Act as originally proposed."
Congress gave only limited attention to the scope of the MBTA's protection,
now perhaps its most controversial aspect.7" Opponents charged that the Act
would reach general killings of birds. 6 Proponents did not contest the opponents
broad reading77 but, instead, argued that broad powers were needed for effective
enforcement, 8 and that any harshness would be tempered by prosecutorial discretion and judicial lenity.7
After modifying the bill to require warrants for searches,' ° Congress enacted
the MBTA on July 3, 1918." Since that time, Congress has amended the Act to
implement each of the three succeeding Migratory Bird Conventions with Mexico, Japan, and the former Soviet Union."2 The Supreme Court has held that the

73. See 56 CONG. REC. 7360-81 (1918); id. at 7446-47 (statement of Rep. Tillman); id. at
7449 (statement of Rep. Caraway); id. at 7450-51 (statement of Rep. Mondell); id. at 7452
(statement of Rep. Huddleston). See also id. at 7445 (statement of Rep. Bland) (questioning the
constitutionality of delegation of authority to define illegal actions by regulation). But see id. at 7448
(statement of Rep. Robbins) (arguing the need for consistent enforcement and hunting seasons from
state to state).
74. See 65 CONG. REC. at 7440-61 (1918). Opponents warned that federal officers "will pin
the bottom of an oyster can upon their coats and invade the homes of free citizens." Id. at 7449
(statement of Rep. Caraway); id. at 7447 (statement of Rep. Tillman) ("Such a person may come
with the end of a tomato can appended to the lapel of his coat as his badge of authority ... ").
75. See United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 45 F.Supp. 1070, 1079-82 (D. Colo. 1999)
(providing a thorough presentation of the legislative history of the MBTA).
76. "When you kill any kind of bird . . . you will kill it by permission of the Secretary of
Agriculture .... " 65 CONG. REC. 7364 (1918) (statement of Rep. Huddleston); see id. at 7453
(statement of Rep. Green) ("The effect of this is to put the whole thing absolutely in the power of the
Secretary of Agriculture to make regulations .... ).
77. Proponents did contest one extreme reading. Opponents of the Act raised specters of a
"barefoot boy" who kills a songbird or takes a robin's egg, suggesting that he would be "hauled
before a court, sent to jail, or fined the heavy fine provided by this bill." Id. at 7364 (statement of
Rep. Huddleston); see id. at 7455 (statement of Rep. Mondell). See id. at 7447 (statement of Rep.
Tillman) (stating bill would make "mollycoddles" and "sissies" of our boys). Proponents of the Act
suggested such concerns were fanciful. See id. at 7456 (statement of Rep. Dempsey) ("to imagine
[such prosecutions] and to spend time in talking about them would be bad enough if it were done in
sport"); id. at 7367 (statement of Rep. Platt) ("Now, of course, it is utter nonsense to talk about the
little boy going to school with birds' eggs in his hands to show the scholars. He would come under
the provisions of the bill in regard to providing eggs for scientific purposes.").
78. See id. at 7441 (statement of Rep. Miller); id. at 7454 (statement of Rep. Lea) (arguing that
effective enforcement requires discretionary power to prescribe appropriate regulations).
79. See id. at 7441 (statement of Rep. Miller) (explaining that advice and cooperation of game
commissions will temper any "high-handed or arbitrary" actions by the Department); id. at 7444
(statement of Rep. Dowell) (stating punishment will be solely a matter for the courts, not for the
Department); id. at 7452 (statement of Rep. Flood) (rejecting notion that maximum fine of $500 and
maximum imprisonment of one day is severe); id. at 7457 (statement of Rep. Cooper) (suggesting
that maximum penalties are not severe).
80. See 16 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
81. 40 Stat. 755 (1918); see 16 U.S.C. § 706.
82. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 712; BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 11, n.43 (observing
"[n]otwithstanding the many differences among them, the ratification of each new convention did
not result in a major overhaul of the Act but only in technical amendments that merely added
appropriate references to each subsequent convention").
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conventions "establish minimum protections for wildlife; Congress could and
did go further in developing domestic conservation measures" (i.e., the
MBTA)."
B. ConstitutionalChallenges
Rooted in the exercise of treaty powers, the MBTA, unlike the Migratory
Bird Act of 1913, withstood judicial scrutiny. First and most importantly, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of both the MBTA and the Canadian
Convention as valid exercises of treaty powersY The Court observed that,
"[h]ere a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved.""
The Supreme Court later held that MBTA prohibitions on the sale of bird
parts are not Fifth Amendment "takings" of property." The MBTA "taking" (i.e.,
hunting) prohibitions also were held not to constitute a Fifth Amendment taking,
even when private lands are consequently closed to hunting.' "Numerous cases
have considered, and rejected, the argument that destruction of private property
by protected wildlife constitutes a governmental taking."'8 Moreover, a property
owner has no unconditional or absolute right to kill federally-protected wildlife,
including migratory birds, in defense of his property. The Ninth Circuit stated,

83.

Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 62 n.18 (1979) (emphasis added). But see BEAN &

ROWLAND, supra note 11, n.43 ("Thus, to the extent that the new features of the later conventions

cannot be subsumed within the general language of the Act, those features remain unimplemented by
domestic legislation.").
84. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920). The Supreme Court's reliance on the
Federal government's treaty powers contrasts with its reliance on commerce clause powers to
validate subsequent environmental legislation. Its reliance on treaty powers derived from a more
restrictive view of the scope of the Commerce Clause in 1913 than just 25 years later, by which time
the judicial climate had changed markedly. In Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d 620, 624 (9th Cir.
1938), a suit to enjoin prosecution under the MBTA for luring migratory game fowl, the Ninth
Circuit said,"[w]e are fully in accord with Judge Evans' opinion and the government's contention
that these birds may be regulated by Congress as subject of [sic] interstate commerce." Similarly, in
Cochrane v. United States, 92 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1937), the Seventh Circuit, in reviewing
MBTA convictions, opined, "[o]ur conclusion therefore is that the legislation was authorized by the
Commerce Clause, as well as by the treaty." See also Andrus, 444 U.S. at 63 n. 19 ("the underlying
assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed")
(citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979)).
85. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
86. See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 64, 67-68; see also United States v. Richards, 583 F.2d 491, 496
(10th Cir. 1978) (stating that defendant's possession of sparrow hawks pursuant to state permits
prior to federal regulation did not create property rights; therefore, the subsequent federal regulations
prohibiting sale of the birds did not cause an unconstitutional deprivation of property).
87. See Lansden v. Hart, 168 F.2d 409, 412 (7th Cir. 1948) (observing that the Presidential
Proclamation closed land to hunting around State game preserve); Bailey v. Holland, 126 F.2d 317,
324 (4th Cir. 1942) (noting that the regulation closed private lands to hunting around federal wildlife
refuge); Bishop v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 449, 452 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (holding that the United States
was not liable for a taking in relation to the damage caused by the prohibition against hunting on
private lands).
88. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1334 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing, for example, Mountain
States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 1428-29 (10th Cir. 1986) (summarizing decisions
of courts rejecting compensation demands under different legal theories), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951
(1987)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989). See also Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616, 619
(7th Cir. 1950) (noting that depredation by protected wildlife is compensable under Federal Tort
Claims Act), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939 (1951).
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"we decline plaintiffs invitation to construe the fifth amendment as guaranteeing the right to kill federally-protected wildlife in defense of property."'9 Instead,
"regulations require landowners to seek the assistance of a governmental official
who is expected to act in the public interest."
Finally, the MBTA has survived at least one challenge alleging that it was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad." Other courts have found vagueness in
particular regulations or applications." However, reflecting the struggle courts
encounter in applying the MBTA's strict liability standard, discussed infra Part
III. B.
C. Structure of the MBTA
The MBTA in many ways acts as a skeleton upon which the implementing
regulations necessarily place the flesh. For example, the MBTA initially sets
forth a sweeping prohibition against taking, killing or possessing "at any time,
by any means or in any manner," migratory birds, parts, nests, eggs or products
thereof." While it is seemingly overreaching on its face, this prohibition was
written in contemplation of modifying its regulations. Under Section 704 of the
MBTA, the Secretary of the Interior is
authorized and directed ... to determine when, to what extent, if at all,

and by what means, it is compatible with the terms of the conventions
to allow hunting, taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase,
shipment, transportation, carriage, or export of any such bird, or any
part, next, or egg thereof, and to adopt suitable regulations permitting
and governing the same .... '

The Secretary also is explicitly authorized (though not directed) to issue
implementing regulations related to the Conventions." These implementing

89.
90.

Christy,857 F.2d at 1330.
United States v. Darst, 726 F. Supp. 286, 288 (D. Kan. 1989).

91. See United States v. Smith, 29 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling that the ban on the
possession of bald eagle feathers was neither vague nor overbroad based on the "plain language" of
the statute).

92. See United States v. Chew, 540 F.2d 759, 761 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that the definition
of "bag limit" was vague, ambiguous, and overbroad, but the conviction was upheld because there
was no ambiguity as to "killing," with which defendant was charged); United States v. Rollins, 706
F. Supp. 742, 744-45 (D. Idaho 1989) (holding that the MBTA criminal provision was
unconstitutionally vague as applied where, inter alia, pesticides were used in accordance with the
instructions on the label).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994). For the exact language of this prohibition, see infra Part I1.D.

94. Id. § 704.
95. See id. § 712(2). Section 712 also provides specific authorization for the Secretary to issue
regulations "to assure that the taking of migratory birds and the collection of their eggs by the
indigenous inhabitants of the State of Alaska shall be permitted for their own nutritional and other
essential needs ...."Id. § 712(1). This statutory provision has not been used following the Ninth

Circuit's decision in Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed'n & Outdoor Council v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 945
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the regulations must comport with the most restrictive provisions of the
Conventions). Because the Canadian Convention did not contain an exemption that would comport
with this statutory provision, implementing regulations for Section 712 are not in effect. The stillpending Canadian Protocol may remove this impediment by permitting such takes by indigenous
peoples. See infra Part III.A.2 (Exclusion of Non-Native Species) for discussion of the exclusion of
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regulations, discussed in relevant part infra, delineate hunting seasons and
methods, provide complete exemptions for certain limited activities by limited
groups of people, and provide for permits for other types of activities, rendering
the initial flat prohibition eminently workable.
The MBTA also includes a prohibition against the transportation or importation of certain migratory birds, parts, eggs or nests thereof, depending on the
manner and place of previous acquisition and possession." States and Territories
are explicitly free to make and enforce laws and regulations that provide even
further protection to migratory birds, nests and eggs, consistent with the MBTA
and the Conventions." The MBTA also provides for seizure and forfeiture of
birds, parts, nests, or eggs thereof that are, in some manner, found to have been
obtained or handled contrary to the provisions of the MBTA."
Finally, and for our present purposes most importantly, the MBTA sets forth
the parameters for both felony and misdemeanor criminal violations of the general prohibition of Section 703."
D. General Prohibitions
The general MBTA proscription states:
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter provided, . . . it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any
manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill .... sell .... barter,... purchase, . . . ship, . . . or ... transport ... any migratory bird, any part,
nest, or eggs of any such bird .... included in the terms of the conventions between the United States and Great Britain ... [Mexico] . . . Japan... [and the Soviet Union]."

non-native species from the conventions; infra Part IH.C.1 (Rights Under the Conventions) for
discussion of Native Americans' rights under the Conventions.
96. See 16 U.S.C. § 705.
97. See id. § 708.
98. See id. § 706.
99. See id. § 707. The remaining MBTA provisions relate to appropriations and arrest and
search warrant powers. Id. §§ 706, 709a.
100. Id. § 703. Section 703 also prohibits attempts or offers to do most of the prohibited
activities. In 1998, Congress added a new prohibition on the use of bait:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to (1) take any migratory game bird by the aid of baiting, or on or over any baited area, if the
person knows or reasonably should know that the area is a baited area; or
(2) place or direct the placement of bait on or adjacent to an area for the purpose of
causing, inducing, or allowing any person to take or attempt to take any migratory game bird by the
aid of baiting on, or over the baited area.
Section 102(b), Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act of 1998 (enacting 16 U.S.C. § 704(b)). Note that
the Reform Act makes it a crime to take either (1) by aid of baiting, or (2) on or over any baited area,
terms that are more fully described by regulation. See 64 Fed. Reg. 29799, 29804 (June 3, 1999)
(promulgating 50 C.F.R. § 20.11 () (1998) (baited area) and (k) (baiting)). The new crime for
placement of bait does not appear to apply to placement of bait in aid of hunting that is not
conducted on or over the baited area even though the hunting itself is illegal. A full discussion of
issues related to migratory game bird hunting, including baiting, is beyond the scope of this article.
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As noted above, these broad prohibitions of the MBTA"' are circumscribed
by the regulations contemplated therein."'
E. Regulatory Exceptions
Definitions of terms used in the MBTA are contained both in the migratory
bird hunting and permit regulations, ' and begin the process of qualifying the
broad prohibitions, and in the general regulations.' The hunting regulations
establish hunting season exceptions to the prohibitions, including season lengths
and bag limits, which are revised annually. ' Permanent migratory game bird
regulations specify tagging and identification requirements, prohibit certain
hunting methods, and address related matters.'"
In addition to the exceptions for hunting, the regulations provide allimportant exceptions for otherwise-prohibited activities. 7 Each of the exceptions generally requires either (1) that the person undertaking the otherwise-

prohibited activity fall into a particular job category, or act with regard to only
captive-reared species; or (2) that a permit authorizing the activity in question be
obtained in advance of the activity.0 '
1. Permit-less Exceptions
The first, permit-less type of exception encompasses Department of Interior
enforcement personnel who must, to perform their official duties, take, acquire,
possess, transport or "dispose of migratory birds, or their parts, nests or eggs.""
A similar job-related exception applies to "[s]tate game departments, municipal
game farms or parks, and public museums, public zoological parks, accredited
members of the American Association of Zoological Parks and Aquariums and

101. The MBTA itself does contain one restriction on the breadth of this prohibition when it
provides that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to prevent the breeding of migratory
game birds on farms and preserves and the sale of birds so bred under proper regulation for the
purpose of increasing the food supply." 16 U.S.C. § 711. However, even that limitation is again
dependent on "proper regulation." Id.
102. For a brief description of experience with regulations in the first 60 years of the MBTA,
before the advent of regulatory challenges by environmentalists, see Coggins & Patti, supra note 2 at
197. The regulations have not been revised to reflect the recent, December 14, 1995, Protocol with
Canada.
103. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 20.11 (Migratory Bird Hunting definitions), 21.3 (Migratory Bird
Permits definitions). The major difference between Part 20 and Part 21 is that Part 20 was meant to,
and largely does apply only to migratory game birds. Compare id. § 20.1(a) with id. § 21.1.
104. See id. §§ 10.11, 10.12. For example, "Take means to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect." Id. §
10.12. However, "barter" and "sale" are defined in neither the MBTA nor in the implementing
regulations.
105. See id. §§ 20.100-.110 (Part 20, subpart K). A discussion of migratory bird hunting
regulations is beyond the scope of this article.
106. See id. §§ 20.21, 20.36, 20.81, 20.131-.134 (Part 20, subparts A through J and L).
107. Seeid. §§ 21.11,21.12.
108. The regulations maintain a clear distinction between game and non-game migratory birds
(see id. §§ 10.12, 20.11), as did the Canadian and Mexican conventions. Game bird hunting and
related activities are regulated by id. § 20 (Part 20, Migratory Bird Hunting).
109. Id.§ 21.12(a).

1999]

SHOCKED, CRUSHED AND POISONED

public scientific or educational institutions..... This exemption allows them to
acquire migratory birds, their parts, nests, eggs, or progeny, without a permit but
only where the person from whom they receive the item legally acquired it pursuant to a permit or under Section 21.12(a)."' A further general exception is
granted for the acquisition, possession and transportation of lawfully acquired
and properly marked captive-reared migratory waterfowl, and is extended to
include sale, trade, disposition and donation where the waterfowl in question are
mallard ducks."2 Finally, any person may sell or barter the feathers of migratory
waterfowl"' "killed by hunting .... or seized and condemned by Federal or State
game authorities" for the making of fishing flies, bed pillows, mattresses, and
similar commercial uses."' They may not be used for millinery or ornamental
use, nor for mounted specimens of birds taken."'
2. Exceptions Requiring a Permit.
a. Common Permits
Of greater significance with relation to enforcement of the United States'
treaty obligations under the MBTA are exceptions that require prior acquisition
of a permit, especially for takings of migratory birds by private citizens.'0 Several of the possible permits address pre-existing interests and industries affected
by the prohibitions of the MBTA. For example, a permit can be obtained
authorizing "taxidermy services on migratory birds or their parts, nests or
Permits are available for scientific collecting activities and falconry
eggs ....
activities, including raptor propagation.' 8 Complementing the exceptions established for captive-reared migratory waterfowl, permits are also available to
of "captive-reared and propauthorize the sale, trade, donation or other disposal
9
erly marked migratory waterfowl or their eggs."'
Many of these possible permits are conditioned on the permittee maintaining
records of their activities. For example, a person holding a taxidermist permit is
required to keep accurate records on a yearly basis "showing the names and
addresses of persons from and to whom migratory birds or their parts, nests or
eggs were received or delivered, the number and species of such, and the dates
of receipt and delivery," as well as records documenting his legal "acquisition of
any captive reared" migratory waterfowl from a holder of a current waterfowl

110. Id. § 21.12(b).
11l. Seeid.§21.12(b).
112. Seeid.§§21.13,21.14.
113. Waterfowl is a synonym for the bird family Anatidae. See Canadian Convention, supra
note 3, art. 1(a).
114. 50 C.F.R. § 20.91
115. See id.
116. See id. §§21.21-.28, 21.30.
117. Id.§ 21.24
118. See id. §§ 21.23, 21.28, 21.30. Note that persons engaged in falconry may also be affected
by the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§3371-3378,
the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§668-668d. Persons must possess a permit in
order to take, possess, sell, etc. any raptor for falconry. See id. § 21.28. For a discussion of federal
falconry regulations, see Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Falconry: Legal Ownership and Sale of CaptiveBred Raptors, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 358-60 (1987).

119.

50C.F.R. § 21.25.
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sale and disposal permit. ' Such records, and even just the requirement that they
be created and maintained, can significantly enhance enforcement capabilities
and can be an effective deterrent to potential violators.
b. Special PurposeActivities Permits
Two additional types of permits are of significant interest. First, special
purpose permits may be issued for "special purpose activities related to migratory birds, their parts, nests, or eggs ..... Such permits are a catchall intended to
address circumstances in which a proposed activity would benefit the migratory
bird resource, or is justified by "important research reasons, reasons of human
concern for individual birds, or other compelling justification[s].'. 22 Over the
years special purpose permits have come to be used for six identifiable categories of activities: (1) wildlife rehabilitation, (2) special purpose possession (i.e.,
educational purposes), (3) captive-bred migratory game bird activities' 2, (4)
Indian religious uses (other than eagle parts which are addressed under 50
C.F.R. Part 22), (5) salvage of dead birds, and (6) miscellaneous activities such
as, historically, airport safety.'2'
c. DepredationPermits and Orders
Second, and perhaps most importantly, permits are available for the taking,
possession or transportation of migratory birds for depredation control
purposes.'" Permit applications for taking depredating migratory birds must
describe the area where depredations occur, the nature of the interests injured,
the extent of the injury, and the particular migratory bird species committing the
injury.' 26 While the regulations list the basic information that must be included
for this type of permit application, there is no guidance for what circumstances

120. Id. § 21.24(d)(1); see also §§ 21.23(c)(4) (requiring reports on scientific collection
activities), 21.24(d)(1) (requiring annual reports from holders of waterfowl sale and disposal
permits).
121. Id. § 21.27.
122. Id.
123. At least those captive-bred migratory game birds, such as sandhill cranes, not already
covered under the provisions addressing captive-bred migratory waterfowl, id. §§ 21.14, 21.25, as
discussed above.
124. The MBTA regulations are periodically revised, including those governing the special
purposes permits. It is anticipated at this time that some of the most common categories of special
purposes permits, such as those issued for wildlife rehabilitation, will be addressed separately under
the proposed revised regulations rather than continuing under the old catchall special purpose
regulations. Interview with George Allen, United States Fish and Wildlife Service (Oct. 13-14,
1999).
125. See 50 C.F.R. § 21.41. "Depredation" is not explicitly defined in the regulations. See, e.g.,
id. §§ 10.12 (general definitions), § 21.3 (Migratory Bird Permit definitions). No permit is required
for activities that merely herd or scare depredating migratory birds, except threatened or endangered
species, or bald or golden eagles, for which permits are required under the Endangered Species Act,
16 U.S.C §§ 1531-1544, and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d. See
id. § 21.2(b).
126. See id. § 21.41(b). See also id. Part 13 (General Permit Procedures), which specifies
additional permit application requirements.
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would allow proper issuance of the depredation permit."' Thus, the regulations
effectively grant broad discretion to issue such depredation permits with the
respective Regional Directors of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.' 8
Some instruction as to the circumstances in which takings of depredating
migratory birds could be expected to be authorized may be gleaned from analogous regulations. Regulations authorize the Director of the USFWS to issue
standing depredation orders in the Federal Register "[ulpon the receipt of evidence clearly showing that migratory game birds have accumulated in such
numbers in a particular area as to cause or about to cause serious damage to
agricultural, horticultural, and fish cultural interests."'" Such standing orders, as
opposed to permits, are used in circumstances involving chronic and welldocumented instances of depredation to authorize persons to kill, without a depredation permit, particular species of birds found depredating in particular locations. For example, in March 1998, the Service promulgated regulations authorizing until April 30, 2005 (unless specifically revoked earlier), under certain
conditions, the killing of double-crested cormorants when the cormorants were
found committing or about to commit depredations to aquaculture stocks on
premises used for the production of such stocks.'"
To ensure that depredation permits are not abused, birds killed pursuant to a
depredation permit, or a depredation order, must be disposed of in accordance
with the law. This usually requires turning the birds over to a Fish and Wildlife
Service representative for disposition to a charitable or similar institution."' The
birds can be used for food by charitable or other institutions, or in some cases
provided to a scientific or educational institution, but are not to enter commercial trade or otherwise conflict with the intentions and goals of the Migratory
Bird Treaties entered into by the United States.'2
F. Criminal Provisions
The MBTA provides for both felony and misdemeanor offenses. The types
of activities that can form the basis of a felony offense are more limited than the
types that can form the basis of a misdemeanor. In addition, a felony offense
includes a basic mens rea requirement of knowledge.
1. Felony Offenses
Where no exception applies and no permit has been obtained, the MBTA, 16
U.S.C. § 707(b), provides:
Whoever, in violation of this subchapter shall knowingly
(1) take by any manner whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to
sell, offer to sell, barter or offer to barter such bird, or

127. See id.§ 21.41(b). See also 50 C.F.R. § 2.1 (describing responsibility of various field
installations for performing program operations of the FWS).
128. See id. §21.41. See also id. §§ 2.1 (describing responsibility of various field installations
for performing program operations of the FWS), 2.2 (listing locations and geographic jurisdiction of
seven FWS regional offices).
129. ld. § 21.42.
130. See id. § 21.47.
131. See id. § 21.41(c)(4).

132.

See id.; 16 U.S.C. §§ 704, 712 (1994) (authorizing regulations).
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(2) sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird
shall be guilty of a felony
[Emphasis added.]"
Thus, felony offenses are reserved for activities involving an element of
commerce, that is, sale or barter, as well as knowledge'.. The maximum penalties
for a felony violation are two years imprisonment, a $250,000 fine for an individual ($500,000 for an organization), or both."

133. The person committing the violation must have knowledge that he or she is conducting the
activity giving rise to the violation but need not know the law. That is, the government must show
that the defendant's actions were intentional but need not show that the defendant knew they were
illegal.
It is not intended that proof be required that the defendant knew the taking, sale,
barter or offer was a violation of the subchapter, nor that he know the particular
bird was listed in the various international treaties implemented by this Act.
United States v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting S. Rep. 99-445 (1986), reprintedin
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128). See also Pitrone, 115 F.3d at 6 (contrasting "knowingly" with
"'willfully' - a word which is conspicuously absent from Section 707 (b) - [and which] sometimes
has been construed to require a showing that the defendant knew his behavior transgressed the
law.").
134. 16 U.S.C. § 707(b). Although not made explicit, the MBTA felony provision also includes
trafficking in bird parts. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 ("'migratory bird' means any bird ... including any
part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product"); Pitrone, 115 F.3d at 8-9 (MBTA felony
conviction of taxidermist for unpermitted sale of mounted waterfowl).
135. Congress did not add the "knowing" scienter requirement to the felony provision until
1986. Title V, § 501 of Pub. L. No. 99-645, 100 Stat. 3582, 3590 (1986). It did so in response to the
Sixth Circuit holding that when creating a crime which carries a substantial penalty, "Congress must
require the prosecution to prove the defendant acted with some degree of scienter." United States v.
Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985). The procedures leading to the Wulff decision were
curious. The original indictment alleged the defendant "knowingly" violated the MBTA. See Wulff,
758 F.2d at 1122. The defendant moved to strike the word "knowingly" as surplusage, to which the
prosecution agreed. See id. The defendant then moved to dismiss the indictment as a violation of due
process because the MBTA did not require guilty knowledge, a motion the trial court granted
following the defendant's conviction at trial. See id. The Sixth Circuit held that Congress intended
the MBTA to be a strict liability statute and the court refused to read a scienter requirement into the
Act. See id. at 1124. Consequently, the court held that the failure to require proof of some degree of
scienter in the MBTA felony provision violated due process. See id. at 1125.
Immediately after Congress amended the MBTA in response to the Wulff decision, the
Third Circuit rejected the reasoning of Wulff. See United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 435 (3d Cir.
1986). The Third Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit that the MBTA violations, including the
felony violation, were strict liability offenses and that the court could not supply a scienter
requirement not intended by Congress. See Engler, 806 F.2d at 431-32. Nevertheless, in a very
thoroughly reasoned opinion, the Third Circuit observed that the Supreme Court repeatedly affirmed
felony convictions in strict liability criminal prosecutions. See id. at 433-35. Significantly, in
reaching its result, the Third Circuit rejected the prosecution's concession that the absence of a
scienter requirement in the MBTA felony provision violated due process. See id. at 433.
136. See 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (stating two year imprisonment); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3), (c)(3)
(providing fine amount). Alternative fines equal to twice the pecuniary gain or loss caused by the
offense are also available. See id. § 3571(d). The MBTA does not set minimum fines. For non-petty
offenses, including all felonies, the Sentencing Guidelines do set minimum fines depending on the
severity of the offense. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5EI.2(c) (1998) (setting
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2. Misdemeanor Offenses
The MBTA provides that:
any person, association, partnership, or corporation who shall violate
any provisions of said conventions or of this subchapter, or who shall
violate or fail to comply with any regulation [50 C.F.R. Parts 20 and
211 made pursuant to this subchapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor...."
In contrast to the felony offense, no knowledge is required for a misdemeanor conviction under the MBTA-it is a strict liability offense." '
For offenses committed before October 30, 1998, the maximum penalties
were six months imprisonment, a $5,000 fine for an individual ($10,000 for an
organization), or both."' As of October 30, 1998, Congress increased the maximum fine to $15,000 for both individuals and organizations."

minimum fines for individuals), 8C2.4(a) (setting "base fines" for organizations); 18 U.S.C. § 19
(petty offenses defined) (1994).
137. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a).
138. See infra note 206.
139. See 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (specifying maximum imprisonment); 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(7)
(defining a Class B misdemeanor); id. §§ 357 l(b)(6), (c)(6) (setting alternative maximum fines for
Class B misdemeanors). As with felonies, a fine equal to twice the pecuniary gain or loss caused by
the offense, whichever is greater, is available as an alternative fine for any MBTA misdemeanor
offense. Id. § 357 1(d). In contrast to MBTA felonies, the Sentencing Guidelines do not set minimum
fines for MBTA misdemeanors because, with the exception of the new misdemeanor for placing
bait, the maximum sentence for MBTA misdemeanors is not greater than six months, making them
Class B misdemeanors. See id. § 3559 (7) - (9) (defining Class B and C misdemeanors and
infractions - offenses punishable by six months or less, i.e., petty offenses); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § lB 1.9 (1994) (explaining that sentencing guidelines do not apply to Class B
or C misdemeanors or to an infraction).
The district court for each judicial district may, for petty offenses, by local rule, provide
that "a fixed sum may be accepted in suitable cases in lieu of appearance and as authorizing the
termination of the proceedings." FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(d)(1). Many MBTA violations are resolved by
such "forfeiture of collateral," a process analogous to paying a traffic ticket without appearing in
court.
140. See 16 U.S.C. § 707(a); Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act of 1998, Pub. Law No. 105312, § 103 (amending 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (defining the maximum fine)). Although the maximum
MBTA misdemeanor fine exceeds that specified by the statutory definition of a petty offense
($5,000 for individuals and $10,000 for organizations), see 18 U.S.C. §§ 19, 3559(a)(7), 357 1(b)(6),
& (c)(6), at least one court has held, in the context of the Endangered Species Act, that a maximum
fine as great as $25,000 does not alter the otherwise "petty" classification of an offense (with a
maximum prison term of 6 months or less) for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury. See United States v. Clavette, 135 F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1998). See also S. REP. No. 105366.
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III. ENFORCEMENT ISSUES

A. What is Protected
The scope of the MBTA in terms of the types of birds it protects is quite
broad. It has been said that the regulatory "list of migratory birds entitled to
protection includes almost all native North American birds.'".
Evidence of actual migration between the United States and treaty countries
is not required. Birds bred and raised in captivity are included if they are members of listed species'4' although the regulations create exceptions for captivereared migratory waterfowl.' ' Birds acquired before the MBTA prohibitions
were enacted, known as "pre-Act" birds, as well as their parts and products may
also be subject to the Act's prohibitions.1' The MBTA protects some species not
listed in the Conventions ' and, in some respects, the coverage of the MBTA

141. Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 180 ("but excludes some non-migratory species such as
quail, prairie chickens, and turkeys, and introduces ('exotic') species such as starlings, house
sparrows, and ring-necked pheasants").
142. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1998) (defining "migratory bird" as: "whatever its origin, whether
or not raised in captivity"); United States v. Richards, 583 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1978) ("[t]he fact
that captive birds do not migrate is immaterial."); United States v. Lumpkin, 276 F. 580, 584 (N.D.
Ga. 1921) (setting forth jury instruction to determine if the birds which the defendant shot were
migratory birds); see also 50 C.F.R. § 21.3 (defining "captivity"). But see United States v. Connors,
606 F.2d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that captive-reared ducks are not included in the
treaties). The Connors decision purported to interpret an ambiguity in the treaties, the first two of
which include only wild ducks and the last of which includes ducks without any limitation. See
Connors, 606 F.2d 272. The decision, however, relied upon the regulatory definition of migratory
game birds, as an agency interpretation of an ambiguity. See 50 C.F.R. § 20.11 (1998). Connors was
probably erroneous when decided and of even less weight in light of subsequent amendments to the
regulations and to the Canadian Convention, for the following reasons: (1) Connors was charged
with hunting migratory birds, not migratory game birds, therefore, the migratory game bird
definition in the regulations, upon which the court relied, was not the agency's interpretation of the
meaning of migratory bird; (2) Even the definition of migratory game birds, 50 C.F.R. § 20.11, upon
which the court relied, no longer limits its scope to only wild ducks, Connors, 606 F.2d at 271; and
(3) Section 712 of the MBTA authorizes the Secretary "to issue such regulations as may be
necessary to implement the provisions of the conventions." 16 U.S.C. § 712. Presently, the Secretary
defines migratory birds to include captive-raised birds. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.12. The definition, which
is broader than that of the Conventions, recognizes that wild and captive-breed birds are
indistinguishable and regulation of both is necessary to assure that wild birds are protected. Thus, the
regulatory definition is necessary to implement the protections of the Conventions. See also BEAN &
ROWLAND, supra note 11, at 92-93 (arguing that Connors is clearly wrong in light of Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979)).
143. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.13 & 21.14. See also id. §§ 21.28 through 21.30 (Falconry).
144. See 50 C.F.R. § 21.2(a) (stating that pre-Act birds, but not their off-spring, may be
possessed or transported but not sold, imported, bartered, etc.); Andrus, 444 U.S. at 60-61, 63.
145. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 172 ("Raptors such as hawks and owls, formerly
considered shootable pests, are now protected by the MBTA even though they were listed in neither
the 1916 nor the 1936 Convention."). Although not listed in any convention when first regulated,
some raptors were listed in the subsequent Japanese and Soviet Conventions. See Japanese
Convention, supra note 18, annex (listing Osprey, Gyrfalcon, Peregrine Falcon, and miscellaneous
hawks); Soviet Convention, supra note 19, appendix (listing Gyrfalcon, Peregrine Falcon, Merlin,
and Osprey). A better example of species not listed in the Conventions but regulated by the MBTA
may be captive-raised birds. See infra note 192.
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extends beyond migratory birds. For example, MBTA Section 705 makes it
illegal to transport any bird, bird part, nest, or egg, taken or carried contrary to
the law of the State, Territory, Province of Canada, or District in or from which
it was taken or carried.'" Section 705 is not limited to migratory birds.' 7
Although the coverage appears broad, the issue of which particular species
of birds are covered under the Act is the subject of some difference of opinion.'"
Nevertheless, the issue has been litigated only once, in a recent, unreported decision.'" The MBTA prohibitions refer to the terms of the Conventions"' and Congress has defined migratory birds as those which are such under the Conventions;"' however, as explained above, the four Conventions cited by the MBTA
define migratory birds differently." 2 For example, the Canadian Convention
defined migratory game birds by taxonomic families and by common names of
included species or groups of birds,"' while the Mexican Convention lists families without listing included species." The Japanese and Soviet Conventions
each define migratory birds as those species, common to each respective country, that migrate between the countries or, in the case of the Soviet Convention,
migrate to a common area in a third-country."'
Guidance on the precise scope of protected species may be found in several
places.
1. The Implementing Regulations
Pursuant to his authority under Section 704 of the MBTA, the Secretary of
Interior has undertaken to define "migratory birds" falling within the protection
of the MBTA."' Originally, the regulatory definition of migratory birds mimicked the definition of the MBTA and cited to the Canadian and Mexican Conventions and bird family lists."

146. See 16 U.S.C. § 705.
147. See id.
148. See BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 11, at 71 ("[T]here has even been controversy over
what species are protected by the various conventions.").
149. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently dismissed a pro se
lawsuit to compel the Secretary of the Interior to list the mute swan as a migratory bird under the
MBTA. Joyce M. Hill v. Babbitt, Memorandum Opinion (D.D.C. Civ. No. 1:99CV01926, Sept. 27,
2000). See infra note 202 (discussing the Hill decision).
150. See 16 U.S.C. § 703.
151. See id. § 715j ("Migratory birds" defined). Section 715j is not part of the MBTA, but its
definition is applicable to the MBTA. See id.; see also 50 C.F.R. § 20.11 (1998) (defining migratory
game birds). The MBTA and the definition of "migratory bird," 16 U.S.C. § 715j, cite the original
Canadian, Mexican, Japanese, and the Soviet Conventions, but not the December 14, 1995 Protocol,
which substituted an updated list of migratory birds for that contained in the Canadian Convention.
152. See text, supra Part I.C.3 (Protected Birds) (comparing the different definitions of
migratory birds in the four Conventions).
153. See Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. 1.1.
154. See Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art. IV.
155. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. 1H;Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art. I.
The Japanese and Soviet Conventions also list each individual species of migratory bird covered by
each Convention. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, annex; Soviet Convention, supra note 19,
appendix.
156. See5OC.F.R. §§ 10.12-.13.
157. See id.§ 10.1(1961).
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Between 1950 and 1970, however, the Department of the Interior issued a
series of eight publications on "Birds Protected by Federal Law" as Wildlife
Leaflets, "official" publications of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife of
the Fish and Wildlife Service.'' Those eight publications, which were predecessors to the present regulatory list of migratory birds, consistently excluded exotic species. By 1968 the regulations contained two overlapping definitions. Part
1 of Subchapter A, containing general definitions, defined migratory birds with
a simple, unqualified list of family names.' 9 Part 10 of Subchapter B, dealing
with hunting and possession of wildlife, defined migratory birds within the conventions as "all those species of wild birds which (a) are indigenous to the
United States and (b) belong to one of the following listed families of birds: (1)
Migratory game birds (i) Anatidae .*..""
Those twin regulatory definitions remained unchanged until 1972 when, as part of a reorganization of the hunting
regulations, the Subchapter B definition of migratory birds was deleted and a
new definition of migratory game bird was added which simply listed family
names, omitting the previous requirement that they be indigenous to the United
States.'"' The following year, 1973, a further reorganization of the regulations
deleted the general definition in Subchapter A, moved the Subchapter B definition of migratory game birds, and added a new definition of migratory birds."2
Beginning with the regulatory list of protected birds promulgated in 1973,
the regulations have listed protected birds by species, using both their common
and scientific names. The regulatory list has always excluded species, even
within families designated in the Conventions, that are not native to the United
States."' However, the definition of migratory bird as set forth in the 1973 regulations simply cited to the MBTA for the terms of the Conventions.'"
Presently, Department of the Interior regulations define protected birds only
in terms of the list of migratory bird species."
The significance of this definitional history is that although the regulatory
definitions expressly, or through the Conventions, defined migratory birds by
families, the Secretary of the Interior never interpreted the Conventions to include every species within each family and, in particular, never interpreted the
Conventions to include species not native to the United States.
When the definitions were promulgated, there was no suggestion that the
changes reflected any change in the Secretary's long-standing interpretation of
the Conventions-protecting only indigenous species of the listed bird

158. Wildlife Leaflet Nos. 327 (1950), 432 (1961), 455 (1963), 469 (1965), 472 (1966), 475
(1967) 486 (1969), and 494 (1970). John T. Trapp of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
provided this information.
159. See5OC.F.R.§ 1.11 (1968).
160. Id. § 10.1 (1968) (emphasis in original).
161. See 37 Fed.Reg. 13472 (July 8, 1972) (promulgating 50 C.F.R. § 10.11 (1972)).
162. See 38 Fed.Reg. 22015 (August 15, 1973) (promulgating 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (definitions)).
163. See 38 Fed.Reg. 22015 (August 15, 1973) (promulgating 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1974) ("List
of migratory birds")).
164. See 38 Fed.Reg. 22015, 22016 (August 15, 1973) (promulgating 50 C.F.R. § 10.12
("Definitions")).
165. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1998) (defining migratory birds in terms of the 50 C.F.R. § 10.13
("List of migratory birds")).

19991

SHOCKED, CRUSHEDAND POISONED

families."' Public comments on the 1977 revisions focused exclusively on which
birds should be listed within the meaning of the treaties."' There was no suggestion that the Conventions protected all species of each family of birds listed in
the Conventions. In particular, there was no suggestion that the Conventions
included non-native birds that were introduced into the United States,
and for
6
which the United States had not been a normal part of their range.' 1
The need for a specific list of protected birds arises from latent ambiguities
in the Conventions, individually and collectively. In his 1985 revisions to the
migratory bird list, the Secretary of the Interior described some of the ambiguities and other factors influencing his interpretations of the Conventions, concluding that "[b]ecause of taxonomic changes over the years, there is a need to
better define and interpret the species intended to be afforded protection under
the various migratory bird treaties."" He also noted that many of the scientific
"names appearing in the treaties are no longer in use.". In addition, new data
and the review of old data demonstrated the need for the addition of some birds
of regular occurrence in the United States, the deletion of some bird species
because the records had been disavowed and because their occurrence was
deemed accidental, i.e., the United States is outside the species' normal range
and occurrence was deemed infrequent and irregular."' Similar concerns motivated the previous revision of the migratory bird list in 1977, when the present
regulatory definition of "migratory bird" was adopted."'
2. Exclusion of Non-Native Species
It has been the policy of the United States for at least 22 years to restrict the
introduction of non-native or exotic species into ecosystems of the United
States."' The policy has been expressly premised "' on the National Environ166. See 38 Fed. Reg. 22,015 (August 15, 1973); 37 Fed. Reg. 13,472 (July 8, 1972).
167. See 42 Fed. Reg. 59,358 (November 16, 1977) (amending 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 ("migratory
bird definition") and 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 ("List of migratory birds")).
168. See 50 Fed. Reg. 13,708-22 (April 5, 1985); 42 Fed. Reg. 59,358-62 (November 16,
1977).
169. 50 Fed. Reg. 13,708 (April 5, 1985) ("Revised List of Migratory Birds").
170. Id. An example of ambiguities resulting from differences in nomenclature and changes in
scientific understanding are found with the swans, family Anatidae. The Canadian and Mexican
conventions listed simply Anatidae. The Japanese convention listed the Whooper swan, and the
Soviet convention listed the Whooper, Whistling, and Bewick's. However, federal regulations
presently list only the Whooper, Tundra, and Trumpeter, not Whistling nor Bewick's. The
explanation for the seeming discrepancy is found in changing nomenclature and scientific
understanding. The Tundra swan is also known as the Whistling swan, both Tundra and Whistling
being described by the scientific name Cygnus columbianus. Compare Soviet Convention, supra
note 19, appendix (listing scientific name for Whistling swan), with 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1998) (listing
scientific name for Tundra swan). Bewick's swan was once listed as a separate species with its own
scientific name, Cygnus Bewickii, but present scientific classification includes it in the same species
with Whistler and Tundra swans, Cygnus columbianus. See 50 Fed. Reg. 13708, 13,709 (April 5,
1985) ("Cygnus Bewickii is included in Cygnus columbianus").
171. See Revised List of Migratory Birds, 50 Fed. Reg. 13,709.
172. See Revised List and Definition of Migratory Birds, 42 Fed. Reg. 59,358 (November, 16,
1977) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.10) (amending 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (migratory bird definition),
and 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (migratory bird list)).
173. See Exec. Order No. 11,987, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,949 (May 24, 1977); Exec. Order No.
13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6,183 (February 3, 1999) (Section 2(a)(3) of which orders each federal agency
"not [to] authorize, fund, or carry out actions that it believes are likely to cause or promote the
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mental Policy Act of 1969,"17 for the entirely logical reason that one cannot protect the environment of the United States if one allows the entry of injurious
non-native species 76 into our environment.'7 If one were to read the migratory
bird Conventions to protect non-native species of migratory birds, a conflict
would arise between the MBTA and current national policy. A close examination of the Conventions supports a conclusion that they do not protect non-native
species.
1

By their terms, the Japanese and Soviet Conventions only protect species7
and subspecies that migrate between the two countries and the United States.
In addition, both Conventions list every species of bird protected by the Conventions."' An examination of those lists reveals that all of the listed species
exist naturally, from wild origin, within the United States and its territories.'' In
addition, at least one species common to both countries, the mute swan, is not
included, presumably because, while it is a native wild bird in Japan, it is only a
feral or captive non-native bird in the United States.' "'
1

Similarly, each particular species or group of species listed under the Canadian Convention is native to North America.'' However, the listed families (as
opposed to species) in that Convention encompass additional species or groups
of species that are not individually listed in the treaty, but those omitted species
and groups of species are not native to North America.'7 Thus, examples of the

introduction or spread of invasive species in the United States."). Executive Order 13,112 supersedes
Executive Order 11,987. See Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6,186 (Section 6(b) revoked the
1977 Executive Order); see also Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 4701 - 4751 (undertaking to prevent unintentional introduction and dispersal of non-indigenous
species into waters of the United States, especially from ballast water of ships).
174. See Exec. Order No. 11,987, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,949 (May 24, 1977) ("in furtherance of the
purposes and policies of ... the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969"); Exec. Order No.
13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183 (February 3, 1999).
175. 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.(1994)).
176. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 4702(2) (Supp. 1998) (stating "'aquatic nuisance species' means a
non-indigenous species that threatens the diversity or abundance of native species or the ecological
stability of infested waters"); Exec. Order No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6,183 (Section l(g) defining
"Native species" as one present "other than as a result of an introduction").
177. See 16 U.S.C. § 4701(a)(2) (Supp. 1998) ("when environmental conditions are favorable,
non-indigenous species become established, may compete with or prey upon native species of plants,
fish, and wildlife, may carry diseases or parasites that affect native species, and may disrupt the
aquatic environment and economy of affected nearshore areas"); National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (declaring: "to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment and biosphere").
178. Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. 11.1; Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art. .1.
179. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. 11.1; Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art.
1.3(a).
180. See Exhibit 8 in support of the United States Motion for Summary Judgment, Declaration
of Robert J. Blohm [Chief, Branch of Surveys and Assessments, Office of Migratory Bird
Management, United States Fish and Wildlife Service], at
11, Hill v. Babbitt, et al., Civ. No.
1:99CV01926 (HHK), D. D.C. [hereinafter Blohm Declaration].
181. See Blohm Declaration, supra note 180, at 12.
182. See Blohm Declaration, supra note 180, at J 7, 9.
183. See Blohm Declaration, supra note 180, at 'i' 7-9.
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family Limicolae'" (shorebirds) listed in the Convention include those groupings
of species with examples native to North America, e.g., avocets, but not the
groupings of shorebirds that are exclusively non-native, e.g., thick-knees and
pratincoles."'
The Canadian Convention's listing of migratory insectivorous birds also
strongly suggests that only native species were intended to be covered. The list
of migratory insectivorous birds in the Convention consists of common name
groupings of species, e.g., warblers.'" All of those groupings include species
native to North America ....
.However, the Convention does not include any of
the many similar groupings of migratory insectivorous birds native exclusively
to areas outside of North America .....
Furthermore, the "Canadian Convention
expressly limits its application" to only "wild" birds for some listed types."39
Thus, for the purposes of the Canadian Convention, "the Anatidae (waterfowl)
include only brant (which have not been domesticated),' .....
wild ducks, geese,
and swans,'....
and the Columbidae (pigeons) "include only doves and 'wild pigeons.'"'..
Despite the apparent intention of the parties to exclude from protection under the conventions and the MBTA non-native or exotic species, a debate over
protection of non-native species nevertheless can arise from the language of the
Mexican Convention and the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Alaska Fish and
Wildlife Federationand Outdoor Council v. Dunkle.'1 In 1987, the Ninth Circuit

184. See Blohm Declaration, supra note 180, at
7-9 n.1.("Since the Convention was
adopted, formal classification of birds has changed significantly, such that the shorebirds then
grouped together as the Limicolae have been split several separate taxonomic families, now grouped
in the Order Charadriiformes and including more than 50 species... in North America.").
185. See Blohm Declaration, supra note 180, at 8. ("Similarly, the examples of the Gruidae
(cranes) listed in the Convention are limited to two species native to North America: little brown or
sandhill cranes, and whooping cranes. None of the 13 species of cranes not native to North America
is listed.").
186. See Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. 1.2.
187. See Blohm Declaration, supra note 180, at 9.
188. Blohm Declaration, supra note 180, at 9.
189. Blohm Declaration, supra note 180, at 1 10; see also Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37
Stat. 828, 847 (1918) (protecting "All wild geese, wild swans, brandt, wild ducks ....wild pigeons,
and all other migratory game and insectivorous birds which ... do not remain permanently the entire
year within the borders of any State or Territory").
190. Blohm Declaration, supra note 180, at I 10.
191. Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. 1.
1(a).
192. Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. I.l(e).
Although the Conventions protect only
"wild" birds, the Secretary of the Interior is free to extend protection to domestic or captive-raised
birds if doing so furthers the purposes of and is consistent with the Conventions. See 16 U.S.C. §
712(2) (authorizing regulations as may be necessary to implement the Conventions). Because of the
impossibility of distinguishing wild and captive-bred birds, and the consequential difficulties in
enforcing the prohibitions of the Conventions, the Secretary has defined migratory birds to include
captive-raised birds of the listed species. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1998) (defining migratory birds).
193. 829 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1987). In Dunkle, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a challenge to a Fish
and Wildlife Service agreement with Alaska natives under which the Service had been allowing
natives to take migratory birds and eggs in violation of the MBTA. In order to limit and control the
technically illegal hunting, the Service had negotiated agreements with native organizations to, in
effect, regulate the illegal hunt. See Dunkle, 829 F.2d at 935-36. The Ninth Circuit found that,
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held, in Dunkle, that the MBTA required implementing regulations to be compatible with the most restrictive of the conventions.'"
The Mexican Convention defines migratory birds by listing the scientific
names of bird families, 9 as does the Canadian Convention.'" However, unlike
the Canadian Convention, the Mexican Convention does not list species or
groups of birds included within the families.'97 Thus, in applying the Dunkle
decision, it may be argued that, notwithstanding the exclusion of non-native
species by the Canadian, Japanese and Soviet Conventions, the listing of families by the Mexican Convention without identifying particular species within
those families and without explicitly excluding non-native species, provides
MBTA protection for all species and subspecies within those families regardless
of whether they are native to the United States or North America.
Under the Ninth Circuit's Dunkle analysis, the Mexican Convention may be
the most restrictive in that it arguably protects the broadest scope of birds, and
the regulations therefore must be compatible with those restrictive terms. On the
other hand, the Soviet Convention requires the parties to control the "establishment in the wild of live animals ...

that may be harmful to migratory birds or

their environment. .... Such harmful animals commonly include non-native species of birds that compete with native species for resources within the same
ecological niche. Thus, reading the Mexican Convention to protect non-native
species of listed families of migratory birds, even if harmful to native species,
would create a conflict with the Soviet Convention. Such a situation arose with
the mute swan in the Chesapeake Bay.
The mute swan is a non-native, introduced species of Anatidae,'" a family
listed in the Mexican Convention.' "The mute swan occup[ies] habitat and consume[s] food used by migratory, endangered, and threatened species, which the
federal government is obligated to preserve ..... Control of mute swans is thus
called for under the express terms of the Soviet Convention. To effectively implement that intent and the provisions of all of the Conventions, the MBTA
regulatory provision relied upon by the Ninth Circuit should be read as it is
written, not as the Ninth Circuit interpreted in Dunkle. In other words, regula-

because only some and not all of the Conventions provided for native hunting, the Service could not
enter into the agreements it had made. See id. at 940-41,945.
194. See id. at 941. The Ninth Circuit found the Canadian Convention the most restrictive, and
it did not allow for the out-of-season native hunting at issue. See id. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit
held that the principle of unreviewable enforcement discretion allowed the Service to continue to
decline prosecution of illegal hunting by Alaska natives. See id. at 938. Consequently, the Fish and
Wildlife Service could allow totally uncontrolled illegal hunting but not controlled hunting.
195. See Mexican Convention, supra note 17 art. IV.
196. See Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. I.
197. See Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art. IV.
198. Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art. IV.2(b).
199. See Exhibit I in support of United States Motion for Summary Judgment, Declaration of
Keith M. Weaver [Supervisory Refuge Operations Specialist at the Blackwater National Wildlife
Refuge complex with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service],
5-8, Hill v. Babbitt, Civ. No.
1:99CVO1926 D. D.C. [hereinafter Weaver Declaration].
200. See Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art. IV.
201. Weaver Declaration, supra note 199, at 16.

1999]

SHOCKED, CRUSHED AND POISONED

tions must be "compatible with the terms of the conventions," plural, i.e., all the
Conventions." '
B.

Scope of ProhibitedActivity

A second area of dispute important to those seeking to enforce the MBTA,
and one which has been extensively litigated but not yet resolved, is the precise
scope of activities prohibited by the MBTA. Historically, criminal prosecutions
under the MBTA have focused, as did the original treaties, on hunters, poachers
and other related activities."' Beginning in the 1970's, this began to change.'
Both federal prosecutors and private citizens -' brought cases in which persons or
federal agencies were accused of violating the MBTA through activities such as

202. 16 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. 1998); see also id. § 712(2) (also listing all four conventions);
supra note 192, (discussing secretary's authority under 16 U.S.C. § 712(2) to regulated non-treaty
birds if necessary to implement the Conventions).
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently denied a request to
compel the Secretary of the Interior to list the mute swan as a migratory bird protected under the
MBTA. Hill v. Babbitt, Memorandum Opinion (D. D.C. Civ. No. 1:99CV01926, Sept. 27, 2000).
The court found that the Canadian and Mexican conventions do protect all swans, but that the
Japanese and Soviet treaties do not protect mute swans. See Hill, Memorandum Opinion at 8-10.
Relying on "deductive logic" and a simple hypothetical, the court reasoned that a hypothetical mute
swan migrating from Russia through Canada to the United States would create a conflict between
application of the Russian and Canadian treaties. See id. at 13. The district court treated the conflict
in the treaties as an ambiguity to be analyzed using the two step analysis of Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). See Hill at 11.Reading the law in an
effort to determine Congress's intent, the court did not find persuasive arguments that MBTA
protection is limited to "wild," native birds. See id. at 12-13. Relying instead on the provision
authorizing the Secretary to prescribe hunting regulations, and without further explanation, the court
found the Secretary could reasonably exclude mute swans from MBTA protection. See id. at 13
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 704). The court did not address the Ninth Circuit's Dunkle holding, which
requires application of the most restrictive convention. See Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed'n & Outdoor
Council v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 941 (9th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff in Hill has appealed the
dismissal of her lawsuit. See Joyce T. Hill v. Babbitt, D.C. App. No. 00-5432.
203. See Scott Finet, Habitat Protection and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 10 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 1 (1996).
204. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 174, 196 (arguing that the original intent of the
drafters of the Canadian Convention and of Congress was to protect migratory birds from more than
just hunting and poaching): Mickell Jimenez, Sierra Club v. Martin: The Eleventh Circuit's
Interpretation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 18 J. LAND REsOURCES & ENVTL. L. 159, 160
(1998) ("Congress intended primarily to protect migratory birds from swamp drainage and hunters."
(citing H. R. Rep. No. 64-1430, at 2 (1917)); Steven Margolin. Liability under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 7 ECOLOGY L. Q. 989, 997 n. 72 (1979) (quoting 49 CONG. REC. 1485 (1913)). But see
Benjamin Means, Prohibiting Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited Reach of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 823, 824 (1998) ("This Note argues, however, that the MBTA covers
only activity that is directed at wildlife, and that absent such purposive conduct, no violation
exists."). It should be noted that H.R. Rep. No. 64-1430 incorporated a letter from Secretary of State
Robert Lansing. It is the letter alone that referred to the impact of draining on migratory birds:
"[Tihe extension of agriculture, and particularly the draining on a large scale of swamps and
meadows, together with improved firearms and a vast increase in the number of sportsmen, have so
altered conditions that comparatively few migratory game birds nest within our limits." H.R. Rep.
No. 64-1430, at 2 (1917) (August 17, 1916, letter, Secretary of State Robert Lansing to the President,
submitting the treaty for transmission to the Senate).
205. Issues relating to ability of private citizens to bring suit under the MBTA, either directly or
through the APA, are beyond the scope of this article.
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pesticide use, wastewater discharge, timber harvest, and the maintenance of
power poles. Inextricably intertwined with, and informing the issue of whether
the MBTA addressed such non-hunting, and in some cases indirect, takings, was
the fact that the MBTA is, for such activities, a strict liability statute.2"
1. Must Not Poison
First, a series of cases were decided between 1973 and 1975 in which companies were prosecuted under the MBTA for migratory bird deaths associated
with oil sump pits operated by companies."0 ' The courts regularly found the

206. The MBTA as a strict liability statute was first affirmed in 1939, in United States v. Reese,
27 F. Supp. 833, 835 (W.D. Tenn. 1939), where the court stated:
There appears no sound basis here for an interpretation that the Congress intended
to place upon the Government the extreme difficulty of proving guilty knowledge
of bird baiting on the part of persons violating the express language of the
applicable regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute [MBTA]; but it is more
reasonable to presume that Congress intended to require that hunters shall
investigate at their peril conditions surrounding the fields in which they seek their
quarry.
See Reese, 27 F. Supp. at 835. Since 1939, the federal courts of appeal have almost uniformly held
the misdemeanor provision of the MBTA, Section 707(a), to be a strict liability criminal statute. See
United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Manning, 787
F.2d 431, 435 n.4 (8th Cir. 1986)); United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 1986)
("Scienter is not an element of criminal liability under the Act's misdemeanor provisions");
Manning, 787 F.2d. at 435 n. 4 ("it is not necessary to prove that a defendant violated the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act with specific intent or guilty knowledge."); United States v. Chandler, 753 F.2d 360,
363 (4th Cit. 1985) ("a hunter is strictly liable for shooting on or over a baited area."); United States
v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that "scienter is not required for a
conviction" under the MBTA).
In Morissette v. United States, the Supreme Court discussed reasons for strict criminal
liability for "public welfare offenses"- offenses that "are not in the nature of positive aggressions
or invasions, with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where the
law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
255 (1952).
For policy arguments both for and against strict liability under the MBTA, compare
Margolin, supra note 204, at 996-99, with M. Lanier Woodrum, The Courts Take Flight: Scienter
and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 336 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 241, 250-51 (1979) (arguing that
Congress did not intend the MBTA to impose strict criminal liability). To the extent that Woodrum
argued that Congress did not intend the MBTA to impose strict liability, Congress subsequently
proved Woodrum wrong. See S. REP. No. 99-445, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6113, 6128 (stating that, when Congress added the scienter requirement for MBTA felony offenses,
"[niothing in this amendment is intended to alter the 'strict liability' standard for misdemeanor
prosecutions under 16 U.S.C. § 707(a), a standard which has been upheld in many Federal court
decisions."); S. REP. No. 105-366, at 2 (1998) (when enacting the scienter requirement for baiting
offenses, Congress said, "[tihe elimination of strict liability, however, applies only to hunting with
bait or over baited areas, and is not intended in any way to reflect upon the general application of
strict liability under the MBTA.").
207. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 183-85 (citing United States v. Stuarco Oil Co., 73CR-129 (D. Colo. 1973) (company charged and pled nolo contendere to 17 counts under the MBTA
for deaths of birds resulting from company's failure to build oil sump pits in a manner that could
keep birds away); United States v. Union Tex. Petroleum, 73-CR-127 (D. Colo. 1973) (prosecution
of oil company for maintenance of oil sump pit); United States v. Equity Corp., Cr. 75-51 (D. Utah
1975) (company charged with and plead guilty to 14 counts under the MBTA for deaths of 14 ducks
caused by the company's oil sump pits); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., CR-1-90-8 (N.D. Tex.
May 1, 1990)).
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companies strictly liable for the migratory bird deaths caused by the operation of
these sump pits.Then, in January of 1978, the Eastern District of California, in United States
v. Corbin Farm Service,' expressly found that the MBTA prohibited acts other
than just hunting-related acts and acts specifically intended to kill migratory
birds. In Corbin Farm, the United States charged a pesticide dealer, his employee, an aerial spray operator, and the owner of the field sprayed, with 10
counts for bird deaths resulting from the single application of pesticides to an
alfalfa field."' Pointing to the language in § 703 of the MBTA that it shall be
unlawful at any time, "by any means or in any manner" to take migratory birds,
the court determined that such take by poisoning was a prohibited activity under
the strict liability MBTA misdemeanor take prohibitions."'
In applying the MBTA prohibitions to such indirect poisoning actions, however, the Court, in Corbin Farm, was concerned with the issue of scienter. The
issue was, and remains, that if the MBTA applies to more than just hunting and
poaching, and if it truly provides for strict liability, are there any limits to liability if even the most apparently innocuous action resulted in the take of a migratory bird? Hypotheticals repeatedly heard in this debate include striking a migratory bird while driving a car, or putting a picture window in a building into
which a migratory bird flies."' The District Court in Corbin Farm dealt with
such concerns in part, and significantly, by noting in its discussion that "[w]hen
dealing with pesticides, the public is put on notice that it should exercise care to
prevent injury to the environment and to other persons; a requirement of reasonable care under the circumstances of this case does not offend the
Constitution....3 The court seemed to feel it could borrow from tort law to justify
strict application of the MBTA to various inherently dangerous activities such as

hunting and pesticide poisoning."'

208. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 183-85.
209. 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Ca. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
210. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 515.
211. Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
212. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 192 (referring to a car and building); United States v.
FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978) (referring to a car, plane, and building); Corbin Farm
Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, at 535 (referring to a car); United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n., 45
F.Supp.2d 1070, 1084 (D. Colo. 1999) (quoting Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp.
1559, 1582-83 (S.D. Ind. 1996)).
213. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 536.
214. An issue inherent in many MBTA prosecutions, and particularly those involving less
immediate consequences, such as poisonings, is the determination of the appropriate "unit of
prosecution," e.g., is the number of violations determined by the number of bird deaths, the number
of causative actions, or the number of species taken. See United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 578
F.2d 259, 260 (9th Cir. 1978).
The "unit of prosecution" in different cases has varied; but, in most cases, the
appropriateness of the "unit of prosecution" was not raised. See, e.g., Corbin Farm Serv., 578 F.2d at
260 (providing one count per transaction resulting in bird deaths); FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 903
(noting one count per species per day); United States v. Rogers, 367 F.2d 998, 999 (8th Cir. 1966)
(one count per day); United States v. Stuarco Oil Co., 73-CR-129 (D. Colo. 1973) (one count per
bird); see Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 183-85 (citing United States v. Equity Corp., Cr. 75-51
(D. Utah 1975) (one count per bird)). Compare United States v. Tempotech Indus. Inc., 1996 WL
14056 (2d Cir.) with Jackson v. United States, 517 U.S. 1192 (1996) (describing a Lacey Act
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The following month, the Second Circuit, in United States v. FMC Corpo-

ration,"' used related logic to affirm MBTA misdemeanor convictions for bird
deaths resulting from FMC's discharge of wastewater from pesticide manufacturing into a pond that attracted migratory birds.

"FMC argue[d] that it had no intention to kill birds, that it took no affirmative act to do so, possessed no scienter, and thus should not be held liable under
the Act ..... The court rejected FMC's argument, quoting from Morissette that
"[t]he criminal law may punish 'neglect where the law requires care, or inaction
where it imposes a duty.' 22' Wrestling with the same concerns as the Corbin
Farm court, the Second Circuit took that court's rationale one step further and
analogized expressly to the body of tort law that holds persons engaged in inherently dangerous activities should be held strictly liable for damages caused by
those activities."8 Nonetheless, the court was careful to note that "[i]mposing
strict liability on FMC in this case does not dictate that every death of a bird will
result in imposing strict criminal liability on some party ....
The FMC court also stated, "[c]ertainly construction that would bring every
killing within the statute, such as deaths caused by automobiles, airplanes, plate
glass modern office buildings or picture windows in residential buildings into
which birds fly, would offend reason and common sense. ''2' The court noted
that, in any event, "[s]uch situations properly can be left to the sound discretion
of prosecutors and the courts" and that "an innocent technical violation ... can
be taken care of by the imposition of a small or nominal fine.22
Following the logical progression of these cases, in the early 1990's three
district courts found that cyanide leaching processes, used in mining operations
to extract precious metals, created cyanide-laced tailings or settlings ponds that
prosecution that grouped violations into five counts by year, "[s]o long as the method of aggregating
offenses is reasonable - and here it was, given the ongoing multi-year nature of the scheme - the
govemment need not charge a defendant with the smallest 'unit of prosecution' available.").
Only in Corbin Farm did the court discuss and enter a holding concerning the appropriate
"unit of prosecution." The Ninth Circuit adopted the opinion of the District Court which examined
historical charging practices and legislative history. See Corbin Farm Serv., 578 F.2d at 260; Corbin
Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 527-29, 531. The appropriate "unit of prosecution" remains unsettled,
although the Corbin Farm decisions provide one well-reasoned alternative. For a discussion of the
Corbin Farm decisions' treatment of the "unit of prosecution," see Margolin, supra note 204, at
1001-04.
215. 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
216. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 906.
217. Id. at 907 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952)).
218. See id. (citing Rylands v. Fletcher, Hurl. & C. (1856, L.R. I Ex. 265 (1866), L.R. 3 H.L.
330 (1868)); see also United States v. Van Fossan, 899 F.2d 636, 637-39 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the MBTA prohibited poisoning of migratory birds by strychnine-laced grain). But see, United
States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742, 744-45 (D. Idaho 1989) (where a farmer applied pesticides in
what the court found not to be a reckless manner, the court found that the MBTA was
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the farmer, but not that the MBTA was limited to hunting and
poaching related activities).
219. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 908.
220. Id. at 905.
221. Id. (quoting United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Ky 1939)). But see
Rollins, 706 F. Supp. at 745 ("With deference to the respected tradition of the Second Circuit, a
violation of due process cannot be cured by light punishment.").
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attract and kill migratory birds, thereby exposing operators to criminal liability
under the MBTA."2 Similarly, Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company, owners and operators of the oil tanker Exxon Valdez, were found criminally liable under the MBTA for migratory bird mortalities caused by an accidental oil spill when the vessel ran aground in Prince William Sound and discharged oil.2" In perhaps the most extreme example of an indirect taking, EPA
registration of a pesticide under FIFRA"' was found to have violated the taking
prohibition of the MBTA when migratory birds died from ingestion of strychnine-laced grain."'
One might then conclude that it has been generally established that, scienter
issues notwithstanding, the MBTA prohibition against taking applies to takings
attributable to other than just traditional hunting and poaching activities. This is
not quite so.12

2. Habitat Modification by Timber Harvest-No Problem
In 1991, the first of a series of citizen suit cases held that the MBTA did not
prohibit at least indirect takings resulting from habitat modification caused by
timber harvest. Departing from the inherently dangerous activity type of analysis
used in the poisoning cases, these Courts reasoned primarily that timber activities do not constitute a taking of migratory birds within the meaning of the
MBTA,-' because the MBTA "was intended to apply to individual hunters and
poachers.""' In justifying this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit, in Seattle Audubon,

222. See United States v. Kennecott Communications Corp., No. N-90-16M (D. Nev. Mar. 8,
1990); United States v. Echo Bay Minerals Co., No. CR N-90-52-HDM (D. Nev. 1990); United
States v. Nerco-Delamar Co. (a.k.a Delamar Silver Mine), No. CR 91-032-S-HLR (D. Idaho Apr.
21, 1992).
223. United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A90-015 CR (D. Alaska, sentencing April 24, 1991).
224. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994).
225. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Adm'r EPA, 688 F. Supp. 1334, 1354-55 (D. Mn. 1988),
rev'd on other grounds, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989).
226. See also Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 193-94 (describing possible impact on other
wildlife statutes of construing "kill" or "take" to include negligent or hazardous activity with
foreseeable consequences).
227. In MBTA challenges to timber harvesting, a number of courts have also held that the
MBTA is not applicable to the federal government, but those holdings have recently been called into
question. See cases cited infra note 238. In the closing days of his administration. President Clinton
signed an Executive Order requiring federal agencies to implement the spirit of the MBTA, if not the
letter of the law. See Executive Order No. 13,186, 66 Fed. Reg. 3853 (Jan. 17, 2001) (Section 3(a) of
which requires agencies "taking actions that have, or are likely to have a measurable negative affect
on migratory bird populations" to enter into agreements with the FWS to "promote the consevation
of migratory bird populations").
228. Citizens Interested in Bull Run, Inc. v. Edrington, 781 F. Supp. 1502, 1510 (D. Ore. 1990);
see Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997)
("the ambiguous terms 'take' and 'kill' in 16 U.S.C. § 703 mean 'physical conduct of the sort
engaged in by hunters and poachers') (quoting Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. United States Forest
Serv., 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991)); Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 952 F.2d at 303 (finding that the
MBTA definition of take describes physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers),
cert. granted on other grounds, 501 U.S. 1249 (1991); Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F.
Supp. 1559, 1583 (S.D. Ind. 1996) ("The better reading of the statute is to find that the prohibitions
apply only to activity that is intended to kill or capture birds or to traffic in their bodies and parts.");
Curry v. United States Forest Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541, 549 (W.D. Penn. 1997) ("the loss of
migratory birds as a result of timber sales of the type at issue in this case do not constitute a 'taking'
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found it significant that the definition of take under the MBTA, and thus the
scope of prohibited activity, differs from that set forth in the Endangered Species Act of 1973."' The MBTA definition of take does not include the terms
"harass" and "harm .....
The court reasoned that this difference showed that the
MBTA had not addressed habitat modification problems, unlike the expanded
scope of the ESA that included takes (harassing or harming animals) caused by
habitat modificationY The court made no attempt to reconcile its holding with,
for example, cases where habitat was modified by the introduction of oil instead
of the removal of trees.
3. Must Not Fold, Spindle, or Mutilate the Occupied Tree
Thus, the issue of whether the MBTA applies at least to direct takings
caused by non-hunting related activities, including habitat modification, is still
somewhat open to debate. At least two district courts have found that a violation
of the MBTA would result from timber harvesting, even though it is not a hunting-related activity, but only where the harvesting is demonstrated to directly
kill migratory birds.2 In other words, although the MBTA might be read to not
apply to habitat modification such as timber harvest that indirectly may kill migratory birds, it could prohibit the direct taking of a bird or a nest and eggs even
though they were taken by means of tree-cutting rather than collection or shooting." This rationale comports with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Seattle

or 'killing' within the meaning of the MBTA") (citing Newton County Wildlife Ass'n). "[Tlhe
MBTA applies to activities that are intended to harm birds or to exploit harm to birds, such as
hunting and trapping, and trafficking in birds and bird parts. The MBTA does not apply to other
activities that result in unintended deaths of migratory birds." Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1579. But see
Humane Soc'y v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing without deciding
whether the MIBTA applies to timber harvesting).
229. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
230. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 952 F.2d at 303.
231. See id. Three of the four treaties address the need for refuges and habitat protection. See
Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art. 11.B; Japanese Convention, supra note 18, arts. 111.3, VI;
Soviet Convention, supra note 19, arts. IV, VII. However, the general prohibitions of the MBTA do
not address habitat destruction or preservation. See 16 U.S.C. § 703.
232. See Sierra Club v. Martin, 933 F. Supp. 1559, 1565 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (finding plaintiffs
seeking injunctive relief had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their underlying MBTA
claim, where the Forest Service authorized timber harvest that had been demonstrated would result
in the deaths of thousands of migratory songbirds), reversed on other grounds, 110 F.3d 1551 (11 th
Cir. 1997) (finding the MBTA did not apply to federal government agencies). See also Jimenez,
supra note 204, at 159 (discussing the decision in Sierra Club v. USDA, No. 94-CV-4061-JPG (S.D.
I11.
Sept. 25, 1995), which remanded a Management Plan to the Forest Service for further
consideration of whether the plan would violate the MBTA, where the Plan allowed logging during
the nesting season).
233. See 16 U.S.C. § 703 (stating that it is unlawful to traffic in "any migratory bird, any part,
nest, or egg of such bird, or any product... ");see also Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. V
("The taking of nests or eggs of migratory game or insectivorous or nongame birds shall be
prohibited, .... "); Mexican Convention, supra note 17, art. I.A ("parties agree to establish laws,
[and] regulations... [for] '[t]he establishment of close seasons, which will prohibit ...the taking of
migratory birds, their nests or eggs . .."'); Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. 111.1 ("The
taking of the migratory birds or their eggs shall be prohibited."); Soviet Convention, supra note 19,
art. II.1
("Each Contracting Party shall prohibit the taking of migratory birds, the collection of their
nests and eggs and the disturbance of nesting colonies."). The 1995 Protocol amending the Canadian
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Audubon Society as well. The Ninth Circuit, in Seattle Audubon Society, stated,
"[clourts have held that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act reaches as far as direct,
though unintended, bird poisonings from toxic substances.... Habitat destruction causes 'harm' to the owls under the ESA but does not 'take' them within
the meaning of the MBTA.""'
4. Must Not Shock-Electrocution.
More recently, the issue of the application of the MBTA to non-hunting
activities has been exhaustively analyzed in United States v. Moon Lake Electric
Association.3 ' In Moon Lake the question was whether the MBTA applied to the
deaths of migratory birds that were killed by the defendants' electric power
poles." Deaths of migratory birds due to electric towers, television towers, and
other man-made structures have been documented since the 1950s. In some
incidents thousands of migratory birds have died in a single night from collisions with smokestacks or television towers.' In Moon Lake, a rural electric
distribution cooperative was operating some 2,450 power poles without installing inexpensive equipment on the poles that could have prevented the deaths of
some 38 birds of prey caused by the poles. -"

Convention expands the limited scientific and propagation exceptions to include educational and
other purposes consistent with the principles of the Protocol. See Protocol, supra note 16, art. V.
234. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 952 F.2d at 303 (citations omitted). But see BEAN & ROWLAND,
supranote 11, at 81 (explaining that the basis of the Seattle Audubon Society decision was that "the
conduct simply did not fall within the Treaty Act's prohibitions. The decision thus would appear to
preclude criminal prosecution of a logger or timber company under the Treaty Act even if the logger
or timber company intended to kill birds by logging.").
235. 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999).
236. See Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
237. See John L. Trapp, Bird Kills at Towers And Other Man-Made Structures: An Annotated
Partial Bibliography (1960-1998) (visited Nov. 8, 1999) <http://www.fws.gov/r9mbmo.html>.
238. See Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. One cannot help but wonder whether the outcome
would have been the same had such an inexpensive solution not been available. The government's
prosecution of the electric company in Moon Lake and its defense of the U.S. Forest Service timber
harvest activities (including those that cause direct take) are reconcilable in that it had been the
position of the government (and the prevailing case law) that the MBTA does not apply to the
federal government. See Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551, 1555 (1 1th Cir. 1997) ("The MBTA.
..does not subject the federal government to its prohibitions."); Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v.
United States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating "that MBTA does not appear
to apply to the actions of federal government agencies."); Curry v. United States Forest Serv., 988 F.
Supp. 541, 548 (W.D. Penn. 1997) ("The MBTA, by its plain language, does not subject the federal
government to its prohibitions.").
Whether the government will persist in arguing that the MBTA civil provisions do not
apply to the federal government is uncertain in light of a recent decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Humane Soc'y v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir
2000) (challenge to USDA takings, without a MBTA permit, of specimens of exploding population
of non-migrating Canada geese in the Chesapeake Bay area). The court observed that the
Department of the Interior's longstanding position prior to 1997 had been that the MBTA restricted
federal agencies in the same manner as it restricted private citizens. See Humane Soc'y, 217 F.3d at
884. The court also observed that the USDA did obtain a permit for similar destruction of migratory
birds in other parts of the country, e.g., Puget Sound. See id. at 884 n.2. The court reasoned that
section 703 of the MBTA, which prohibits unpermitted harm to migratory birds, does not turn on the
identity of the perpetrator, e.g., private or federal, and that a suit for injunctive relief would be
appropriate against federal officers to assure compliance with the MBTA. See id. at 885-86. The
court expressly rejected the conclusions of the courts in Newton County and Sierra Club v. Martin
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The Moon Lake Court, like others before it, wrestled with the issue of how
far the strict liability law might reach. However, based on both the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, the District Court in Moon Lake
expressly rejected the limitation used by the Ninth Circuit, i.e., that the MBTA
regulates "only the sort of physical conduct [normally] exhibited by hunters and
poachers... 9 The Moon Lake Court also did not rely on the inherently dangerous
analogy, nor the discretion of prosecutors, to avoid such undesirable results.
Instead, to describe a rational parameter for the MBTA's strict liability misdemeanor, the Court cited the fundamental requirement that the government must
show proximate cause even in strict liability cases."' Thus, the Court reasoned,
"[b]ecause the death of a protected bird is generally not a probable consequence
of driving an automobile, piloting an airplane .... or living in a residential
dwelling with a picture window, such activities would not normally result in
liability under § 707(a) [the MBTA misdemeanor provision], even if such activities would cause the death of protected birds.""'
While the debate continues over the application of the MBTA to activities
beyond the ken of the hunters and poachers of 1918, the proximate cause analysis provided by Moon Lake may be utilized again in the future."'
C. Native American Issues
Another increasingly important issue in enforcing the MBTA is the relationship between the statute and the interests and rights of Native Americans.
1. Rights Under the Conventions.
Three of the four Conventions implemented by the MBTA make some exception for Eskimos, Indians, or indigenous inhabitants. The Canadian Convention states, "Eskimos and Indians may take at any season auks, auklets,
guillemots, murres and puffins, and their eggs, for food and their skins for
clothing, but the birds and eggs so taken shall not be sold for sale .....
The Japanese Convention allows that "[e]xceptions to the prohibition on taking may be
permitted [for] .. .[t]aking by Eskimos, Indians, and indigenous peoples of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for their own food and clothing."'" And the
Soviet Convention similarly provides that, "[e]xception to these prohibitions
may be made ... [flor the taking of migratory birds and the collection of their

eggs by the indigenous inhabitants of ...the State of Alaska for their own nu-

and held that the prohibitions of section 703 do apply to federal agencies. See id. at 888. However,
the court's opinion assumed, for the sake of argument and without deciding, that the criminal
provisions of section 704 would not apply to federal agencies, because that section uses the term
"person" which does not normally include the sovereign. See id. at 886.
239. Moon Lake, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1079.
240. See id. at 1077.
241. Id. at 1085. Under the Endangered Species Act, such unintended takings may be
authorized by an incidental take permit. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994). However, neither the
MBTA nor its implementing regulations contains any similar means for authorizing such incidental
takes.
242. A full analysis of the possible use of this type of proximate cause analysis to provide
logical parameters for the scope of the MBTA appears in a related article in this volume.
243. Canadian Convention, supra note 3, art. 1.3.
244. Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. 1I11 (e).
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tritional and other essential needs ...

during the seasons established ....

In

addition, the recent December 14, 1995 Protocol rewrote the Canadian Convention in order to accommodate the rights of Canadian aboriginal peoples2 and of
indigenous inhabitants of Alaska, both native and non-native Americans. 4
In Alaska Fish and Wildlife Federation and Outdoor Council v. Dunkle,"7
the Ninth Circuit held that any exceptions to the MBTA prohibitions the Secretary of the Interior may create by regulation may be no more permissive than the
most restrictive of the Conventions." The court held that the rights of native
Americans under the Canadian Convention were more restrictive than their
rights under the Soviet Convention. and, consequently, the Secretary of the
Interior could not enter into an agreement that would have allowed native
American residents of Alaska to exercise their hunting rights under the Soviet
Convention."' However, the intent of the drafters of the recent Canadian Protocol, and the intent of the Senate in ratifying it, was clearly to grant special
privileges to residents of Alaska.
2. Rights Under Indian Treaties.
In addition to rights granted by the Conventions, Native Americans prosecuted for wildlife violations can raise defenses based upon alleged exclusive
treaty rights to hunt or fish. Treaty rights can even be raised in the absence of an
express treaty provision.5 ' When treaty rights appear to conflict with a wildlife
statute, courts will try to interpret both so as to avoid conflict and to give effect

to both. However, when treaty rights and a wildlife statute cannot be reconciled,
the issue becomes whether Congress intended enactment of the wildlife statute
to limit or abrogate the existing treaty rights."' In the absence of a clear indica-

tion that Congress intended to abrogate the treaty rights, courts will uphold the

245. Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art. 11.1(c).
246. See Protocol, supra note 16, art. 11.4(a) & (b).
247. 829 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1987); see text, supra Part III.A.2 (Exclusion of Non-Native
Species).
248. See Dunkle, 829 F.2d at 941. In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court has said
that the terms of the Conventions do not carry great weight in interpretation of the MBTA. See
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 62 n.18 (1979) ("But the language of the [Japanese] Convention, like
the terms of the other Conventions, does not carry great weight in the interpretation of the statute.").
In fairness to the Ninth Circuit, it also relied heavily on legislative history that contemplated
amendments to the other Conventions in order to allow the hunting rights Congress recognized in the
Soviet Convention. See Dunkle, 829 F.2d at 940-41 (citing S. REP. No. 1175, 95th Cong., 2d
Session., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 7641; 124 CONG. REC. 31,532 (1978)
(statement by Senator Gravel)). But see Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984) (explaining that the Court may resort to legislative history only if the intent of
the statute is unclear). In addition, the Dunkle court did not find a conflict between the different
conventions but, instead, simply a difference in scope. See Dunkle, 829 F.2d at 941.
249. Although three of the four Conventions make some allowance for native or aboriginal
rights, the Mexican Convention makes none. Consequently, it is unclear how the Ninth Circuit
concluded the Canadian Convention is the most restrictive with respect to Native American hunting
rights. See Dunkle, 829 F.2d at 941 ("The United States-Canada Convention is the most restrictive of
the four treaties, and all of the Secretary's regulations must be in accord with that treaty.").
250. See id. at 945.
251. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) ("These rights need not be expressly
mentioned in the treaty.").
252. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 738-39.
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treaty rights and dismiss the prosecution. The standards used for determining
Congress's intent have varied between and within courts."
There have been instances in which courts have upheld treaty rights to hunt
migratory birds and, consequently, dismissed MBTA prosecutions." ' However,
recent prosecutions under related wildlife statutes have been upheld, since courts
have found that the wildlife statutes abrogated treaty rights." Even in instances
in which courts have upheld treaty rights to hunt migratory birds, some have not
found a right to sell the bird products. 6
3. Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Relevant to all prosecutions, but especially to those against native Americans, is the potential for defenses based on the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA)," which provides that:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except... if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.5 '
Application of RFRA and treaty rights is rapidly evolving and a full discussion of their application is beyond the scope of this article.
D. ExtraterritorialApplication
Another area of significant concern for enforcement efforts is the geographic
scope of the MBTA.
There is no doubt that the restrictions of the MBTA bind all those who act
within United States territory."' At the other end of the spectrum, it seems to be
accepted that the MBTA does not bind foreign nationals acting within foreign
territory.w Questions have arisen, however, when U.S. nationals act within the

253. See id. ("We have enunciated, however, different standards over the years for determining
how such a clear and plain intent must be demonstrated.").
254. See United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 664-65 (D. Minn. 1991) (confirming that
the Chippewa enjoy the treaty right to sell migratory bird feathers); United States v. Cutler, 37 F.
Supp. 724, 725 (D. Idaho 1941) (confirming that the Shoshone and Bannock enjoy the treaty right to
kill migratory birds).
255. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 743-46 (holding that the Bald Eagle Protection Act abrogated treaty
rights, so that treaty rights could not be asserted against prosecution under either the Eagle
Protection Act or the Endangered Species Act).
256. See United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Yankton
Sioux), rev'd on relatedgrounds, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-bb-4 (1994).
258. Id. § 2000bb- I(a)-(b).
259. United States territory, for this purpose, is most conservatively defined to include a
marginal belt of the sea extending outward from the coastline three nautical miles. However, an
executive proclamation states the zone could extend outward from the coastline for twenty-four
geographical miles. Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (1999).
260. In some limited cases, United States criminal jurisdiction has been found in instances
involving a foreign national acting in a foreign territory. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8,
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territory of foreign sovereigns, and when acts occur outside the territory of any
sovereign, e.g., on the high seas or in Antarctica.
1. Legal Framework for Determining Extraterritorial Application.
Generally, "Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. Whether Congress has in fact exercised that
authority... is a matter of statutory construction."'
As a matter of statutory construction, it is presumed that Congress has not
exercised its authority to apply legislation beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States."' The primary purpose of this presumption has been described
as protecting "against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other
nations which could result in international discord."6 '

The presumption can be overcome with regard to criminal statutes if (1) a
clear expression of contrary intent appears in the legislation, or (2) the statute
belongs to a particular class of statutes the nature of which inherently requires
its application beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This special class of statutes has been described as those:
which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the
government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the
government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers, or agents.
Some such offenses ... are such that to limit their locus to the strictly
territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily
by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at
committed
'
home."

While on its face the class of statutes described in Bowman appears fairly
restrictive, subsequent decisions by Circuit Courts of Appeals have interpreted
Bowman liberally to allow extraterritorial application either where the govern-

9-11 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding jurisdiction where foreign national made false statements in her visa
application, because such actions have potentially adverse effects upon security of governmental
functions); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 548-50 (9th Cir. 1961) (finding jurisdiction in
relation to visa fraud due to adverse effect produced by alien's entry into the United States).
One might argue that the taking of a migratory bird by a foreign national in a foreign
territory, so that the bird consequently does not migrate back into the United States, would similarly
produce a sufficient domestic adverse effect to support extraterritorial application, particularly where
the foreign territory was also a signatory to one of the bilateral migratory bird treaties and thus
already committed to maintaining the migratory bird populations for both nations to enjoy. But see
United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding sovereigns generally enjoy
control over the natural resources within their territories and the exploitation thereof).
261. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citations omitted).
262. See Arabian, 499 U.S. at 248; Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952) ("the
legislation of Congress will not extend beyond the boundaries of the United States unless a contrary
legislative intent appears"); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) ("legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States"); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (recognizing presumption of
territorial jurisdiction with regard to crimes against private individuals or their property).
263. Arabian, 499 U.S. at 248.
264. Id.
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ment's own interests are at stake or where the nature of the offense would appear to require, as a practical matter, extraterritorial application for effective
25
enforcement.
Overlaid on this two-part analysis are considerations of fundamental principles of international law. Three tenets of international law commonly are cited
in relation to considerations of extraterritoriality. First, citizenship alone is a
"relationship sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction" by a sovereign." '
Second, any exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable with respect to a person
or activity "having connections with another state ..... And third, "a sovereign
may regulate the ships under its flag and the conduct of its citizens while on
those ships .....

2. When In Rome...
The question of whether the MBTA applies to U.S. nationals acting within a
foreign territory was the subject of a Solicitor's Opinion dated December 11,
1980."' In a four-page summary opinion, the Office of the Solicitor opined that
the fundamental prohibitions of the MBTA do not apply to U.S. nationals acting
within foreign territories. Using a Bowman-based analysis, the Solicitor found
that because the underlying migratory bird treaties contemplated that each
country would enact implementing legislation, and because persons of any nationality would be bound by that implementing legislation when inside the territory of another party, a lack of extraterritorial application of the MBTA would
not curtail the scope or usefulness of the MBTA."7 ° This rationale also implicates
a basic premise behind the presumption against extraterritoriality. That is, particularly where the foreign sovereign has its own statutes addressing the very
conduct at issue, extraterritorial application may cause discord if the United
States were to attempt to enforce its own implementing legislation to actions
taken within the foreign sovereign's territory. Moreover, the opinion concluded,
there is no clear expression of Congressional intent to the contrary to be found
within the MBTA.27 Thus, the general presumption against extraterritorial application is not overcome.

265. See United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The nature of the
enactment here in question mandates an extraterritorial application under the second category
described in Bowman"); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1990).
266. United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1001 (5th Cir. 1977).
267. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403(1) (1987).
268. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922) (noting U.S. ships on the high seas are
constructively a part of the territory of the United States); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 502 (1986); Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935) (setting forth five fundamental
bases in international law for extraterritorial jurisdiction: (1) territorial; (2) national (sovereign's own
citizens); (3) universal (physical custody of perpetrator of universally abhorrent crime such as
terrorism); (4) passive personal (based on nationality of the person injured); and (5) protective
(based on actions at issue having potential adverse effects on security or governmental functions)).
269. See Solicitor's Opinion re Extraterritorial Application of Section 2 of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, December 11, 1980.
270. See id. at 3-4.
271. Seeid.at4.
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Significantly, the Opinion noted that, under the Soviet Convention, the parties could, by mutual agreement, "designate areas of special importance to the
conservation of migratory birds outside the areas under their jurisdiction," and
that they would attempt to ensure that their citizens, or those subject to their
jurisdiction, would act in accordance with the principles of the treaty in relation
to those areas."' Were the parties to designate such areas, which to date they
have not, the opinion acknowledges that arguably the MBTA would apply to
acts of U.S. citizens within those areas. The opinion does not state on what basis
such extraterritorial application would be extended. Perhaps it would simply be
because one would expect any such designation to include a clear expression
from Congress on this issue. Or perhaps the intent of the Soviet Convention
Treaty alone would lead to this conclusion, as will be explored further below.
The position that the MBTA does not apply to U.S. citizens when they are
acting in foreign territory is also supported by a 1977 decision in which the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the moratorium provision of the Marine Mammal Protection Act did not apply to United States citizens acting in the
waters of a foreign sovereign and in accordance with that sovereign's statutes.2 7 '
The Fifth Circuit cited many of the considerations relied upon by the Solicitor's
Memorandum. The authors have found no information indicating any significant
continuing dissent from the conclusion reached in the 1980 Solicitor's Memorandum regarding this issue."'
3. When In Limbo...
a. The Crisis
An entirely different equation comes into play when dealing with the actions
of persons, both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals, in areas such as the high
seas, Antarctica, or the Exclusively Economic Zones ("EEZ"), that are neither
U.S. territory per se, nor the territory of foreign sovereigns. 7 ' The stakes for this
issue are quite high both for migratory birds and for fishermen because a significant number of migratory bird deaths occur in conjunction with ocean fishing
activities.
For example, it has been documented that sixty-one species of birds have
been killed by long-line fisheries when they attempt to eat bait.7 Of these species, twenty-five have been accorded "threatened" status by the World Conservation Union as either critically endangered, endangered or vulnerable.7' It has
also been documented that populations of southern albatross have been declining

272. Soviet Convention, supra note 19, at art. IV, para. 3.
273. See United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
274. But see, supra note 260.
275. It is quite possible for a statute to have extraterritorial application in some circumstances
but not in others. For example, a statute that Congress explicitly states is applicable on the high seas,
may still, lacking a further explicit statement, not be applicable in a foreign territory. This results
from the differing degrees of incursion on foreign sovereignty implicated in the different
circumstances.
276. Interview with Al M. Manville II, Ph.D., Wildlife Biologist, Office of Migratory Bird
Management, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (Feb. 10, 2000) (referencing Constituent Briefing: U.S.
National Plan of Action for the Reduction of Incidental Catch of Seabirds in the Longline Fisheries,
National Marine Fisheries Service (Jan. 19, 2000)).
277. Id.
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in direct correlation to long-line fishing efforts in the southern ocean fisheries
and these incidental takes are considered incompatible with a sustainable southern albatross population.' The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service stated that a conservative estimate of the number of seabirds taken worldwide in long-line fisheries alone in a given year is in the hundreds of thousands.27"
b. The Existing Policy
The first time the Solicitor's Office addressed this broader issue of extraterritorial application in areas outside of any particular sovereign's territory, it was
not analyzed in depth. Instead, the Solicitor issued a four-page Memorandum in
early 1981 that relied on its 1980 Memorandum. This 1981 Memorandum erroneously represented that the earlier Opinion addressed the more general issue of
any extraterritorial application of the MBTA, not just its application to acts that
occur in foreign territory.2"
Like the 1980 Memorandum, the 1981 Memorandum was initiated primarily
to address only a very narrow issue-the application of the MBTA to foreign
nationals acting outside of United States territory. Also like the 1980 Memorandum, the 1981 Memorandum noted one possible indicia of at least some extraterritorial application; it acknowledged that the Negotiation Report from the
American Delegation for the Soviet Convention stated that "it was the intention
of the 'American negotiators to have this Convention apply to the fifty states
(including the high seas out to the 200 mile limit).....
.But the Memorandum
went on to conclude that there is nothing in the legislation that indicates this
intention was carried out by Congress and concluded that an individual violating
the MBTA outside the jurisdiction of the United States could not be prosecuted
by the United States.' :
c. The Future as Congress Intended
In fact, the issue of extraterritorial application of the MBTA, particularly to
U.S. citizens within territories for which there is no sovereign power, is not so

278. Id.; Nigel G. Brothers, et al., The Incidental Catch of Seabirds by Longline Fisheries:
Worldwide Review and Technical Guidelines for Mitigation, Food and Agriculture Organization,
Fisheries Circular No. 937 (1999).
279. Id.
280. Memorandum from Assistant Solicitor, Fish and Wildlife, to Office of Migratory Bird
Management, Fish and Wildlife Service dated March 27, 1981 ("In a December 11,1980, memo to
the Chief, Division of Law Enforcement, from the Assistant Solicitor, Fish and Wildlife, we pointed
out that section 2 [16 U.S.C. § 703] of the MBTA does not apply extraterritorially. In other words,
an individual (including a United States citizen) violating the MBTA outside the jurisdiction of the
United States could not be prosecuted by the United States.").
A third Solicitor's Memorandum dated October 6, 1987, concluded that the Presidential
Proclamation that established the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone did not alter the 1980 and
1981 conclusions that the MBTA does not apply extraterritorially. Memorandum from Charles P.
Raynor, Assistant Solicitor, to Frank Dunkle, Director, Fish and Wildlife Service dated October 6,
1987.
281. Memorandum from Assistant Solicitor, Fish and Wildlife, to Mark Schaffer, Office of
Migratory Bird Management, Fish and Wildlife Service pg. 3 n.2 (March 27, 1981).
282. See id. (mentioning a State Department "informal opinion" indicating that agency's belief
that jurisdiction extended only to the territorial seas).
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clear cut as one might imagine from the brief Solicitor's Opinion. Both from a
legal and a pragmatic perspective, the MBTA should be found to apply at least
as to U.S. citizens and U.S. flag vessels acting within areas outside of any foreign territory.
i. CongressionalIntent
Congress did not include within the MBTA any explicit general statement of
congressional intent with regard to the extraterritorial application of the MBTA.
Parts of the MBTA and references to the MBTA in subsequent legislation, however, weigh in favor of finding at least limited extraterritorial application.
First, the legislation itself provides that it "shall be unlawful to ship, transport, or carry, by any mean whatsoever, .. . to or through a foreign country, any
bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof' which was taken, or transported at any
time in violation of the laws of the State, Territory, or district in which it was
taken or from which it was shipped.285 In other words, if a bird is taken in violation of a State law, and then carried by another individual through Brazil, that
act of carriage through Brazil is illegal under the MBTA. This appears on its
face to be an explicit extraterritorial application of the MBTA.
This provision of the MBTA addresses actions involving a bird illegally
taken within the United States. While indicative of an intent to apply at least
parts of the MBTA extraterritorially, this raises at least two questions: (1) why
did Congress specify that carriage through a foreign country, which implicates
direct sovereignty issues, is illegal while not explicitly addressing the issue of
such carriage on the high seas or at least within the EEZ; and (2) did Congress
mean to apply the statute extraterritorially only where the bird in question was
illegally obtained in the United States originally, thus indicating that a bird taken
outside of the United States would not be covered by the MBTA?
In the absence of any discernable reason to distinguish carriage through a
foreign country from carriage through a global commons in this circumstance,
the Congressional intent that at least Section 705 be given extraterritorial applications should be read to extend to all extraterritorial areas since Congress has
stated that it should apply in what is normally the most limited circumstance for
extraterritorial application. As to the second question, additional light may be
shed on this by reference to a second expression of Congressional intent regarding the MBTA.
In the recently enacted Antarctic Conservation Act," Congress specifically
provided that a criminal conviction under that Act, which covers only actions in
the Antarctic, "shall not be deemed to preclude a conviction for such an act under any other law, including, but not limited to, the Marine Mammal Protection
Act (MMPA) of 1972, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act. 2. The MMPA and the ESA expressly prohibit takings of marine mammals and endangered species, respectively, within the United States, its

283.

16 U.S.C. § 705 (1994) (emphasis added).

284.

16 U.S.C. §§ 2403-12 (1988).

285.

The Antarctic Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 2408(c) (1994) (emphasis in original).
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territorial seas, and on the high seas.28 Antarctica has been commonly equated
with the global commons of the high seas. ' If Congress did not intend the
MBTA to have at least extraterritorial application as far as Antarctica and the
high seas, this statutory language would become superfluous, violating another
basic tenet of statutory construction.
Thus, the express language of both the MBTA and the Antarctic Conservation Act supports an interpretation that (1) the MBTA "take" prohibitions under
Section 703 were intended to apply within the United States and areas that are
not subject to another sovereign, including Antarctica and on U.S. flagged ships
on the high seas; and (2) the MBTA transport prohibitions under Section 705
were intended to apply even within foreign territories to the extent that the birds
at issue were illegally handled in the first instance within the United States.
ii. Nature of the Statute
Even if the intent of Congress were not clear, under Bowman and its progeny, the nature of the MBTA appears to require, as a practical matter, extraterritorial application for effective enforcement.
The migratory birds at issue by their very nature are frequently found outside the territorial extent of the United States. One oft-cited example is the
northern fulmar which spends the vast majority of its time on the high seas, only
returning to land to nest, typically on lands outside the territorial limits of the
United States. If the MBTA were effective only as to actions taken within the
territorial limits of the United States, it would afford virtually no protection for
the northern fulmar, to which the MBTA expressly applies." ' Similarly, both the
Japan and Soviet Conventions protect only birds that migrate between those
countries and the United States."9 Neither of these countries share with the
United States a land border, or an extensive border between territorial waters.
Since the migration therefore requires that the birds fly over international waters, a failure to apply the MBTA within these waters will result in a significant
gap in the protection of the birds covered by these treaties. Since "[t]he natural
inference from the character of the offense is that the sea would be a probable
place for its commission", ' it must be concluded that Congress intended the
MBTA to apply beyond the territorial United States.
Moreover, as noted above, the necessity of extraterritorial application is
underscored by the language of the Soviet Convention, discussed above, that
286. See 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(1)-(2) (1994) (addressing Marine Mammal Protection); 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538(a)(1)(B),(C) (1994) (addressing Endangered Species); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d
996, 997, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that Congress did not intend the MMPA moratorium
provisions to apply within foreign territories and acknowledging the intended application of the
MMPA's prohibition provisions to the high seas).
287. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting
Executive Order 12114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980) and giving both Antarctica and the oceans as examples
of "the global commons outside the jurisdiction of any nation").
288. 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1998) (listing the Northern Fulmar as a migratory bird protected under
the MBTA).
289. See Japanese Convention, supra note 18, art. I. I.A; Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art.
1.I.A.
290. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 99 (1922).
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contemplates the designation of areas of special conservation importance outside
the jurisdiction of either nation, in which their citizens would be bound by the
principles of the treaty. 9' The mere fact that the MBTA is the implementing
statute of four international agreements reflects the necessity of international
cooperation and enforcement to carry out its purpose.
iii. InternationalLaw Issues
The basic principles of international law further support the application of
the MBTA in areas that are not subject to another sovereign, and to actions involving birds illegally handled in the first instance within the United States.
International law supports the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the United
States over its own citizens, wherever they may be found. International law further supports the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the United States over
United States' flagged ships. Furthermore, it is "reasonable" for a sovereign to
exercise jurisdiction over persons in other sovereign territories where the individual possesses or controls an item previously rendered contraband within the
territory of the United States.92
Most cases that address the issue of whether a statute has extraterritorial
application where Congress has not specifically so stated are (1) fact-specific
and (2) pragmatic, recognizing basic tenets of international law and diplomacy.
One can view the cases as a sliding scale. At one extreme are cases where the
nature of the statute and the facts presented do not seem to require or contemplate extraterritorial application while to find such extraterritorial application
would likely cause significant international tensions.' At the other extreme are
cases where the nature of the statute and the facts appear to demand extraterritorial application and international repercussions are likely to be nonexistent."
The MBTA falls into this latter end of the scale.
IV. CONCLUSION

While the MBTA has been in effect for close to a century, its mandates have
become increasingly significant, and controversial, as the protection of migratory birds runs into conflict with activities and appurtenances of modem society
that did not exist, or were not so prevalent, when the Act was passed. The extent
and importance of the MBTA's prohibitions, particularly their application to
situations outside the context of domestic hunting, is just now being appreciated,
as are the profound impacts that such non-hunting activities have on the natural
resource that the MBTA, and its underlying treaties, are intended to protect and
perpetuate. But while the applications may be novel, the purpose of the prohibitions remains exactly the same - preservation of migratory birds.

291. Soviet Convention, supra note 19, art. IV.3.
292. See United States v. McRary, 665 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding extraterritorial
application of federal kidnapping statute justified where victim was taken within United States
territory before being transported in foreign commerce).
293. See EEOC v. Arabian Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (finding Title VII does not apply to
U.S. citizens working in foreign territories).
294. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding extraterritorial
application for false statements made in the context of applying for a visa at a U.S. consulate).
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The question now will be whether or not just human utilization of, but also
human impacts upon the migratory birds will be controlled under the MBTA.
The courts have and will continue to provide some interpretive guidance on
issues such as extraterritorial application, protected species, and the scope of the
strict liability taking prohibitions. Ultimately the Secretary of the Interior,
through the FWS, or the legislature may also be called upon to address at least
some of these issues.

COMMENT

TREATY FISHING RIGHTS AND INDIAN PARTICIPATION IN
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
For centuries before the Europeans came upon North America, the rivers met the needs of the salmon and the salmon met the needs of the
Indian. The tribes and the salmon had benefited from this partnership,
secure in their adaptation to the environment and to each other. The Indians knew they had to protect the quality of the rivers. Under conditions of abundance, their religious and technological precautions ensured perpetuation of the fish.'
INTRODUCTION

From 1854 to 1855 the territorial Governor of Washington, Isaac Stevens,'
negotiated a series of treaties ("The Stevens Treaties" or "Treaties") with the
Indians then inhabiting the Pacific Northwest region west of the Cascade
Mountains and north of the Columbia River.' The Stevens Treaties cleared the
way for white settlement of the area. Stevens and the Indians negotiated these
Treaties at arms length, not as between a conqueror and the conquered.' Both
sides specified prerequisites for agreement. The Indians demanded guaranteed,
undiminished access to the salmon; Stevens required land for white settlement.
Stevens understood well the fishing needs of the Indians, and the language of the

1. Fay G. Cohen, Treaties on Trial 29 (1986).
2. President Pierce appointed the Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens, and Stevens also served
as the Indian Superintendent of Indian Affairs. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Rights and
the National Forests: The Case of the Aboroginal Lands of the Nez Perce Tribe, 34 IDAHO L. REV.
435, 436 (1998).
3. See Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132; Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan.
22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927; Treaty of Point no Point, Jan. 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933; Treaty of Neah Bay,
Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty of Walla-Walla Valley, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951; Treaty of
Olympia, July 1, 1855, 12 Stat. 971.
4. See Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 675 (1979) [hereinafter Fishing Vessel]; see also Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 436-39 (describing
the negotiating skill of the Nez Perce and the strong arm tactics of Governor Stevens). Initially, the
United States negotiated all Indian treaties at arms length, and each treaty truly represented the
wishes of the parties. But, after the war of 1812, the United States began to exert its superior military
force to the detriment of the Indians. Treaties made during this period more closely resemble
adhesion contracts than arms length negotiations. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote three decisions
that formed the basis of Indian treaty interpretation, and helped bring the treaty result, but not the
process, back to even keel. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
Later Supreme Court decisions further supported Chief Justice Marshall's vision of "domestic
dependent nations." See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (stating that the
Indian tribes are communities dependent on the United States); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681,
684-85 (1942) (noting that it is the United States' responsibility "to protect the interests of a
dependent people").
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Treaties clearly reflected that understanding.! In the Treaties, Stevens gained
vast quantities of Indian land for white settlement in exchange for the Indians'
continued access to tribal fishing grounds, small tracks of retained land, and
occasionally money.'
Each of the Stevens Treaties used essentially identical language to memorialize off-reservation Indian fishing rights: "The right of taking fish at all usual
and accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the territory."7 The fishing communities in the Pacific
Northwest, composed of both Indians and non-Indians have debated the meaning of these words since the early 1900's. At various times, the United States
Supreme Court has attempted to quell the debate. The Supreme Court's decisions provided that a reviewing court has a duty to interpret the Treaty language,
specifically the phrases "usual and accustomed" and "in common with the citizens," to effectuate the parties' intent at the moment of treaty formation Arguably those instructions have simply added uncertainty, as little evidence exists
regarding the parties' intent at the time of treaty formation.
In effect, the Supreme Court determined the parties' intent by considering
the parties' reasonable expectations.! Plainly read, the Treaties' language guarantees to the Indians access to their historic fishing grounds, and fish sufficient
to sustain their subsistence and commercial needs. By their nature, the Treaties
immediately fulfilled the United States' rights, but not the Indians.' The United
States frustrated the Indians reasonable expectations of continued access to fish
by actively contributing to the decline of salmon populations. As salmon stocks
have declined the Indians have been forced to forgo their treaty-based expectations and share in the consequences of white settlement."
Recent interpretations of the Treaties justify, if not demand, Indian participation in a host of salmon planning and conservation activities, including
habitat preservation" and international fisheries management." Yet, these decisions do not comport with the reasonable expectations of either the United States

5.
6.
7.
8.

See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676.
See id. at 676-77.
Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra note 2, art. Im.
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675.

9. The phrase 'reasonable expectations" is a term of art borrowed from the law of close

corporations. See David C. Crago, Fiduciary Duties and Reasonable Expectations: Cash-Out
Mergers in Close Corporations,49 OK. L. REV. 1, 1 (1996). Due to the nature of close corporations
(e.g., only a few shareholders who generally derive their income from their participation in running
the corporation), the majority shareholders may not act to frustrate the "reasonable expectations" of
the minority shareholders. "Reasonable expectations" typically include a voice in management of the
corporation and a reasonable return on investment. See id. The comparison is particularly close here,
as the Indians reasonable treaty expectations included continued access to the fish, and now Indians
enjoy a voice in management of the salmon fisheries. See infra Part HI.
10. Immediately prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Fishing Vessel, the Indian's take of
salmon represented approximately two percent of the total harvest. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at
677 n.22.
11. See Michael C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the Endangered Species Act,
Lessonsfrom the Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REV. 519 (1999) (investigating the affect of listing
salmon as endangered species on fisheries management decisions).
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or the Indians. When Stevens negotiated the treaties, neither party anticipated
the need to manage the salmon, as the fish abundantly populated the Northwest's rivers. 3 The courts now attempt to safeguard the Indians' reasonable expectations of continued access to fish by mandating division of harvestable fish,
and, at least in part, Indian participation in fisheries management decisions.
This Comment considers the United States' attempts to manage pacific
salmon in light of its statutory requirements and the Indians' fishing rights. Part
I briefly describes the nature of the relationship between the United States and
the Northwest Indians. Part II outlines Indian fishing rights in the Northwest as
decided by the Supreme Court and two federal district courts. Part III outlines
pertinent Unites States' domestic and international obligations, and considers
Indian participation in international fisheries management. Part IV discusses
Indian participation in fisheries management decisions in the context of the
mechanisms discussed in Parts II and III. It continues with a brief discussion of
why Indian involvement may rest on a discretionary foundation. Finally, Part V
concludes that continued Indian participation in fisheries management decisions
benefits the overall salmon population.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIANS IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST

Salmon are anadromous fish." As such fish, they hatch in the clear, clean
headwaters of mountain streams, migrate to the ocean to grow to adults, and
then return to their hatching location to spawn and die.' Salmon require five
things to perpetuate the species: access to and from the ocean; fresh water of a
certain quality and quantity; clean gravel beds for spawning and hatching; food;
and protective cover." Taking too many salmon from one returning run means
that fewer salmon will reach their hatching grounds to spawn, and consequently
fewer of the offspring will return.
The Northwest Indians require salmon for survival today, just as they did in
1854 and 1855 when Stevens negotiated the Treaties. When the Indians fished
the Northwest's rivers alone, they harvested only the salmon they needed for
subsistence and trading. 7 In fact, salmon and Indian life in the Pacific Northwest
continue to be inseparable." The Indians rely now as they did in the 1800s on
salmon for subsistence, commercial livelihood, and religious rituals.' Because of
12. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 692 n.31 (noting that the International Pacific Salmon
Fisheries Commission may promulgate special Indian regulations).
13. See id. at 669.
14. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 20.
15. There are five species of salmon (the Chinook, Coho, Chum, Pink, and Sockeye) and the
steelhead. The steelhead is actually an ocean trout. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 25. Unlike the
salmon that return to their native stream once to spawn and die, the steelhead may return to spawn
two or three times before death. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 20.
16. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 28.
17. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 24.
18. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 20-23; see also United States v. Wahington, 384 F. Supp.
312, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("One common cultural characteristic among all of the Indians was the
almost universal dependence upon the products of an aquatic community.").
19. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 20-25; see also Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 665-66;
Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 350.
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their dependence, the Indians take great care not to pollute the rivers and to fish
responsibly. 0 In the past, the Indians often opened traps and nets to release back
the salmon they caught, and "once the Indians had met their needs, they stopped
fishing."2' Each season, Indians performed elaborate religious ceremonies intended to ensure the salmon would return.2
White settlement in the Pacific Northwest during the late nineteenth century
contributed to a drastic decline in salmon populations for several reasons." First,
the population infusion simply meant more fishermen chased an essentially
fixed number of fish. Second, technological advances in fishing allowed fishermen to more efficiently remove salmon from the rivers and ocean. Third, the
recently perfected canning process expanded the salmon market beyond the
immediate vicinity of the Columbia River Basin. Finally, environmental factors, such as timber harvesting and dam building, depleted the habitat available
for salmon spawning.'
President Pierce empowered Governor Stevens to negotiate treaties with the
Indians,"0 and by 1854, the United States Supreme Court had judicially legitimized federal control over the Indians through the Commerce Clause and the
theory of "discovery and conquest."27 The courts have traditionally recognized
four sources of federal power over Indian tribes, two based in the Constitution
and two developed through the common law. The Commerce"' and Treaty
Clauses' form the Constitutional power, while the discovery' and trust responsibility' doctrines form the common law power. The Supremacy Clause 2 also
plays a significant role, but is not a direct source of federal power over Indian
tribes. Instead, it gives treaties and other federal legislation effect. Today, the
Federal Government exercises power over Indian tribes primarily through the
Commerce Clause and trust responsibility doctrine.
The Commerce Clause states, "Congress shall have Power ... to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."3' The Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause to

20.

See

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

COHEN, supra note 1, at 25.
COHEN, supra note 1, at 24
See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S at 668-69.
See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 352.
See COHEN, supra note 1, at 45-48.
See Act of March 3, 1852, 10 Stat. 226, 238.

COHEN,

supra note 1, at 24.

27. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 587-88 (1823); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-60 (1832).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I1,§ 2.
30. The discovery doctrine was first outlined by Chief Justice Marshall in M'Intosh, when he
stated that "Conquest gives a title the courts of the conqueror cannot deny .... " Johnson, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat) at 588.
31.

See generally FELIX COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 220-21

(Rennard Strickland, et al. eds., 1982) (hereinafter FELIX COHEN).
32.

U.S. CONST. art. VI.

33.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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help define the unique relationship between Indians and the United States, and
to deny foreign nation status to the Indians.' Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia declared that the Commerce Clause "clearly contradistinguished [Indians] ... to themselves ... .'
The Commerce Clause grants Congress plenary power over Indians.'
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia recognized the legal relationship between the
United States and the Indian tribes. It described Indian tribes as "denominated
domestic dependent nations ... [whose] relation to the United States resembles
that of a ward to his guardian."" The Commerce and Supremacy Clause's combined effect denies the power of state law in Indian country."
The nature of the "domestic dependent" relationship and formal promises
made by the United States gave rise to the trust responsibility doctrine." The
Supreme Court characterized the trust responsibility relationship as a fiduciary

duty, a special duty of protection, and a moral obligation." Formal promises in
treaties and other official United States actions made the trust responsibility
doctrine a moral imperative.' For instance, the Stevens Treaties promised the
Indians a perpetual home and access to the salmon in exchange for vast amounts
of land. These promises created a trust relationship." In practice, the trust relationship makes the United States act to enforce its treaty obligations against the
states, and serves as a check on federal mismanagement of tribal assets or bad
faith with regard to other federal authority."
The United States formalized its early relationship with Indians using treaties, as the federal government envisioned Indian tribes as independent, sovereign nations." Like other treaties, these "essentially [formed] a contract between

34. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 1 (1831).
35. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18.
36. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378
(1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); see also FELIX COHEN, supra note 31, at
217 (explaining that "[pilenary does not mean 'absolute' in the sense that it may be exercised free of
constitutional limits or judicial review").
37. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 pet.) at 17.
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1984) (defining "Indian country" as all land within the limits of a
reservation, all dependent Indian communities, and all Indian allotments).
39. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18. For a detailed discussion of the trust
responsibility doctrine, see generally FELIX COHEN, supra note 31, at 220-21; STEVEN L. PEVAR,
THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 26-33 (2d ed. 1992), Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial
Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
40. See, e.g., Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384; Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27-28
(1886); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S.
206, 225-26 (1983).
41. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time is
That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601, 614-15 (1975) (stating the trust relationship can develop through
treaties, executive orders, agreements, statutes, and withdrawals by the Secretary of the Interior).
42. See PEVAR, supra note 39, at 26; See also Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 41, at 614.
43. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1545, 1585 (1996).
44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, grants the President power to make treaties with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate. However, in 1871 Congress passed a law prohibiting further
treaty making with the Indian Tribes. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1995).
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two sovereign nations."' Governor Stevens efficiently negotiated these treaties
with the Pacific Northwest Indian tribes. In his first year, Stevens secured millions of acres of land for white settlement." In exchange for Indian land, Stevens' treaties promised perpetual, undisturbed rights to reserved portions of land
(the Indian reservations), and "[tihe right [to take] fish at [the] usual... grounds
... in common with all the citizens of the [t]erritory... and of erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing [the fish] ..... .Stevens knew the tribes
would not agree to a treaty without specific guarantees of fishing rights, and he
intended to give those rights to them."
The Supreme Court established the so-called "cannons of treaty interpretation" out of the trust responsibility relationship." These canons guide judicial
interpretation of treaty language, essentially demanding that ambiguity be resolved liberally for the Indians," in terms favorable to the Indians," and in a
manner understood by the Indians." Still, the Supreme Court held that Congress
may use its plenary power over the Indians to abrogate treaty promises when
they clearly evince such an intention." The courts, however, will not lightly
assume that Congress acted to abrogated Indian treaty rights."
Using the cannons of treaty interpretation, the Supreme Court determined
that Indian treaties actually granted rights from the Indians to the United States,
and not from the United States to the Indians." The rights forfeited in treaties
simply derived from a larger, pre-existing body of inherent Indian rights." So,
treaties reserved to the Indians those rights not explicitly described or limited by
treaty."
II. NORTHWEST INDIAN TREATY FISHING RIGHTS AS DEVELOPED THROUGH THE
COURTS
A series of six Supreme Court decisions decided between 1905 and 1979
interpreted the measure and scope of Indian fishing rights encompassed in the
language of the Stevens Treaties." Through an examination of these decisions

45. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)).
46. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 666.
47. Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra note 3, art. III.
48. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 666 n.9.
49. See FELIX COHEN, supra note 3 1, at 221.
50. See Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).
51. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
52. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675-76; Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631
(1970); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 582 (1832).
53. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
54. See FELIX COHEN, supra note 31, at 222-23; Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 690.
55. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
56. See generally id.
57. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
58. In chronological order, the decisions discussed include: United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.
371 (1905), Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942), Puyallup Tribe v. Washington, 391 U.S. 392
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and a few additional, this section describes the rights retained by the Indians
after the Stevens Treaties. Those rights allow Indians to cross and temporarily
use private property to exercise the federally protected off-reservation fishing
rights, rights which they share with the citizens of the Pacific Northwest states.
A state may only limit the Indian rights through reasonable regulations, specifically necessary, and targeted for conservation.
Indian participation in fisheries management decisions became necessary,
because the last of the decisions discussed herein entitled the Indians to a significant portion of the harvestable salmon. Indian participation became necessary to meet Indians' reasonable expectations secured by treaty, to ensure the
salmon's survival, and to recognize private fishing interests. The cases not only
established the breadth of Indian fishing rights with respect to state regulation
and private property rights, but as set out below, they also provided the foundation and rationale for Indian participation in fisheries management decisions at
all levels.
A. From Winans to Puyallup III
The United States Supreme Court first construed the Stevens Treaty language in United States v. Winans." There, the United States sought to enjoin
Winans, a white settler, from excluding Yakima Indians from his property. The
United States asserted that the Winans' land bordered one of the Indians "usual
and accustomed" fishing grounds as provided by treaty, and as such, Winans
could not prevent the Indians from fishing in the area.' Winans had erected a
fishing wheel' in the Columbia River adjacent to his property under a license
issued by the State of Washington. The wheel so efficiently caught fish that it
effectively prevented the Indians from exercising their treaty rights. Winans
asserted that the treaty language, "the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with the citizens of the territory[,]" conferred no
greater rights than those enjoyed by any other citizen whose land bordered the
6
river. '

The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that the treaty language preserved
for the Indians a non-exclusive, off-reservation fishing right, which held greater
significance than that asserted by Winans." The Court explained that an Indian
fishing right reserved in the Stevens Treaty was tantamount to an easement.' It

(1968), Washington v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973), Puyallup Tribe v. Washington, 433 U.S.
165 (1977), Wahington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979).
59. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
60. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 380.
61. A fishing wheel resembles a Ferris wheel. It removes fish from a stream with great
efficiency. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 189 (1992). It may be
mounted either to the side of the river or on a floating platform. See id. It has a series of buckets
mounted about is circumference, and the river's current keeps it spinning. See id. If mounted in a
fortuitous location, it can scoop out great quantities of salmon. See id. One fishing wheel in 1906
was reported to remove 417,000 tons of salmon in one year. See id.
62. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 379.
63. Seeid. at 381.
64. See id. at 381.384.
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reserved to the Indians the right to cross and occupy private land' to the extent
the Indians needed access for fishing and erecting temporary shelters to cure
their catch.' The Indians could assert this right against the United States and
subsequent grantees.'
Unfortunately for the Yakimas and other Northwest Indians, the Winans
decision was flawed in a manner not immediately apparent. In the dicta following the denial of Winans' claim, the court professed an unsupported and therefore unsubstantiated grant of power to the states to regulate the Indians' offreservation treaty fishing rights."
In Tulee v. Washington,6" the Supreme Court did little more than solidify its
dicta announcement in Winans by holding that a state could regulate Indian
fishing rights for conservation purposes. The state of Washington charged and
convicted a Yakima Indian of netting salmon without a fishing license." Washington asserted that its power to conserve fish and game permitted it to require a
license of the Indian plaintiff." The State of Washington argued that the license
requirements were not inapposite to the Yakima's treaty rights, since the requirements were not discriminatory." The Court decided Washington could
regulate the "time and manner of fishing outside the reservation as... necessary
for the conservation of fish," but it may not charge a license fee. 3 The court
found the license fee, as applied, was "not indispensable to the effectiveness of a
state conservation program," but impermissibly limited a federal right.'
In a series of three Puyallup" decisions dating from 1968 to 1977, the Court
further honed its interpretation of Stevens Treaty language. In Puyallup I,
Washington" contested the Indian's refusal to adhere to off-reservation, statefishing regulations. The regulation at issue prescribed fishing for steelhead trout
only recreationally with hooks and not commercially with nets. 7 The Indians
'

65. Winans is distinguished from Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919), the
subsequent Supreme Court case to interpret Stevens' treaty language, by the character of the land
involved. In both cases the Yakima Indians asserted their fishing rights. See Seufert, 249 U.S. at 19596; Winans, 198 U.S. at 377. Winans' land was previously ceded to the United States by treaty with
the Yakimas. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 377. The land in Seufert belonged to another tribe. See
Seufert, 249 U.S. at 197. In Seufert, the Court held the Stevens' treaty language also retained for the
Yakimas the right to fish. Id. at 199.
66. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
67. See id. at 381-82.
68. See id. at 384 (stating: "Nor does it restrain the state unreasonably, if at all, in the
regulation of the right" to regulate Indian fishing).
69. 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
70. See Tulee, 315 U.S. at 682.
71. See id. at 683.
72. See id. at 683-84.
73. Id. at 684.
74. Id. at 685.
75. Puyallup Tribe v. Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) [hereinafter Puyallup 1]; Washington
v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) [hereinafter Puyallup II]; Puyallup Tribe v. Washington, 433
U.S. 165 (1977) [hereinafter Puyallup III].
76. The Department of Game regulates the steelhead fishery, while the Department of
Fisheries regulates the salmon fishing. See Puyallup 11, 414 U.S. at 46.
77. See Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. at 396.
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targeted by the State of Washington used nets for commercial fishing from before the date of the treaty to the time of the suit." The Court reiterated the Winans dicta ratified by Tulee, and held that the state's police power allowed nondiscriminatory regulation of off-reservation Indian treaty fishing rights to the
extent necessary for conservation, provided the regulations met appropriate
standards. ' The court's holding foreclosed the state's ability to charge treaty
Indians a fee to exercise their treaty fishing right.' The Court declined to decide
whether the state may properly prohibit Indian net fishing in the name of conservation, as the lower state court had not collected sufficient evidence to decide
whether the net prohibition was a "'reasonable and necessary' conservation
measure. ... ""
The Court, however, concluded that any final determination of the conservation question must be shaped to give meaning to the phrase "in common with"
as used in the Treaties. 2 In other words, the Court limited state regulatory powers over off-reservation Indian fishing to those actions that do not completely
frustrate off-reservation Indian fishing rights in the name of conservation. Impliedly, the Court would find any state conservation regulation that completely
eliminated net fishing for salmon improper.
In Puyallup II, the Court again considered the permissibility of Washington's regulation of off-reservation Indian fishing in the context of a prohibition
on using nets for steelhead fishing." The Court considered whether the blanket
prohibition on nets discriminatorily affected Indians, as the regulation seemingly
apportioned the entire steelhead run to sport fishermen as Indians did not fish by
hook." Based on Washington's allocation of some, albeit limited, fish to sport
fishermen, the Court found Washington's regulations discriminatory ." In other
words, because Washington permitted limited fishing, some fish were available,
and the Indians must be given their share. The Court declined to definitively
divide the take between sport and net fishermen, as that exercise involved impermissible fact-finding." Therefore, it remanded the case to the trial court for an
expert apportionment between Indian-net and sport-hook fishermen." The
Court's holding recognized sufficient state police power to apportion the fish
and to prevent the fish's extinction by net fishing. The Court stated that the

78. See id.
79. See id. at 398-99 (indicating that the state may not "qualify" the Indians' right to fish,
"[b]ut the manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing and the like
may be regulated ...in the interest of conservation").
80. See id. at 399.
81. Id. at 401 (citing Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 422 P.2d 754, 764 (Wash.
1967)).
82. Id. at 403 (reiterating the Stevens treaty language "The right of taking fish at all usual and
accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the
territory") (emphasis added).
83. See Puyallup II,
414 U.S. at 46.
84. See id. at 46-47.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 48-49.
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treaty did not "give the Indians a federal right to pursue the last living steelhead
until it enters their nets." 8"
On remand of Puyallup H, the Washington State Supreme Court heard expert testimony and issued an order that apportioned the steelhead between the
Indians and the sport fishermen." This state court order set the stage for the last
of the Puyallup decisions, Puyallup III.' After struggling with sovereign immunity issues, the Court, in Puyallup III, narrowed the question to whether the state
could regulate on-reservation Indian fishing rights for conservation purposes.'
This differs from the previous cases, as the other cases involved state regulation
of off-reservation fishing rights. The Court examined the nature of Indian reservations in light of the treaty language " and the allotment program, " and decided
that on-reservation state regulation was necessary to give effect to Washington's
overall steelhead conservation programY Therefore, where the Indian's onreservation actions could completely frustrate statewide conservation programs,"
the Court permitted state regulation."
B. Sohappy v. Smith"7
In Sohappy, the Indian plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court against the
State of Oregon Fish and Game Commission," seeking a decree to define "their

88. Id.
89. See Puyallup 111, 433 U.S. at 172 (explaining the case history).
90. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
91. See Puyallup 111, 433 U.S. at 165.
92. Article II of the Treaty of Medicine Creek, the subject treaty, states "the Puyallup
Reservation was to be 'set apart, and so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out for their
exclusive use' .... " See id. (citing Treaty of Medicine Creek, Mar. 3 1893, art. i, 10 Stat. 1132).
93. The General Allotment Act of 1887 (the Dawes Act) 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381(1983)). The Dawes Act required the
President to allot Indian reservation lands to the Indians with the excess available for white
settlement or purchase by the federal government. The federal government held land allotted to the
Indians in trust for 25 years, when it was then available for patent to the Indians. The Indians could
either retain the land or sell it as any other landowner could. The Dawes Act was an assimilative tool
meant to "civilize" the Indians and make farmers of them. In fact it succeeded only to the extent that
reservations were settled by whites, and Indian land base was further eroded. See FELIX COHEN,
supra note 31, at 130-31. The Court in Puyallup 111 found it persuasive that, after the allotments, the
extent of the land in trust status amounted to only 22 of the previous 18,000-acre reservation, and
none bordered the Puyallup river. See Puyallup 111, 433 U.S. at 174.
94. See Puyallup 111, 433 U.S. at 175.
95. See id. at 176.
96. The question of state regulation of on-reservation fishing rights is not completely settled.
Here, the original reservation was substantially diminished from the original 18,000 acres, and none
of the remaining trust land was located adjacent to the river. In 1980, the Supreme Court decided
that Indians could not regulate non-Indian fishing on allotted land located within the reservation. See
generally Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1980) (noting that although this decision speaks
to Indian regulation of non-Indian fishing on privately owned land within the reservation, it also
approves state regulation of fishing on reservation land).
97. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969). This case properly fits in chronological order between
Puyallup I and 11. It is included because here to help unify the Puyallup decisions, and because it
was cited approvingly by Judge Boldt in his decision that follows. See infra notes 104-107, and
accompanying text.
98. Sohappy, 302 F. Supp at 903.
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treaty right 'of taking fish at the usual and accustomed places' on the Columbia
River" within the context of existing state regulations." Citing with approval
Puyallup I, the court reasoned that state regulation of off-reservation Indian
fishing rights must fulfill three requirements. The regulations must: (1) be necessary for conservation; (2) not discriminate against Indians; and (3) meet "appropriate standards."'" The court distinguished state regulation of non-Indian
fishermen from treaty Indian fishermen by holding that: "The state may not
qualify the federal right by subordinating it to some other state objective or policy. It may use its police power only to the extent necessary to prevent ...
[practices]... that... imperil the continued existence of the fish resource .....
This restricted regulatory authority is distinct from the power a state wields
over non-Indian fishing rights, which is limited only by the state's organic legislation and the reasonableness standards of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" In
effect, Sohappy made Oregon consider the Indian fishing community as a regulated body outside the previously existing sport and commercial fisheries. Sohappy is particularly instructive here, because it interpreted the Stevens treaty
language to ensure the Indians a "fair share" of salmon. '
C. United States v. Washington"
In United States v. Washington, the United States brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief to settle the Indians' off-reservation treaty fishing
rights. By joining all interested parties and seeking jurisdiction to decide all
related claims, Senior District Judge Boldt intended to resolve the Indian fishing
question once and for all.'"' From extremely comprehensive historical evidence
supported by expert testimony and pertinent constitutional, statutory, and common law, Judge Boldt interpreted the Stevens treaty language"' with all possible
deference to the Indians."'' Judge Boldt fundamentally based his decision on the

99. Id. (quoting the Stevens treaty language).
100. Id. at 907.
101. Id. at 908.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 911.
104. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974). This case properly fits in chronological order
between Puyallup II and III. It is discussed here to give unity to the Puyallup decisions and to better
lead into the discussion of the subsequent and final Supreme Court ruling on the Stevens treaty
language.
105. At this point, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled favorably for state regulation of onreservation fishing as necessary for conservation. See supra notes 89-96, and accompanying text.
106. See supra, notes 39-43, and accompanying text. The Treaty of Medicine Creek is typical
of the language in all II treaties under consideration in Fishing Vessel.
107. In fact, Judge Boldt desired to go even further, but was restrained by precedent. The
decision analyzed a state's right to regulate off-reservation fishing consistent with the police power
used to regulate non-Indian fishing. See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 334. Judge Boldt concluded the
state's authority to regulate off-reservation Indian fishing was derived from dicta first appearing in
Ward v.Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896). See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 335. Apparently the
Supreme Court carried that dicta through subsequent decisions without constitutional or statutory
justification. Judge Boldt expressed concern regarding a state's ability to control a federal right
without express delegation of such power. See id. at 337. Despite these concerns, precedent
demanded that Judge Boldt hold that a state may regulate Indian off-reservation fishing where such
regulation is strictly limited to measures "reasonable and necessary to prevent demonstrable harm to
the actual conservation of fish." Id. at 342. The court further defined reasonable and necessary

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:2

difference between pre-existing, inherent Indian right, ' and a privilege regulated
by the state pursuant to its police power. Practically, the decision fulfilled the
Indian's reasonable expectations they held when they signed the treaty. It
granted the Indians unobstructed access to salmon and a specific quantity of
salmon. Further, by specifically granting Indians half of the available fish and
not just an ambiguous right to fish, the decision mandated that Indians be
granted a voice in fisheries management. The only way that non-Indians could
now increase the size of their catch was to increase the overall number of
salmon available. Since Indians now controlled half of the fish, their participation was essential.
In the context of history and the law, the decision systematically described
the meaning of the treaty phrase, "[tihe right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common
with all citizens of the territory .... '"' Judge Boldt decided the phrase guaranteed the Indians off-reservation fishing essentially everywhere."' The right was
subject to only very narrow state regulation," and its measure amounted to the
opportunity"' to take up to fifty percent of the "harvestable fish .... This fifty
percent dedicated to the tribe did not include fish required for personal subsistence or ceremonial purposes, as those purposes were "special" and "distinct"
from commercial purposes." Also, the Indians' harvestable portion did not in-

within the context of the state regulation to mean "appropriate to its purpose ... and essential to
conservation." Id. The court also required hearings with meaningful Indian participation prior to
affecting state regulation of Indian off-reservation fishing rights. The decision found that the state
had the burden of proof regarding reasonable and necessary. See id.
108. It is convenient to think of Indian fishing "rights" like the "right" to free speech
guaranteed in the First Amendment. Read carefully, the First Amendment does not grant a right, but
restricts congressional power. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech...
." U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The Amendment implies an inherent freedom that may not be abridged,
absent another constitutional amendment. Similarly, the Court interpreted Indian treaties as a grant
of rights from the tribe to the United States. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
As such, the treaty phrase "the right of taking fish at all usual ... places ... in common with the
citizens of the territory[,] .... " implies a grant of rights to the citizens, with the Indians retaining an
inherent right to fish. It is the citizens' powers that are qualified and not the Indians' rights. Like the
First amendment, a clear expression is necessary for congress to abrogate a right.
109. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 331 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
110. See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 332.
Ill. See id. at 342.
112. Mandating that granting the Indians a right to 50% of the harvestable fish would be
paramount to establishing a property right in free swimming fish. By couching the Indians' rights in
terms of an opportunity, the court preserves the long established belief that wild animals do not
become property until reduced to possession. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 526-27 (1896).
113. See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 343. Harvestable fish is a term of art defined by Judge
Boldt as that quantity of fish available for catching by all fishermen. See id. It is calculated by
subtracting from the entire number of fish in a run destined for the Indians' usual and accustomed
fishing grounds, the number of fish required for "spawning escapement and tribal needs." See id.
Essentially the harvestable fish are those fish at least partially under state control. See id. at 343.
114. See id. at 343. No court has addressed the Indian take in terms of the Indians' right to a
quantity, other than a portion of fish. Granted, fish runs vary from year to year, but when the Indians
signed the treaty they surely envisioned, at a minimum, they would retain their then existing
lifestyle. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 616 (1983); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564, 576 (1908) (extrapolating that the treaty should reserve to the Indians an amount of fish
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clude the fish taken by Indians on the reservation.'" Finally, Judge Bolt's decision mandated that Washington use its position on the International Pacific
Salmon Fisheries Commission to promote Indian fishing rights."' As discussed
below, Ninth Circuit's'" and Supreme Court's indirect review left Judge Boldt's
decision substantially intact.
D. Washington v. Washington Commercial PassengerFishing Vessel Association"'
In Fishing Vessel, the Supreme Court indirectly reviewed Judge Boldt's
decision, and largely vindicated tribal fishing rights. This most recent Supreme
Court review of Stevens' treaty language, holds that the language "the right of
taking fish" intended to secure in the Indians not merely equal access to fishing,
but a specific share of the harvestable fish that pass through tribal fishing
areas."' The Court interpreted the right as a specific share, because of the predictable quantities of fish associated with anadromous fish runs."' This case
succinctly summarized the parties' intentions under the Stevens Treaties as follows:
Nontreaty fishermen may not rely on property law concepts, devices
such as the fish wheel, license fees, or general regulations to deprive
the Indians of a fair share of the relevant runs of anadromous fish in the
case area. Nor may treaty fishermen rely on their exclusive right of access to the reservations to destroy the rights of other "citizens of the territory." Both sides have a right, secured by treaty, to take a fair share of
the available fish. That, we think, is what the parties to the treaty intended when they secured to the Indians the right of taking fish in
common with other citizens."'
The court concluded that the harvestable portion of the fish should be
equally divided between treaty and non-treaty fishermen, and that the half allocated to the Indians represented a maximum."' If less than half sufficiently provided ' the Indians with a "moderate living,"'".. then that amount constituted their
take."

necessary to sustain a moderate living, and that the balance of the harvestable portion would be
available for non-treaty fishermen).
115. See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 344.
116. See id. This requirement is necessary to ensure the harvestable fish include all those
destined for the Indians' "usual and accustomed grounds and stations." See id.at 343.
117. The Ninth Circuit's review modified Judge Boldt's holding in one respect. It indicated any
"equitable adjustment" made to the Indians' share of the harvestable portion of fish should not
consider those fish taken by fishermen outside Washington's jurisdictional reach. See United States
v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975).
118. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
119. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 679.
120. See id. at 678 & 663. The Court equated management of anadromous fisheries to farming
because of the predictable harvest associated with both endeavors. See id at 663.
121. Id. at 684-85.
122. See id. at 685-86.
123. The Supreme Court based this moderate living concept on one of its previous cases where
an Indian treaty was interpreted to reserve sufficient water for the Indians to make a moderate living.
See Arizona v.California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
124. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 685.
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The Court's decision differed from Judge Boldt's in two respects, and both
reduced the Indian's take. First, the Court did not exclude from the Indians'
treaty share those fish caught on the reservation."' In so holding, the Court alluded to Puyallup III, where it allowed on-reservation state regulation where
necessary to prevent frustration of a statewide conservation plan.'26 Second, the
Court ruled that fish caught for subsistence or ceremonial purposes counted
against the tribes' allocation in the same manner as fish caught for commercial
purposes. 7
With the exception of state regulation over Indian fishing both on and off the
reservation, the Court's interpretation of the Stevens treaty language preserved
the tribe's reasonable expectations at the treaty's inception. ' Fundamentally, the
Indians' reasonably expected access to usual and accustomed fishing grounds
and an opportunity to catch a specific portion of the fish. In 1854, neither party
envisioned the current decline in the salmon population. Further, because the
Court allocated to the Indians a significant portion of the salmon run year in and
year out, the decision cemented the necessity for Indian participation in fisheries
management decisions. With the treaty obligations of each party outlined, the
next section presents the mechanisms for Indian participation in fisheries management and comments on the continuing nature of their participation.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE EFFORTS TO INCLUDE INDIANS IN FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
The Indians occupy important decision-making positions in both domestic
and international fisheries management. Domestically, Congress first formally
included Indians in fisheries management decisions when it passed two pieces of
important legislation, the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,2
and the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act. ' "
Internationally, the United States recognized Indian interests in multilateral and
bilateral agreements, including the Law of the Sea, and its Straddling Stock and
Highly Migratory Fish agreement, and the Pacific Salmon treaties with Canada.
This section briefly outlines pertinent sections these acts and agreements and
comments on Indian participation in fisheries management decisions related to
each.
A. The Fishery Conservation and ManagementAct of 1976
Congress took its first step to revitalize the diminishing salmon stocks by
enacting the Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) or Magnuson
125.
126.
127.

See id.
at 687.
See id. at 687 n.28.
See id. at 688-89.

128. Indian treaties are likened to adhesion contracts-liberally construed in favor of the
weaker party. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 41, at 617. "The goal is to achieve the
reasonable expectations of the weaker party." Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 41, at 617-18.
129. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1994). Commonly known as the Magnuson Act for Washington
Senator Warren Magnuson, the Act's chief sponsor. See Charles F. Wilkinson & Daniel Keith
Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of a Transboundary
Common PropertyResource, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 17,48-49 (1983).
130. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1994).
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Act. The FCMA, a controversial piece of legislation, established a "fishery conservation zone" extending 200 nautical miles "from the baseline from which the
territorial sea is measured."' Prior to 1976, the United States asserted jurisdiction over fishing only within the limits of the territorial sea. The FMCA granted
the United States exclusive management authority over all fish' 2 within this
extended "fishery conservation zone, ....
and regulated salmon even beyond the
limits of the "fishery conservation zone.""
In recognition of the anadromous nature of salmon, Congress opted to regulate their entire migratory range. Accordingly, through the FCMA, Congress
gave the United States exclusive management authority over all anadromous fish
originating in the United States and throughout their migratory range.' This
comprehensive management scheme effectively prevented foreign fishing vessels from taking salmon just outside the "fishery conservation zone," which
frustrated domestic conservation measures."' By asserting management authority
throughout the salmon's entire migratory range, Congress acted outside the existing boundaries of international law."' Congress restrained its vigor authority,
however, by not extending jurisdiction under the FMCA into "any foreign nation's territorial sea or fishery conservation zone (or the equivalent), to the extent... recognized by the United States.' 3.
The FCMA established eight regional fisheries councils under the supervision of the federal government. ' FMCA provisions tasked each council with
preparing management plans, which regulated fisheries under each council's
control, consistent with the FMCA's national standards."' These plans were
adopted in a manner similar to federal agency rulemaking procedures, and included notice, public Comment, and publication in the federal register."' The
FCMA guaranteed Indian participation in fisheries management decisions
through an Indian position on the appropriate councils."'

131.
16 U.S.C. § 1811. The territorial sea extends three nautical miles from the shore. See
Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 129, at 49. Warren Magnuson asserts that extending the United
States' regulatory authority to 200 nautical miles helped establish a new rule of customary
international law. See Warren Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and ManagementAct of 1976:
FirstStep Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries,52 WASH. L. REV. 427, 427 (1977).
132. The United States does not have management authority over "highly migratory species of
tuna." 16 U.S.C. § 1812.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 129, at 51.
137. See Wilkinson & Conner, Supra note 129, at 51.
138. See 16 U.S.C. § 1812.
139. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 129, at 52. The two councils concerned with salmon
resources are the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, and the Pacific Fishery Management
Council. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 129, at 52. The Pacific council was granted
responsibility for managaging of salmon originating within California, Oregon, Washington, and
Idaho. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (a)(6).
140. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (g)-(h).
141. See id. §§ 1852 (h)(3) & 1855(c)(3)(A).
142. See id. § 1852 (b).
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B. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planningand ConservationAct"'
In 1980, Congress enacted the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act (the Act). Through the Act, Congress melded the hydroelectric power generation reality of the Columbia River Basin with the conservation goals for anadromous fish. The Act intended to "protect, mitigate, and enhance the fish and wildlife, including related spawning grounds and habitat, of
the Columbia River and its tributaries, particularly anadromous fish... which
are dependent on suitable environmental conditions substantially obtainable
from management ...

of the Federal Columbia River Power System ..

.

Prior to passage of the Act, the Federal Columbia River Power System did not
bear the destructive cost of the salmon fishery wrought by federal dam building,
nor was it passed to the power consumers. Instead, the federal government externalized the cost.'5 The Act internalized this cost by providing, among other
things, water-releases to meet fish preservation and mitigation needs.'"
Significant to the discussion here, the Act created the Northwest Power
Planning Council."' The Northwest Power Planning Council effectively removed
fisheries management decisions from those with significant interests in the
power industry."' Eight members, two each from Washington, Oregon, Idaho,
and Montana composed the Council.' 9 The Act charged the Council with developing and implementing a comprehensive fish plan, consistent with the purposes
of the Act.'5 ' The Act ensured Indian participation in the rulemaking process
through explicit designation of notice and Comment by Indian tribes prior to
rule adoption.''

143. 16 U.S.C. 9§ 839-839h (1994).
144. Id. § 839(6).
145. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 129, at 55. Cost externalization is a common pool
problem described by Hardin in his article on the tragedy of the commons. See Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 168 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). A tragedy of the commons occurs where
a common resource is open to all. In this case, fishing is open to all. The ability of the resource (fish)
to sustain itself is limited by its capacity for reproduction. Each fishermen wants to maximize his
profit. To do this, each must take as many fish as possible. There is no incentive to decrease the
fishing take, because a fish lost to one fishermen is one gained by another. Eventually the number of
fish taken exceeds the fish's capacity to reproduce. When this occurs, the entire resource declines,
and may eventually be lost.
146. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 129, at 55. See also 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(ii).
Releasing water from behind the Columbia River dams has at least two significant effects. First, it
provides additional water flow to ease the salmon's upstream spawning run, and second, it forgoes
the electric power generation potential of the water, thereby externalizing the cost of power
generation.
147. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2)(A).
148. See Wilkinson & Conner, supranote 129, at 55-56.
149. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2).
150. See id. § 839b(h)(1 1)(A).
151. See id. § 839b(h)(4)(A).
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C. The Law of the Sea"2
In 1982, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). Articles 55 through 75 of the UNCLOS describe the rights and
duties of states (countries) with regard to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
UNCLOS defines the EEZ as extending "200 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.'.. Within the EEZ, the
coastal state enjoys exclusive rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage
the living and non-living natural resources within the seabed and superjacent
water." The coastal state determines the allowable fish catch within the EEZ, '
and promotes optimum utilization of the resource." Articles 63 and 64 provide
for coordination among states where fish stocks occur within, or migrate through
the EEZ of more than one state.
The UNCLOS gives special consideration to anadromous fish species. Article 66 grants primary responsibility for anadromous fish species to their country
of origin."7 The UNCLOS requires states of origin to conserve and to regulate
anadromous fish in the area landward of the outer limit of its EEZ."' The UNCLOS encourages coordination between interested states in their regulation of
the overall catch of anadromous fish, even where the fish occurred outside a
state's EEZ.' The UNCLOS also asks the states where anadromous fish originate and other interested states to implement fisheries regulations through regional organization."' The UNCLOS does not provide an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with the state of origins' regulations, but instead it
advocates for coordination between affected states."'
In 1993, the U.N. Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks met to consider current conservation and management provisions
outlined in the UNCLOS."' The Conference intended to improve cooperation
and communication between states that managing straddling and highly migratory fish stocks." The Conference produced the Fish Stock Agreement, a binding treaty."

152. See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. Sales No.
E.83.V.5 (1983) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
153. See UNCLOS art. 57.
154. See id. at art. 56.
155. See id. at art. 61.
156. See id. at art. 62.
157. See id. at art. 66 § 1.
158. See id. § 2.
159. See id. § 3. See also Karol de Zwager Brown, Truce in the Salmon War: Alternatives for
the Pacific Salmon Treaty, 74 WASH. L. REV. 605,617 (1999) (describing the UNCLOS).
160. See UNCLOS art. 66 § 5.
161. See id. at art. 66 § 3(d).
162. See Julie R. Mack, InternationalFisheries Management: How the U.N. Conference on
Straddlingand Highly MigratoryFish Stocks Changes the Law of Fishingon the High Seas, 26 CAL.
W. INT'L L. J.313, 324-25 (1996).
163. See Brown, supra note 159, at 618.
164. Brown, supra note 159, at 619. Apparently there was initial disagreement between Canada
and the United States whether as tothe conference should result in a binding or non-binding treaty. In
the end, Canada succeeded, and the conference adopted a binding treaty. See The Implementation of
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The Fish Stock Treaty accomplished its objectives through existing or newly
created regional management organizations."' The treaty required all "real interest."" states to become members of the appropriate regional organization, lest
they be banned from fishing the regulated stocks in the subject region."' The
treaty tasked regional organizations with identifying stocks within their region
and adopting regulations after considering the specific characteristics of the
region. ' State members of the regional organizations were granted power to
enforce regulations on the high seas within their region against non-members.
Enforcement mechanisms included powers to board, to inspect, and possibly to
order offending vessels to the nearest port."' The Fish Stock Treaty intended to
develop and enforce high-seas fishing regulations. Indians participate in international fisheries management decisions under the Law of the Sea and its associated treaties through their participation on the council established under the
FMCA. '
D. Pacific Salmon Treaty
In 1985, the United States and Canada reached an agreement to jointly manage the pacific salmon originating within their rivers."M This treaty was recently
amended in 1999.72 The treaty provided guidelines for managing six fisheries,
some by the fish's area of origination, others by species of fish."' Two governing
principles gave the treaty form-the conservation and equity principles.'" The
conservation principle demanded that "each party shall 'prevent overfishing and
The equity principle gave
provide for the optimum production' of salmon .....
each country "benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its
waters."...

the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea relating to Fish Stocks, Dec. 4, 1995, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.164/37 (1995) [hereinafter Fish Stock Treaty]. The Fish Stock Treaty does not
become effective until ratified by 30 states. Currently 59 states are signatories and 24 have ratified it,
including both the United States and Canada. See <http//www.un.org/depts/los/los/164st.htm>.
165. See Mack, supra note 162, at 326. Some of these organizations were created as suggested
in UNCLOS, art. 66 § 5, or they were already in existence.
166. A state with a "real interest" is defined as a state fishing for straddling or migratory fish
stocks regulated by a regional organization or fishing in the region. See Fish Stock Treaty art. 8 § 3.
167. See id. at art. 8 § 4.
168. Seeid. atart.8§ 1.
169. See id. at art. 21.
170. See supranotes, 131 -142 and accompanying text.
171. Treaty with Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan. 28, 1985, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No.
11,091, at 7 (entered into force Mar. 18, 1985) [hereinafter Pacific Salmon Treaty]. For a detailed
discussion of various aspects of the treaty, see Brown, supra note 159. The treaty was necessary
because, despite domestic efforts to rejuvenate the salmon population, Canada intercepted a
significant number of salmon as they passed the Canadian coast bound for Alaska. See WILKINSON,
supra note 61, at 213.
172. See Treaty with Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan. 28, 1985, U.S.-Can., 1999
U.S.T. 112 (entered into force June 30, 1999).
173. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 171, T.I.A.S. No. 11,091, at 17-30.
174. See Brown, supranote 159, at 626.
175. Brown, supra note 159, at 626; see also Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 171, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,091, at 7.
176. Brown, supra note 147, at 626; see also Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 171, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,091, at 7.
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Indian tribes played a significant role throughout the Pacific Salmon treaty
negotiations." The tribes filed suit against the Secretary of the Interior, and the
states of Alaska, Washington, and Oregon as the parties negotiated the treaty."'
The Indians claimed that the federal government and the state governments improperly allocated salmon resources as provided under the treaties negotiated by
Governor Stevens."' Specifically, the tribes demanded that the United States
consider Alaska's take when it determined the harvestable portion of fish.'" That
ongoing lawsuit essentially stalled the treaty negotiations. Neither the United
States nor Canada was willing to enter into a binding treaty before the status of
the tribes' take was reconciled with Alaska."'
The legislation enacted by Congress to implement the Pacific Salmon Treaty
reserved Indian participation in fisheries management. "2 - The implementing legislation established a four-member Commission to represent the United States in
fisheries management decisions."' The legislation provided that one member of
the Commission come from a list of candidates created by the treaty Indian
tribes.'"
IV. CONTINUED INDIAN PARTICIPATION IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Judge Boldt's 1974"' decision sparked Indian inclusion in fisheries management from that point forward. That decision, essentially affirmed two years
later by the United States Supreme Court,"' effectively apportioned half of the
harvestable salmon population to the Indians. Due to the large quantity of fish
now controlled by the Indians, Federal and state governments could no longer
ignore their rights.
In 1976, shortly after Judge Boldt's decision, Congress passed the Magnuson Act, which officially included Indians in federal fisheries management decisions. One of the Magnuson Act's eight regional fisheries management, the
Pacific Fisheries Management Council, developed fisheries management plans
for salmon originating in from California, Washington, Idaho and Oregon. Congress ensured Indian participation in salmon management by guaranteeing that
one member of the Council was an Indian.

177. The Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (CRITFC), a group composed of four
Columbia River tribes, helped bring the parties together for the treaty negotiations. See Brown.
surpa note 159, at 621
178. See Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldrige, 605 F.Supp.
833 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
179. See id.
180.

See Thomas C. Jensen, The United States-CanadaPacific Salmon Interception Treaty: An

Historicaland Legal Overview, 16 ENVTL. L. 363, 398 (1986).
181. See Brown, surpa note 159, at 621. The lawsuit was settled by stipulation. It allocated
salmon migrating off the coast of Alaska between the tribes and other interested parties. See Yakima
Indian Nation, 605 F.Supp. at 834. The stipulation forecloses future lawsuits by the tribes in
exchange for veto power over salmon allocations. Id. at 835-36.
182. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3631-3644 (1994).
183. See id. § 3632(a).
184. See id. The chairmanship of the Commission rotates annually among all the members. Id.
185. See United States v. Washington, 384 F.Supp 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
186. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
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In 1980 and 1985 the federal government again sought to include Indians in
fisheries management decisions. In 1980 Congress passed the Pacific Northwest
Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act. Then, in 1985, the United States
and Canada agreed to the Pacific Salmon Treaty. Both instruments had mechanisms to include Indians in fisheries management decisions. The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act promoted Indian involvement by specifically providing Indian with authority to comment on proposed
rules fisheries conservation rules prior to their adoption. The Pacific Salmon
Treaty gave Indians a voice in fisheries management by mandating that one
member of the enacting Commission be selected from a list provided by the
Indians. So, the federal government involved Indians in fisheries management
decisions on both national and international levels.
Continued Indian participation in fisheries management decisions could
erode as quickly as it arose. Felix Cohen described the change in the federal
government's relationship with Indian tribes using the following words: "Like
the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in
our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our
treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith...
In 1953, through Public Law 280,"' Congress granted certain states criminal
and some civil jurisdiction over Indian and Indian reservations.'" In this manner,
Congress exercised plenary power over the Indian tribes and abrogated treaty
rights. "' In a similar fashion, Congress could grant the entire share of salmon to
commercial fishermen.
In 1996, David Getches"' described the end of the Modem Era" - and the
coming of the new subjectivism in Indian jurisprudence.'9 3 Central to Getches'
thesis that the value of precedent in Indian law was disappearing was a quote
attributed to Justice Antonin Scalia," made as the Justice considered a case involving tribal criminal jurisdiction" ' over non-member Indians.'" Justice Scalia
indicated that in evaluating an Indian law issue, the judiciary decides "what the
current state of affairs ought to be by taking into account all legislation, and the
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congressional 'expectations[;] "' legislation is not essential.? ' Justice Scalia's
statement effectively amounts to a sharing of plenary power'" over Indian affairs
between Congress and the judiciary.
Early Supreme Court decisions gave meaning to the Stevens' treaty language by attempting to effectuate the parties' intent on the date of treaty formation. This line of reasoning reached its zenith with Judge Boldt's 1979 decision
in United States v. Wahington, where the court decided that the Indians' reasonable expectations at the time of treaty formation amounted to a reserved, federally protected right to fifty percent of the harvestable salmon, taken essentially
anywhere. Judge Boldt's decision recognized that since Indians retained a right
to such a large portion of the salmon, their interests in fisheries management
decisions must be represented. And so, the decision mandated that Washington
use its position on an international fisheries counsel to promote Indian fishing
interests. That mandate culminated in the current realities of Indian participation
in fisheries management decisions at all levels. Because the Indians' interests in
the salmon transcends economic concerns, and reside in a religious place where
conservation plays a central role, their involvement in fisheries management
decisions can bring nothing but hope to salmon's future.
V. CONCLUSION

Salmon constitutes big business in the Pacific Northwest. Commercial fishermen from the United States, Canada, and distant nations, take salmon from the
Northwest to worldwide markets. International and domestic agreements recognize the United States' obligation to the Indians, and divide the total take between Indians and non-Indians at roughly fifty-percent. Non-Indian, commercial
fishermen in the United States recognize that their livelihood depends on the
total number of available salmon. The most obvious method to increase the harvestable portion of salmon is to increase their overall population. Since the Indians control half of the harvestable portion of salmon, they occupy and essential
place at the negotiation table.
The nature of salmon migration patterns demands a holistic approach to
fisheries management, and such coordination is difficult given the many jurisdictional boundaries a single migrating salmon passes through.'" Through domestic and international avenues, the United States attempts to manage the
salmon population. The Supreme Court interpreted the Stevens Treaties to grant
fifty-percent of the salmon take to Indian fishermen, and the state may regulate
Indian fishing only to the extent necessary for conservation purposes. Through
Congress and the courts, Indians assert authority over decisions that affect the
entire salmon population. These efforts continue to bolster salmon recovery and
bring salmon management strategies more in line with Indian values. Judge
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Boldt's decision in 1974 not only solidified Indian fishing rights, but also produced a victory for salmon mitigation and conservation efforts.
James T. Johnson*

